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1 
KEY FINDINGS 
 All of our interviewees discussed a shift in the balance of power from law firms to clients, 
represented by the way in which major corporates and financial institutions seek to impose 
their own terms of engagement on law firms. This shift is not necessarily reflected in the 
current SRA approach to regulation, which assumes the law firm is setting its terms of 
engagement.  
 
 We were struck by increased pressure on firms to deliver ‘value for money’ in a competitive 
market. Responding to that pressure may be challenging, but firms, and their lawyers, are 
nevertheless required to comply with their duties and professional obligations.  
 
 Despite around three quarters of interviewees outlining a scenario whereby they are forced to 
accept more and more challenging terms of engagement with little room for discussion, some 
firms routinely push back on terms that they deem unacceptable, and continue to receive 
instructions. We found no correlation between a firm's size or heritage and its ability to resist 
more challenging terms of engagement. 
 
 Clients’ contractual requirements constitute a form of regulation of the law firm by the client. 
This private regulation of the corporate and finance practices of large law firms and their 
corporate finance lawyers via contract has the potential to reduce the distinctiveness of those 
lawyers as legal professionals, such that they are seen as, perceive themselves to be, and begin 
to behave like, mere ‘service providers’.  
 
 The seeking by clients to restrict, via contract, who a firm can and cannot act for has reshaped 
the market for financial services litigation. This goes to access to representation issues, in that 
some litigants are no longer able to secure their lawyers of choice. Whether this is also an 
access to justice issue is unclear, and we accept that there is no absolute right to a lawyer, or 
law firm, of first choice. Of most concern are claims from some lawyers that these contractual 
provisions might be used strategically by some clients to deny claimants representation from a 
tier of firms. It was suggested to us by a minority of our interviewees that law firms may be 
appointed to those panels, and made to sign ‘no sue’ clauses, where the client has little or no 
intention of giving that firm work. We accept that we do not have the other side of this story. 
However, if these matters are true, they are concerning.  
 
 By agreeing to accept the terms imposed by clients who seek to restrict or control a firm via 
contract, a firm may be taking on obligations that have the potential to affect duties it owes or 
could owe to other or future clients. This may create an information asymmetry between the 
firm and its less dominant or powerful clients. Accepting that clients and their law firms are 
generally free to engage on terms they see fit, we would question whether firms should be 
required to seek consent to disclose these terms, as appropriate. 
 
 The potential for breaches of confidentiality to arise from client terms -  via inbound 
secondments, IT and data protection audits, most favoured nation clauses etc - struck us as 
being high, but our interviewees seemed confident that this risk was being managed 
appropriately.  
 
 Firms have responded to changes in their engagement in different ways. Some use Risk 
Committees, Opinion Committees and/or Pricing Committees. In some firms, partners appear to 
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have almost total discretion as to the terms they sign up to. Other firms have formal processes 
in place for the review and sign off of these terms (even if, as we were told, those processes are 
not always followed by individual partners). We were struck by the apparent lack of 
sophistication on risk management in some of the world’s largest law firms that we spoke with.  
This echoes other empirical work on legal risk management by in-house lawyer teams.1 
 
 Our interviewees’ understanding of the concept of independence was generally poor. Some 
respondents suggested that they are not independent, nor do clients expect them to be so. This 
may be because lawyer independence is a complex and nuanced concept, or may be for other 
reasons. It is our view that the current definition of independence in the SRA Handbook does 
not necessarily account for many of the complexities and nuances of independence in today’s 
large legal practices. 
 
 A number of structural pressures on independence exist, and some specific threats. The most 
worrisome of which, in our view, is third-party payers seeking in some contexts to influence the 
behaviour of advisers to other parties on a transaction. We have coined the term ‘shadow 
clients’ to denote the power that these third parties (commonly borrowers) have to choose 
which law firms act for other parties on their deals, and to dictate their roles. 
 
 We were struck by the view of some interviewees of the role of the COLP as the ‘holder’ of 
professional values for the firm, and raise the question of whether such has the potential for 
individual lawyers to become less aware of, and less interested in, their own professionalism, 
professional identity and professional obligations.  
 
 There is a lack of sophistication to the ways in which a number of our participating firms 
mitigate independence risks at more junior levels within their organisations, in particular the 
lack of systematic training and development on professional obligations (and the potential 
threats to those obligations). 
 
 Our data suggests an increase in the risks accepted by firms, particularly with regard to: 
wrapping liability of third party advisers; working on an uncapped liability basis; giving reliance 
letters; and signing indemnities. We do not consider these transfers to be of regulatory 
concern, but perhaps a matter for relevant representative bodies, though we note the potential 
build-up of systemic risk in the profession. 
 
 There was no discernible difference between the practices observed by interviewees at firms 
of different heritage (US US Heritage firms, or English or English Heritage firms) but it is clear 
that US practices are having a significant influence on client requests, especially as regards 
commercial conflicts, liability caps, individual liability and reliance letters. 
 
  
                                                          
1
 See: Richard Moorhead and Steven Vaughan, ‘Legal Risk: Definition, Management and Ethics’ (Executive 
Report, 2015) – see: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2594228 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In August 2014, we were commissioned by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) to conduct, on 
its behalf, a piece of independent research on lawyer-client relationships in large commercial firms, 
looking at how those relationships impact, or may impact, professional independence, ethics, 
standards and risk.  
 
The impetus for commissioning the research lay in concerns raised with the SRA by a number of 
stakeholders. In particular, the SRA asked us to focus on three broad questions that linked to these 
concerns:  
(a) how commercial and client pressure affect large firms and their lawyers' 
professionalism and what systems and controls are used to identify and monitor 
those pressures;  
(b) how lawyers identify, monitor and mitigate potential liability arising from 
client driven risk allocation mechanisms, and how widespread these 
mechanisms have become; and  
(c) whether powerful clients (particularly financial institutions) are influencing 
their law firms' engagement decisions in a manner that is inhibiting access to 
representation.  
The SRA was told that issues might specifically arise in situations where law firms are engaged by 
large clients via the use of panels (a practice we discuss in depth in Chapter 2). Our focus in this 
research is not on the use of panels per se, but rather on the extent to which law firms may be 
willing, or feel forced, to sacrifice elements of their independence, or compromise aspects of their 
other professional obligations, to satisfy the needs and wants of large clients with significant buying 
power.  
 
There is comparatively little empirical research on corporate and finance lawyers or how large law 
firms interact with in-house legal teams, despite the fact that corporate and finance practices 
comprise a very significant part of the legal services market, and despite the rise of the in-house 
lawyer (where numbers have more than doubled in the last decade). In addition to seeking views on 
these issues from Compliance Officers for Legal Practice (COLPs),2 the SRA was interested in the 
perspective of senior lawyers engaged in transactional corporate and finance services, practice areas 
that together contribute the most significant proportion of the turnover of City firms.  
 
With input from several members of the External Reference Group (ERG), we worked with the SRA 
to draw up a topic guide (see Appendix 1) that reflected a broad number of interests and potential 
issues. These form the core chapters of this report and are summarised below. In the core chapters, 
we also talk about conflicts of interest. We feel it important to stress that this was not a topic on the 
topic guide, and was not one of the issues raised with the SRA that led to this project. However, it 
was, almost universally, the first matter that our interviewees wanted to speak with us about.  
 
Between December 2014 and March 2015 we conducted 53 interviews, speaking with a mix of 
senior corporate and finance partners (often department heads), COLPs, risk officers and others, 
from 20 leading English and US law firms delivering corporate and finance legal services from 
England & Wales: 15 English/English heritage (‘EH’) firms; and five US/US heritage (‘US’) firms. When 
these interviews were transcribed, we had almost 1,000 pages of data. The interviews were 
anonymous. The SRA did not, and does not, know which law firms we contacted and/or which 
                                                          
2
 http://www.sra.org.uk/lawyers/colp-cofa/ethos-roles.page  
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partners, COLPs and others participated. Ethical approval for the project was given by the University 
of Birmingham. Further detail on our sampling methodology and approach is set out in Appendix 2.  
 
At the start of May 2015, we met with five senior in-house lawyers from five separate financial 
institutions and spent two hours with them discussing our interim findings. While this meeting does 
not, and cannot, reflect the views of the entire community of in-house lawyers, it did provide useful 
context for some of the changes in lawyer-client engagement that we learned of, and offers a 
counterpoint to some of the opinions expressed by our private practice lawyer interviewees. 
Chapter 6 sets out the views represented at this meeting in full. One striking comment from this 
meeting concerned where legal teams now tend to be housed within their organisations. We were 
told that the legal departments at the five investment banks represented no longer sit within the 
business, but are instead part of the central corporate function, alongside IT, HR, Compliance and 
other non-fee generating teams. We wonder if this changes the dynamic of in-housers engaging 
external law firms.  
 
What follows in this Executive Summary and Conclusions serves two aims: first, we set out our 
findings; second, we comment, where appropriate, on the extent to which our findings may raise 
issues of regulatory concern for the SRA, or, alternatively, raise issues that The Law Society, The City 
of London Law Society, the profession at large, other regulators or other stakeholders may wish to 
consider. This Executive Summary intentionally does not contain any of the quotes from our 
interviewees. It should, therefore, be seen and read as a taster of what follows in the main chapters 
of this report.  
 
The dynamics between large law firms and their clients are complex. Some of the issues we present 
below are ‘purely’ commercial matters in that they do not concern the regulatory objectives or 
professional principles set out in the Legal Services Act 2007 and/or the professional obligations or 
other requirements in the SRA Handbook. Despite this, shining a light on these practices is important 
for two reasons: (i) it allows for a sense of how lawyer-client relationships have changed, and are 
changing over time (i.e. it paints a picture of market practice that is currently missing); and (ii) it 
signals to the large law firm sector that the SRA is aware of the pressures those lawyers and firms 
are facing and has sought evidence that will enable the profession, its representative bodies and 
other stakeholders to debate and consider appropriate responses. However, we would suggest that 
some of the issues we raise do go to the regulatory objectives, lawyers’ professional obligations and 
the management of claims risk. Some issues also question the extent to which the regulatory 
objectives and professional obligations fit different types of practice. In particular we question 
whether the concept of independence has matured and adapted to a changing legal services market.  
 
It is important to note that we have not been asked to provide, in this report, concrete suggestions 
as to what the SRA should do next with our data.  
 
LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS 
 
One of the principal messages that emerged from our interviews was the concept of a shift in the 
balance of power from law firms to clients, represented by the way in which major corporates and 
financial institutions seek to impose their own terms of engagement on law firms. A number of these 
clients now transact with law firms via panel processes in which there is fierce competition for work 
and where appointments are often accompanied by detailed, mandatory sets of terms and 
conditions (also often known as ‘outside counsel guidelines’). These guidelines cover a variety of 
matters, from fee arrangements to secondments, IT security, conflicts of interest and much more. 
Christopher Whelan and Neta Ziv have suggested that these sorts of guidelines may amount to the 
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privatisation of professionalism, a situation in which clients blur the lines of lawyer governance and 
control.3 All of our interviewees told us that the panel terms that they must sign up to in order to be 
eligible for instructions have become longer and more detailed; that the terms clients are seeking to 
impose have become more onerous; and that the use of panels has itself become far more 
widespread. This is particularly the case in the five years since the credit crisis.  
 
Despite around three quarters of our interviewees outlining a scenario whereby they are being 
forced to accept more and more onerous terms of engagement with little room for discussion, we 
did find that four or five of the firms we interviewed said that they routinely pushed back on terms 
that they deemed unacceptable. Crucially, these firms continued to receive instructions, including 
where they refused to accept positions on panels because of terms that they could not get 
comfortable with. The perception, therefore, that we encountered among many other firms that 
‘everyone is agreeing to these terms’ appears misplaced. Interestingly, we did not find any apparent 
relationship between either the size of the firm, or its heritage (US or English law firms), and the 
ability or willingness of firms to push back on terms. 
 
While client requests have clearly become more numerous, lengthy, and sophisticated in detail, we 
found mixed views amongst partners as to whether these changes give cause for concern in anything 
other than a commercial context. Undoubtedly the biggest challenges for law firms that come out of 
panel requirements are financial, with fee arrangements a particular issue. While we accept there is 
debate over the ethicality of different billing practices, nothing from our data suggested that this 
was an area requiring regulatory intervention. The three matters that did concern us, however, are 
set out in depth in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, which respectively cover conflicts of interest (and access to 
representation), lawyer independence (and the power of borrowers/sponsors to appoint the banks’ 
lawyers), and the transfer of risk from clients to firms.  
 
INFLUENCING ACCESS TO REPRESENTATION 
 
The phrase ‘conflicts of interest’ is capable of meaning a number of different things. On one level, 
we are concerned with ‘legal’ conflicts (i.e. those reflected in the SRA’s Handbook) that seek to 
prevent lawyers and firms from acting for or against different clients on the same matter. On other 
more amorphous and more complex levels, law firms having multiple clients means that there is the 
risk that:  
 
(i) that firm will act against any given client on any given matter (contentious or non-
contentious) where that client has other legal representation; and/or  
 
(ii) that firm will advance arguments which could, in future matters, be to the detriment of 
any given client (e.g. suggesting a clause be drafted or interpreted in way X for client Y, 
which would go against the drafting or interpretation that they would advance for client Z); 
and/or 
 
(iii) that firm will advise a competitor of any given client in a matter wholly unrelated to any 
work it is doing for client X, but in a way that advances the interests of client Y to the 
detriment of client X; and/or 
 
                                                          
3
 Christopher J Whelan and Neta Ziv, ‘Privatising Professionalism: Client Controls of Lawyer Ethics’ (2012) 80 
Fordham Law Review 2577 
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(iv) that firm will advise another client in a matter in which a given client has no immediate 
involvement, but that proves to be to the detriment to any given client’s commercial 
interests.  
 
These wider contentious and commercial conflicts are not explicitly referred to by the SRA in the 
Principles or the Handbook: the SRA’s conflicts focus appears to us to be on lawyers’ relationships 
with a ‘matter client’ (i.e. acting for X on Y) rather than their relationships with ‘clients of the firm’ 
on an ongoing basis across multiple matters (i.e. X and Z being clients of the firm with potentially 
competing interests).  
 
Given the growing use of panels precisely to shift relationships from an individual to an institutional 
context, and from a given-matter-basis to a long-term basis, this presents challenges. In these wider 
contentious and commercial conflicts situations, lawyers and firms need to juggle acting “with 
integrity” (Principle 2), not allowing their “independence to be compromised” (Principle 3) and 
“acting in the best interests of each client” (Principle 4). There may be consumer protection issues 
here. Whilst information asymmetry is not generally of concern with sophisticated clients, if firms 
are signing up to extensive conflicts provisions that may affect their engagements with other clients, 
or potential clients, we would question whether they might in fact be required to secure consent 
and disclose them.       
 
What our data also shows is that lawyers and firms, in these situations, need to be mindful of 
contractual promises they have made to clients on conflicts in their terms of engagement. The 
seeking by clients to restrict, via contract, who a lawyer and a firm can and cannot act for was of 
almost universal concern to our interviewees, and the first matter they raised when we asked them 
to talk about particularly challenging provisions in terms of engagement. Where these clauses 
restrict the ability of firms to sue their clients (on matters where those clients are represented by 
another law firm), this gives rise to potential issues for third parties who may not be able to secure 
representation from their first choice of lawyer or firm. This practice has been raised previously by 
the Tomlinson Report as of specific concern in the context of financial institutions, and the same 
theme comes out from our data.4 What is less clear, however, is whether these practices (i.e. ‘no 
sue’ clauses) and their consequences (i.e. a reshaping of the field in terms of who is willing to sue 
whom) give rise to regulatory issues with which the Financial Conduct Authority, the Competition 
and Markets Authority and/or the SRA should concern themselves. Equally, whether these practices 
engage access to justice issues is unclear. Access to justice is commonly framed in terms of access 
for those unable to afford legal advice, an issue of unmet legal need (itself a complex concept).5 Here 
we have the situation where litigants may be able to secure legal representation (see below) but 
that representation is not, perhaps, the representation they would have chosen in a different world. 
This may or may not be an access to justice challenge, depending on how one defines access to 
justice. 
 
Half of our interviewees were of the view that these practices have led to boutique litigation firms 
opening up and firms developing bank litigation practices that have cornered a niche in the market 
and offer representation where needed. The other half, while accepting these niche firms had 
opened, questioned the quality of representation at those niche firms (primarily because of their 
view that, say, specialist financial litigation requires the claimant firm to also have a specialist 
finance practice in addition to a litigation practice). Quality in legal services is, however, another 
challenging concept, and we might debate the indicators of quality in these sorts of contentious 
                                                          
4
 http://www.tomlinsonreport.com/docs/tomlinsonReport.pdf  
5
 Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice (OUP 2004) 
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matters between firms with (on the face of it) equally well-qualified and equally well-educated 
partners. We also accept that it is in the self-interests of those with whom we spoke to say that the 
quality of these boutique firms is questionable. We were not told of potential litigants being unable 
to find any representation. Rather, those litigants have, perhaps, not been able to find the 
representation they would have preferred.  
 
What seems clear to us is that the market for litigation has been reshaped as a result of contractual 
provisions on conflicts of interest. What concerns us are comments from some of our interviewees 
that some of these contractual provisions were introduced strategically by some clients to deny 
claimants representation from a tier of firms in situations where firms are appointed to panels (and 
made to sign up to these ‘no sue’ clauses) where the panel client had no intention of giving that firm 
much, or any, work. These comments are alarming and we accept that further work is needed to 
substantiate them, such that one might counter argue that frustrated lawyers restricted by contract 
as to whom they can and cannot act for might seek to put forward explanations which cast those 
contractual provisions in a negative light. If (and we accept that this is a big ‘if’) SRA-regulated in-
house lawyers are active in these practices, we might question whether they are really in compliance 
with Principle 1, a lawyer’s obligation to ‘uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of 
justice’. Relatedly, Richard Moorhead has suggested that, “In theory, lawyers’ firms entering into 
contracts which restrain them from acting against banks which is broader than professional conflict 
rules might be criticised for compromising their independence.”6 While we would agree with this 
possibility (that criticism might be so directed), we accept that others feel differently. There is no set 
answer to this matter at present.  
 
These concerns go not only to ‘no sue’ clauses but are equally relevant (if harder to pin down) in the 
context of commercial conflicts provisions introduced by clients into lawyer terms of engagement. 
We were told that these clauses seek to prevent lawyers from acting adverse to their clients on 
transactional matters (where those clients have other legal representation) and extend to the more 
amorphous ‘thou shalt not act adverse to our interests’ clauses, which include denying firms the 
ability to advance issues (e.g. the drafting or interpretation of a clause in a contract) which might, in 
future, be prejudicial to a given client. A number of the firms we spoke to routinely push back on 
these sorts of clauses.  
 
We are unclear, and have been unable to find clarity elsewhere, on the extent to which the 
professional obligations on lawyers and regulated entities restrict the ability of those lawyers and 
firms to enter into these types of contracts with their clients.7 One view might be that such contracts 
are permissible save where they are in tension with the Principles and Handbook. However, such 
would assume (wrongly) that there are neat answers to the complex questions we raise in Chapter 3 
on conflicts of interest. At the same time, a number of firms told us that they have signed up to 
contractual provisions on conflicts with their clients where the firms are not sure they are able to 
comply with those provisions (for example because the provisions are so wide in scope and the 
client has hundreds of subsidiaries operating in multiple jurisdictions). Is this a question of those 
firms really acting ‘in the best interests of each client’ (Principle 4), or is this simply a commercial 
matter (a risk decision) for firms to decide as they see fit (and not a matter for the SRA)? There may 
be situations in which the contractual arrangement has the potential to cut across duties owed to, or 
                                                          
6
 https://lawyerwatch.wordpress.com/2013/11/28/independence-matters-banking-and-big-law-in-the-news/  
7
 We note the situation involving tobacco litigation, Leigh Day and Irwin Mitchell in which the two law firms 
agreed to withdraw claims (and to not pursue future claims) to stop their existing clients from paying costs in 
litigation they had lost against tobacco companies. See: Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering 
and the State in a Global Era (OUP 2001) 151. We are grateful to Richard Moorhead for bringing this example 
to our attention.  
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interests of, other clients of a firm. For example, there could be an asymmetry of information 
between the firm and its less significant or sophisticated clients, as to the contractual arrangements 
the law firm has been required to put in place with its most powerful clients. 
 
In her work, Joan Loughrey has suggested that if we see default regulatory conflicts rules as 
something to contract out of then we see conflicts as “purely private” matters and we fail to 
acknowledge, as the SRA itself acknowledges,8 the importance of conflicts to the public interest.9 
Similarly, we might argue that firms accepting to widen their conflicts obligations via contract also 
frames conflicts in terms of the private and ignores the public. This resonates with the argument by 
Whelan and Ziv, discussed earlier, that clients are “privatising professionalism” through their use of 
detailed outside counsel guidelines. A potential counter to this may lie in how the common law has 
historically understood conflicts in terms of “undivided loyalty” to clients on a matter centric basis.10 
What seems clear is that the profession is concerned about these issues: although the SRA did not 
ask us to focus specifically on conflicts, a number of interviewees raised these concerns with us (and 
these concerns were the first things they wanted to speak to us about).  
 
LAWYER INDEPENDENCE 
 
The issue of lawyer independence was, as set out above, one of the core drivers for this research. 
However, independence in the legal profession is a complex and nuanced concept. At its most basic, 
it is the practice of advising and acting free from inappropriate influence and is commonly 
understood as a tripartite relationship between the client, the lawyer and the state. However, and as 
represented below in Figure 1.1, we would suggest that independence is better understood as a 
series of interconnected and multiple relationships, which each have the potential to impact on the 
role of, and advice given by, any individual lawyer or any law firm. We would also suggest that, in the 
context of the lawyer-client relationship, the following matters have the potential to influence the 
independence of any given lawyer: (i) the balance of power between lawyer, firm and client; (ii) the 
reliance of the lawyer and/or firm on the client for business; (iii) the willingness and potential for 
lawyers and firms to say ‘no’ to clients; (iv) the acceptance by lawyers and firms that affirming 
independence may have negative financial consequences; (v) the closeness of the lawyer and/or firm 
to the client; (vi) law firm culture and the ownership and management of ethics, compliance and 
risk; and (vii) the ways in which firms structure and distribute incentives. Our view is that the current 
definition and exposition of independence in the SRA Handbook (via Principle 3 and associated 
guidance) does not account for these nuances. 
 
We asked our interviewees what they understood by the term ‘lawyer independence’ and whether 
they had encountered situations in which their independence, or the independence of other 
lawyers, had been challenged. Our interviewees were, in general, unable to clearly articulate what 
the principle of independence meant. This may well be because, as we have set out, independence is 
complex and contested. However, when pushed, most could understand the importance of lawyer 
independence, although a minority were of the fixed view that they were not independent, and 
were not appointed by clients to be independent. This is a concerning lack of understanding of the 
SRA Handbook as regards independence, but (as we show later) the regulation could be clearer. We 
                                                          
8
 The SRA describes conflicts of interest (in Chapter 3 of the Code) as “a critical public protection”. 
9
 Joan Loughrey, ‘Large Law Firms, Sophisticated Clients, and the Regulation of Conflicts of Interest in England 
and Wales’, (2011) 14(2) Legal Ethics 215, 230; SRA Code of Conduct, Chapter 3  
10
 Clark Boyce v Mouat [1994] 1 AC 428, 435; Farrington v Rowe McBride & Partners [1985] 1 NZLR 83, 90. 
There is a view that loyalty at common law only applies to the matter on which the solicitor is acting. We are of 
the view that while this may have been the case in Clark Boyce v Mouat, we are not wholly convinced that this 
is still true today. 
 
 
 
9 
were also told by our interviewees of a number of structural pressures on independence, such as fee 
arrangements, law firm compensation models, and individual partners becoming overly reliant on 
any one given client. In the 2012 Upjohn Lecture, Lord Neuberger, President of the Supreme Court, 
commented as follows on the ‘purpose’ of the legal profession: 
 
“A vibrant, independent legal profession is an essential element of any democratic society 
committed to the rule of law. It is not merely another form of business, solely aimed at 
maximising profit whilst providing a competitive service to consumers. I am far from 
suggesting that lawyers ought not seek to maximise their profits, or ought not provide a 
competitive service. What I am saying is that lawyers also owe overriding specific duties to 
the court and to society, duties which go beyond the maximisation of profit and which 
may require lawyers to act to their own detriment, and to that of their clients.”11 
 
FIGURE 1.1 – THE INTERCONNECTED NATURE OF LAWYER INDEPENDENCE12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Lord Neuberger, ‘Reforming Legal Education’  (Association of Law Teachers Lord Upjohn Lecture, November 
2012) 7 – see: https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/lord-neuberger-121115-speech.pdf  
12
 We accept that it is possible to push this figure further and to include other actors. Richard Moorhead has 
helpfully suggested that these other actors might include, say, insurers and additional State regulatory bodies. 
Moorhead has previously used the work of Andrew Abbott to discuss the interconnected nature of 
professionalism see: Richard Moorhead, ‘Precarious Professionalism: Some Empirical and Behavioural 
Perspectives on Lawyers’ (2014) 67(1) Current Legal Problems 447, 452 
Key: 
C-Suite: Board/Senior Executives/’Chief Executive Suite’ 
CLLS: City of London Law Society 
COLP: Compliance Officer for Legal Practice 
GCs: General Counsel 
LSB: Legal Services Board 
MOJ: Ministry of Justice 
SRA: Solicitors Regulation Authority 
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Two specific threats to lawyer independence were brought to our attention (unprompted) by 
interviewees, namely: (i) the risks arising from clients seeking to put pressure on the way in which 
legal opinions are drafted; and (ii) third-party payers seeking, in some contexts, to influence the 
behaviour of advisers to other parties on a transaction (often by dictating who those lawyer advisers 
could be) – for example, a borrower telling its funder bank which lawyers that bank can use on the 
loan. The second matter strikes us as problematic and less amenable to resolution by a simple 
reaffirmation of the SRA Handbook Principles. We have coined the term “shadow client” to denote 
the power that these third parties (commonly borrowers or private equity sponsors) have to choose 
which law firms act on which transactions. While we were not given any specific examples by our 
interviewees of this practice resulting in tangible violations of the Handbook, many of our 
interviewees were concerned by the potential for lawyers appointed by third parties to possibly act, 
in ways subtle and refined, in the interests of those third parties over the interests of their clients. 
We would agree, and this point was also raised (unprompted) by one of the in-house lawyers to 
whom we presented our interim findings.  
  
Finally, we were struck by the lack of sophistication as to the ways in which a number of our 
participating firms mitigate independence risks at non-partner levels within their organisations, in 
particular the lack of systematic training and development on professional obligations (and the 
potential threats to those obligations).13 This may or may not be reflective of the wider market. We 
were also struck by the view, held by a number of interviewees, of the role of the COLP as the 
‘holder’ of professional values for the firm, and raise the question of whether such has the potential 
for individual lawyers to become less aware of, and less interested in, their own professionalism, 
professional identity and professional obligations and how they were mitigating potential liability 
here.  
 
Risk Transfers 
 
The SRA was interested in the extent to which law firms were being asked to accept additional 
and/or different forms of risk by clients and, if they were so accepting, how they managed the 
resulting risk. We asked our interviewees about the extent to which they are willing to accept 
liability for advice given to their clients by other advisers (e.g. by law firms based in jurisdictions 
where the initial firm did not have an office). We also asked firms whether clients sought 
indemnities from them, and the extent to which clients expected them to work on the basis of 
uncapped liability.  
 
Our data suggests an increase in the risks accepted by firms, on an individual and systemic basis, 
with some (but not many) firms being robust in their push back against these three practices. While 
this is interesting, it is perfectly possible to see these changes as simply an allocation, or reallocation, 
of power between sophisticated parties – a matter of contract and negotiation (which in turn shapes 
the nature and extent of tortious obligations). If this is the right interpretation, the developments in 
risk transfer of which we were made aware would be of no proper regulatory interest to the SRA 
(and might instead be better taken forward by the relevant representative bodies).  
 
However, we think there is an equally valid argument that sets out that these risk transfer practices 
operate to build up systemic risk in the legal profession, which could, in due course, lead to 
significant liability, the risk of law firm collapse, and a resultant undermining of the strength of the 
profession (in terms of brand and perception) on the international stage. Principle 8 of the SRA 
Handbook requires lawyers and firms to conduct their roles and businesses in accordance with, 
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 This has been found elsewhere in other empirical work. See: Moorhead (n 12 above) 
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“sound financial and risk management principles.” It might be thought irresponsible for a firm to act 
on a matter which could give rise to liability greater than the firm could sustain, unless the firm also 
caps such liability at the amount of its insurance (or lower).  
 
We were struck by the widely held view that accountants had been much more successful at 
resisting risk transfer from clients and wondered whether there were particular reasons for this. We 
would suggest that this is worthy of further exploration by the profession and its representative 
bodies, perhaps reviewing whether the SRA's minimum terms and conditions for PII are overly 
protective of claimants in this context, and engaging in a dialogue with insurers. We also found that 
firms varied as to the amount of discretion they gave  to their partners, or that was simply exercised 
by individual partners regardless of firm controls, when agreeing engagement terms, opinions and 
the like. 
 
The (Initial) Views from In-House Lawyers at Financial Institutions 
 
The five senior in-house lawyers from financial institutions that we met with told us of the significant 
pressures they are under as regards legal spend. We were also told of how their role has been 
significantly reoriented towards one of risk management in its broadest sense. All attendees at the 
roundtable meeting worked at financial institutions, but not all used panels to manage relationships 
with external legal advisers. All accepted that the terms of engagement that they now expect law 
firms to sign up to on receipt of instructions have become lengthier, but they did not see that as an 
issue which challenged those lawyers’ professional obligations. Nor did they think it an issue that 
private practice lawyers felt there was little room to negotiate on the terms of business.  
 
Those present felt strongly that their legal advisers should not be permitted to sue them on behalf of 
other clients, and their terms of engagement each include no-litigation clauses. These five in-house 
counsel did not make use of wider conflict clauses that require that their advisers should not act 
against their commercial interests, arguing instead that it is useful to have external lawyers with 
experience of working for other players in the market.  
 
We asked the in-house meeting members to define what they expected in terms of professional 
independence from their advisers, and they struggled to articulate their expectations. Finally, we 
asked the meeting attendees about risk transfers, and particularly the issues of wrapping liability, 
indemnities, and liability caps. Those present did occasionally, but not always, ask their law firms to 
accept liability for the advice of third-party law firms on transactions. They did not use indemnities in 
their standard terms (or were not aware of them if they did). They all felt strongly that law firms 
should not be able to cap their liability, with all of those present arguing that lawyers should stand 
behind their legal advice just as banks have to stand behind their own advice. They further pushed 
back hard on firms trying to introduce liability caps under the radar, for example by sending 
engagement letters midway through deals that included caps on liability. 
 
Where Next 
 
We would suggest that the data we present in this report could act as a useful point of departure for 
further research (funded by the SRA, Legal Services Board, Law Society, City of London Law Society, 
individual firms or others) in at least three areas:  
 
 
 
 
12 
(i) with additional in-house lawyers on their roles and responsibilities;14  
 
(ii) with the insurers of legal services; and  
 
(iii) on the role and function of COLPs, and how COLPs are perceived by the lawyers in their 
firms.  
 
There are, in addition, a number of further projects on large law firms that could add further depth 
to the conclusions we have been able to draw.   
                                                          
14
 Steven Vaughan is part of a team led by Richard Moorhead, with Paul Gilbert and Stephen Mayson, working 
on an ‘Ethical Leadership’ project in the context of in-house lawyers. More information can be found here: 
http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/work-starts-on-ethical-leadership-initiative-for-under-pressure-in-
house-lawyers  
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION  
As set out above, in August 2014 we were commissioned by the SRA to conduct a piece of 
independent research on lawyer-client relationships in large commercial firms and how those 
relationships impact professional independence, integrity, duties to other clients, ethics, standards 
and risk. The following chapters of this report sets out the findings from that research. This short 
introductory chapter provides some context and factual background to the matters under 
discussion, and signposts the chapters that follow. 
Concerns raised with the SRA by a number of stakeholders, discussed above in the Executive 
Summary, were translated into the SRA’s Risk Outlook 2014/15, which identified a lack of 
independence from clients as a “priority risk” i.e. a risk the SRA is concerned about but the extent of 
which is unclear to it, or which it feels may not be widespread.15 Our focus is therefore the extent to 
which law firms may be willing, or feel forced, to sacrifice elements of their independence, and/or to 
compromise aspects of their other professional obligations, to satisfy the needs and wants of large 
clients with significant buying power, and the extent to which these risks are being monitored and 
mitigated. 
The balance of power is an important factor in any relationship, and the lawyer-client relationship is 
no exception. Where lawyer-client relationships do not rest on solid foundations of independent and 
ethical legal practice, there are significant implications for the rule of law and public trust in the 
provision of legal services. Large law firms are powerful economic actors. The top 196 law firms that 
the SRA categorises as ‘high impact’ firms (which formed the starting cohort for our research) 
employ 43,585 lawyers,16 or one third of the 131,518 practising lawyers registered as of March 
2015.17 The annual turnover (generated from offices in England & Wales) of these 196 firms is just 
under £13bn,18 which is more than the respective GDPs of 60 of the world’s nation states.19 Using 
data published by the Law Society in 2014, we see that the turnover from these specific 196 firms 
represents around half of the turnover of the entire legal services sector.20 As large law firms have 
grown in significance, so too have there been significant shifts in the sophistication of in-house legal 
departments, and the way in which clients engage and use external legal services providers. 
Between 2000 and 2012, the in-house lawyer population doubled to 25,600 lawyers, or 18% of the 
total lawyer population.21 We comment further on changes to ‘big law’, and the way in which clients 
engage legal services, in Chapter 2.  
Despite the fact that a third of all lawyers work for the top 2% of law firms by turnover in England & 
Wales, and despite the fact that those firms account for half of the entire turnover of legal services 
in England & Wales,22 there is surprisingly little empirical research on commercial firms and their 
corporate and finance lawyers.23 There is also very little known about the way in which these firms 
                                                          
15
 http://www.sra.org.uk/lawyers/freedom-in-practice/ofr/risk/risk-outlook.page  
16
 Data provided to the research team by the SRA 
17
 See: http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work/reports/data/lawyer_firms.page  
18
 Data provided to the research team by the SRA 
19
 International Monetary Fund, ‘World Economic Outlook Database’ (April 2015) 
20
 Law Society, ‘Legal Services Forecasts – 2014’ (28 August 2014) 3 
21
 Oxera, ‘The Role of In House Lawyers’ (February 2012) 6 
22
 As of March 2015, there were 10,316 law firms in England & Wales. See: http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-
we-work/reports/data/lawyer_firms.page  
23
 For a discussion of the research that does exist in this field, see: Richard Moorhead and Victoria Hinchly, 
‘Professional Minimalism: The Ethical Consciousness of Commercial Lawyers’ (2015) Journal of Law and Society 
(forthcoming) 
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engage, interact, and manage long term relationships with their often highly sophisticated client 
base. Our research aims to fill part of that gap and, in so doing, will provide an evidence base for the 
SRA to use in deciding whether regulatory intervention or guidance, and/or a change of policy, is 
needed. These findings will also arm large firms and their lawyers, and their representative bodies, 
with an overview and exploration of market practice that would otherwise be opaque to them (for 
competition law related reasons). 
REPORT STRUCTURE  
This report has five further chapters. Chapter 2 provides additional context on changes to ‘big law’ 
and to lawyer-client relationships, and how our interviewees perceived changes to those 
relationships. This chapter also sets out some of the issues raised with us by our interviewees that 
were either uncontentious (in that most interviewees accepted them as the current state of the 
market and largely acceptable) and/or were only of concern to a minority of those to whom we 
spoke. Chapters 3, 4 and 5, on the other hand, set out issues that were of more general concern to 
our interviewees, and which strike us as potentially problematic as regards challenges to the 
regulatory objectives or professional obligations set out in the Legal Services Act 2007 and/or the 
SRA’s Handbook. 
Chapter 3 concerns the ways in which clients shape which other entities lawyers and law firms can 
act for, via conflicts provisions inserted into terms of engagement. This chapter includes 
consideration of issues of access to representation raised by Lawrence Tomlinson in his report for 
the government on banks’ lending practices.24 Chapter 4 explores the principle of lawyer 
independence and sets out how our interviewees understood lawyer independence, as well as 
specific instances of situations in which we feel lawyer independence has the potential to be 
compromised. Chapter 5 then considers how clients seek to transfer risks to law firms, in three 
specific situations: (i) in firms taking on liability for advice provided to their clients by third parties 
(e.g. other law firms); (ii) in clients asking for indemnities from their lawyers; and (iii) in the ability 
(or, rather, inability) of law firms to cap their liability for the advice that they give. Chapter 6 sets out 
the views of the five in-house lawyers from financial institutions we met with to discuss our interim 
findings. Appendix 1 contains the topic guide we used in our interviews. Appendix 2 sets out the 
detail of our research methodology.  
As with any research of this nature, we set out in this report what we were told by those we 
interviewed. Our methodological approach was designed such that we were as random as possible 
in selecting the firms we contacted, but we cannot make any claims that our data is representative 
of all corporate and/or finance lawyers or the leading commercial firms they work in, or of the COLPs 
of those firms. However, we think it worth noting that we spoke with many heads (or ex heads) of 
Corporate and Finance teams at some of the world’s largest law firms, and with many partners who 
each had more than 30 years of post-qualification experience. As such we are confident that the 
conclusions we draw are robust and can withstand challenge.  
  
                                                          
24
 See: http://www.tomlinsonreport.com/docs/tomlinsonReport.pdf  
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CHAPTER 2 – LAWYER-CLIENT TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT 
In this chapter we discuss how ‘big law’ and the engagement of large law firms has changed over 
time, both via accounts in the existing scholarship on these matters and via what we were told by 
our interviewees. The legal profession has changed significantly in the last three decades.25 What 
was once a relatively homogeneous guild-like institution has morphed into a world of two distinct 
hemispheres (corporate-finance law/private client law).26 Recent research on lawyers has tended to 
conclude that the demands of business are pulling the tide of decision-making within corporate-
finance law firms,27 and so instead of a legal ‘profession’ in corporate-finance law, some suggest that 
we now may have a capitalist service industry.28 Views differ significantly, between and within 
academics and others, as to whether these changes are concerning or not. The work we reference 
below comes from the US, the UK and further afield. We acknowledge, for the avoidance of doubt, 
that there are different legal service markets and potentially different cultures/approaches in 
different geographic regions.  
 
A number of commentators have, since the mid-1990s, been lamenting the decline of law firm 
culture more generally,29 in which business demands, the ‘eat what you kill culture’ of some firms 
and/or sheer growth are said to be to blame.30 There are those who suggest that the notion of a 
corporate/finance lawyer as a professional exercising professional judgment has all but disappeared: 
Gerard Hanlon writes of “commercialised professionalism”;31 Andrew Boon and Jennifer Levin talk of 
these lawyers as “cogs in a machine”;32 and Christopher Whelan and Neta Ziv argue that we have 
“privatised professionalism” due to the power of clients to dictate, via contract, exactly what their 
lawyers can and cannot do.33 As such, some have argued that a “service provider” paradigm, in 
                                                          
25
 For a more detailed account of why this is so, see the various accounts in: Hilary Sommerlad, Richard Young, 
Steven Vaughan and Sonia Harris-Short, The Futures of Legal Education and the Legal Profession (Hart 
Publishing, 2015) 
26
 On the shift from a guild like institution, see: Andrew Abbott, ‘The Sociology of Work and Occupations’ 
(1993) 19 Annual Review of Sociology 187; Emil A Krause, Death of the Guilds: Professions, States and the 
Advance of Capitalism (Yale University Press 1996). On the two hemispheres, see: John P Heinz and Edward O 
Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar (University of Chicago Press, 1982); and John P 
Heinz, Robert L Nelson, Rebecca L. Sandefur and Edward O Laumann, Urban Lawyers: The New Social Structure 
of the Bar (University of Chicago Press, 2005) 
27
 Ronit Dinovitzer, Hugh Gunz and Sally Gunz, ‘Unpacking client capture: evidence from corporate law firms’ 
(2014a) 1 Journal of Professions and Organization 99; Ronit Dinovitzer, Hugh Gunz and Sally Gunz, 
‘Reconsidering Lawyer Autonomy: The Nexus Between Firm, Lawyer, and Client in Large Commercial Practice’ 
(2014b) 51(3) American Business Law Journal 661 
28
 Hilary Sommerlad, ‘The commercialisation of law and the enterprising legal practitioner: continuity and 
change’ (2011) 18 International Journal of the Legal Profession 73; Hilary Sommerlad, ‘Managerialism and the 
Legal Profession: A New Professional Paradigm’ (1995) 2 IJLP 159; Gerard Hanlon, ‘Professionalism as 
Enterprise’(1998) 32 Sociology 43 
29
 Elizabeth Chambliss, Measuring Law Firm Culture, in Austin Sarat (ed) Law, Politics and Society: Law Firms, 
Legal Culture and Legal Practice (Special Issue, 2010)  
30
 Marc Galanter and William D Henderson, ‘The Elastic Tournament: The Second Transformation of the Big 
Law Firm’ (2008) 60 Stanford Law Review 1867; Milton C Regan, Eat What You Kill: The Fall of a Wall Street 
Lawyer (University of Michigan Press, 2004) 
31
 Gerard Hanlon, Lawyers, the State and the Market: Professionalism Revisited (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998) 123 
32
 Andrew Boon and Jennifer Levin, The Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers in England & Wales (Hart, 2
nd
 ed, 2008) 
178 
33
 Whelan and Ziv (n 3 above) 
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which the engagement of lawyers has been standardised, has replaced the paradigm of lawyers as 
professionals.34  
 
David Wilkins argues that the corporate/finance lawyer-client relationship has undergone three 
stages of development over time: (i) initially there was a “Golden Age marriage” in which lawyers 
were trusted advisors to their corporate clients; (ii) this was then followed by a “divorce” in the late 
1980s and onwards, when clients started to engage firms via spot contracting following the growth 
of in-house legal teams (the ‘We hire lawyers not firms’ model); and (iii) a more modern firm-client 
partnership model (in which clients rely on fewer firms but expect more and/or different things from 
them, using a blend of co-operation and competition to get what they want).35 In 2010, Larry 
Ribstein published an article entitled ‘The Death of Big Law’ which predicted the eventual decline of 
the large firm because of a “basically precarious business model”.36 To date, however, this demise 
seems to have been greatly exaggerated. Each of the world’s largest firms employ thousands of 
lawyers in dozens of offices across the globe and, as set out in Chapter 1, reap significant financial 
rewards. 
 
Existing research suggests that the drivers for the changes in the practices of big law and how big law 
firms are engaged are varied: the globalisation of legal services has seen increased competition for 
work;37 the rise of the in-house legal function has allowed clients to better understand which legal 
services they need and how much those services are worth;38 large corporates have started to 
outsource and unbundle some of their work as part of a drive towards efficiency;39 and the financial 
crisis has had a significant knock-on effect on how much clients have available, or are willing, to 
spend on external counsel (the ‘more for less’ agenda).40 Christine Parker has argued that client 
pressure increases competition among law firms. This makes it essential for lawyers to ensure a 
degree of loyalty maintained with the client and, she argues, results in the possible unethical 
behaviour of lawyers.41 We consider independence, and loyalty, in Chapter 4. We are not suggesting 
that there is anything necessarily untoward in clients seeking ‘more for less’ or better value from 
their law firms. We accept that there is a healthy competition for the top end of corporate and 
finance legal services and that, because of the various forces and changes highlighted above, clients 
now have greater purchasing power and greater control over and knowledge of what their law firms 
do. What we see in our research, however, are instances of law firms and lawyers reacting to these 
‘more for less’ pressures in ways that, on occasion, may have the potential to compromise some of 
their professional obligations. This may be more of an issue, and a problem to be solved, for the 
lawyers than for the clients. 
                                                          
34
 Laurel S Terry, ‘The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as 
'Service Providers'’ (2008) Journal of Professional Lawyer 189 
35
 David B Wilkins, ‘Team of Rivals: Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship’ (2009) 
Fordham Law Review 2067 
36
 Larry Ribstein, ‘The Death of Big Law’ (2010) Wisconsin Law Review 749 
37
 Daniel Sokol, ‘Globalization of Law Firms: A Survey of the Literature and a Research Agenda for Further 
Study’, (2007) 14(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 5 
38
 Robert L Nelson and Laura Beth Nielsen, ‘Cops, Counsel and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside 
Counsel in Large Corporations’ (200) 34 Law & Society Review 457; Steven Vaughan, ‘Lawyers in Corporate 
Decision Making’ (2011) 38(3) Journal of Law and Society 463 
39
 Milton C Regan and Palmer T Heenan, ‘Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal 
Services’ (2010) 78 Fordham Law Review 2138; Richard Susskind, The End of Lawyers? (OUP, 2008) 
40
 Whelan and Ziv (n 3 above); Mike Trotter ‘More for less’, (2013) 16(1) Managing Partner 28; Joan Loughrey, 
‘Large Law Firms, Sophisticated Clients, and the Regulation of Conflicts of Interest in England and Wales’, 
(2011) 14(2) Legal Ethics 215 
41
 Christine Parker, ‘Ethical Infrastructure of Legal Practice in Larger Law Firms: Values, Policy and Behaviour’, 
(2008) 31(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 158, 182 
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Previous research has already established that clients are gaining increasingly significant control over 
lawyer’s practices.42 Robert Rosen has suggested that companies have instituted four separate, but 
interconnected, changes to the way lawyers are engaged and used: downsizing; outsourcing; self-
managing teams (which have wide discretion in how they operate); and “porous borders” (which 
links to outsourcing and makes the distinction between the inside and outside of corporates more 
porous).43 In their study of 20 sets of outside counsel guidelines and 20 interviews with in-house and 
private practice lawyers in the US, UK and Israel, Whelan and Ziv found a wide variety in how clients 
engaged their external counsel in terms of the scope, content and form of outside counsel guidelines 
deployed.44 It has been suggested by Ronald Gilson,45 and by Andrew Bruck and Andrew Canter,46 
that the larger the law firm and the more diverse its client base, the more resistant it is to client 
pressure as no single client or matter represents a material percentage of total firm revenues. Our 
data, as set out below, suggests this might not, in fact, be the case and, somewhat surprisingly, that 
there is no necessary correlation between firm size (or, in fact, firm heritage) and the resistance of a 
firm to client pressure.  
 
LAW FIRM PANELS  
 
There are many reasons why clients use panels to manage their legal advisers. Jonathan Rayner 
suggests panels allow clients to negotiate discounted rates and make the monitoring of external law 
firms easier.47 Indeed, the use of panel reviews as powerful cost reduction tools is a common refrain 
in the literature.48 Adam Frederickson and Charles Maddock observe that the numbers of law firms 
within panels are shrinking as clients want to focus on fewer external advisers.49 When selecting 
which firm should be on the panel, a tender process is usually implemented. Richard Thomas 
comments that “demand to pitch for work is becoming a norm”;50 the tender process invites price 
competition among law firms, helps to push down growing legal costs and rationalises the number 
of practices used.51 He further suggests the underlying reason for why panels are used is 
globalisation, in that “loyal and unquestioning local clients have become global companies with huge 
costs”.52  
 
The use of panels also introduces new dynamics to the role of general counsel. Karl Shehu argues 
that although GCs have discretion to choose which firm to instruct, they tend to choose firms they 
                                                          
42
 Robert E Rosen, ‘‘We’re All Consultants Now’: How Change in Client Organizational Strategies Influences 
Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal Services’ (2002) 44 Arizona Law Review 637; Whelan and Ziv (n 
3 above). 
43
 Rosen, ibid. 
44
 Whelan and Ziv (n 3 above) 
45
 Ronald Gilson, ‘Disputing through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict between Lawyers in Litigation’, (1994) 
94(2) Columbia Law Review 509, 531 
46
 Andrew Bruck and Andrew Canter ‘Supply, Demand, and the Changing Economics of Large Law Firms’, (2008) 
60 Stanford Law Review 9 
47
 Jonathan Rayner ‘News: Firms face panel purge’, (2007) Law Society Gazette (22 Mar 2007) 
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 Ben Rigby ‘Making the Grade’, (2012) 8 In-House Perspective 23 ; Richard Thomas ‘Of pitches and panels: 
the changing face of client relationships’ (2007) 64 European Lawyer 23, 24; Emma Kaye ‘The client crunch’, 
158 NLJ 1021 
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 Adam Frederickson and Charles Maddock ‘Law firms must fight to impress in-house counsel’, Euro. Law. 
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have previously used.53 Thus, the relationships between partners and GCs are important. Adam 
Frederickson and Charles Maddock argue that law firms need a coordinated firm-wide strategy on 
client service to maintain good relationship with GCs.54 In relation to the impact on client-lawyer 
relationship, Elizabeth Wall argues that the use of terms of engagement and guidelines effectively 
increases the importance of the role of in-house counsel as they would bear the duty to manage and 
scrutinise the relationship with external law firms.55 Similarly, Harold Barron suggests that the use of 
terms and guidelines changes the client-lawyer relationship in a way that external lawyers no longer 
deal directly with the corporate client and “the general counsel is now the most senior person 
providing legal advice and services to the client.”56 However, our data, set out below, challenges this 
existing work. It strikes us that the role of the procurement team within large corporates and 
financial institutions is becoming increasingly prominent and that the role of the GC in engaging 
external law firms may be diminishing (or at the very least changing significantly). 
 
Many commentators emphasise the role of terms of engagement as an important tool for law firms 
to limit their liabilities if things go wrong – as such, these authors argue that the scope of those 
lawyers’ duties and role must be clearly stated in the terms.57 As we will see in Chapter 5, we have 
been told that the ability for firms to limit their liability via terms of engagement seems increasingly 
under pressure.  
 
Turning to the selection process, Samantha Fairclough’s empirical work with in-house lawyers 
identifies six relevant considerations when clients choose law firms to be on their panel: (i) 
workload; (ii) ‘horses for courses’ (lower fees for routine work; higher fees for complex work); (iii) 
‘willing workhorses’ (a number of smaller or regional firms to complement what Fairclough terms 
the “champion pedigree” largest firms; (iv) client specific knowledge; (v) price; (vi) history.58 She also 
suggests that a law firm’s reputation plays a less important role as GCs are sophisticated buyers of 
legal services and can assess the quality of services themselves.59 This finding is echoed in the 2014 
survey of in-house lawyers conducted by Legal Business.60 Instead, and reflecting the work of Shehu 
discussed above, Fairclough suggests that established relationships are paramount.61 We would not 
disagree, but our research, set out below and in the chapters that follow, certainly suggests that the 
nature of the lawyer-client and GC/partner relationships are changing. As Legal Business concluded 
following its 2014 survey of in-house lawyers, “GCs are gaining more concessions from advisers year-
on-year; there is no sign of the old client/adviser dynamic returning with a reviving UK economy.”62 
 
OUR FINDINGS 
 
In order to position our report and properly understand the threats to professionalism that may be 
caused by client relationships, we first set out to properly understand the nature of lawyer-client 
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terms of engagement in today’s legal market. We asked our interviewees to tell us what sorts of 
requests their clients make that give them cause for concern, and that may impact their professional 
obligations. We then sought to draw out how these client requests have changed over time; 
whether particular types of client make particularly challenging requests; and whether panel 
relationships or the management of relationships through client relationship partners makes dealing 
with challenging requests any easier or harder. 
 
In this chapter of our report we therefore lay out what our interviewees told us about how their 
relationships with large clients operate today, how this has changed, and what are the most 
worrisome outcomes for them of current engagement processes. 
 
Changes to Terms of Engagement Over Time 
 
One of the principal messages that emerged from our first set of questions to interviewees, in which 
we couched in very broad terms our enquiries about how requests from clients have changed over 
time, was the concept of a shift in the balance of power. A large number of our interviewees talked 
of major corporates and financial institutions seeking to impose their own terms of engagement on 
law firms, and in particular to impose conflict provisions that go beyond regulatory requirements, 
such that the law firms are no longer in the driving seat on the terms by which they operate. While 
we accept that this change may be challenging for firms (and significantly so), increased power on 
the client side does not, in and of itself, engage issues of professional regulation or the various 
professional obligations. 
 
All of our interviewees told us that the panel terms that they must sign up to in order to be eligible 
for instructions have become longer and more detailed; that the terms clients are seeking to impose 
have become more onerous; and that the use of panels has itself become far more widespread. This 
is particularly the case in the five years since the credit crisis.  
 
We were told of a number of factors driving this trend. In particular, our interviewees identified the 
growth of the use of panels as a theme deriving from large American purchasers of legal services, 
who figured out some time ago that their buying power could be put to better use if they focused 
their attentions on fewer providers. As the use of panels became more popular in the United States 
throughout the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, so general counsel in Europe were exposed and 
made aware of the concept. We were told that large American corporations and financial 
institutions have often expanded into Europe and adopted the same buying practices; or they have 
relocated personnel to Europe who have shared experience; or personnel employed in legal teams 
at large American legal services buyers have moved jobs and shared their experience with European 
corporations and financial institutions. 
 
A further driver of the trend, we were told, has been the economic downturn, which has pushed in-
house legal departments to seriously reconsider spending on external legal advice, particularly at a 
time when legal and regulatory risk has moved rapidly up the corporate agenda. Our interviewees 
suggested that this focus on compliance risk, which is even more heightened within financial 
institutions, has also led to a much greater focus both on getting better value for money when 
buying legal services, and on the management of risk by the client organisations. As such, it is clear 
that major corporations and large financial institutions globally are now much more sophisticated 
purchasers of services from large law firms, and that competition among law firms to act for these 
clients is fierce. 
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This shift in the balance of power is of particular relevance in the context of legal market regulation, 
where the current guidance is, we would suggest, drafted with a view to protecting vulnerable 
(individual/personal/consumer) clients from much more sophisticated law firms in a way that is now 
arguably less relevant in the large firm-large client context. In her work on corporate lawyers, Joan 
Loughrey has questioned the extent to which the SRA approach to regulation fits the particular 
practices of law among the larger firms.63 We note, for example, that Chapter 1 of the SRA 
Handbook sets out an understanding of law firm-client engagement in which it is the law firm that 
sends its terms and conditions to the client at the start of any given matter.64 However, our 
interviewees told us that the majority of their work is now engaged on terms given to them by their 
clients and that firms are doing less and less work on their own terms and conditions: 
 
 “The general thrust of our compliance, as overseen by the SRA, involves a sort of perception 
of the relationship between lawyers and clients roughly along the lines of, on the one hand 
you have rather sort of benighted clients who never have worked with a large firm of 
lawyers, may not have ever worked with any firm of lawyers before, completely at sea, and 
really sort of don’t know what’s going on. And on the other hand, rather sort of wily lawyers, 
only too happy to take advantage of them, who need restraining by a proper system of 
regulation. And I can see all that. I think when it comes to city firms, the boot’s rather on the 
other foot.” EH COLP 3 
 
“But you’re required to sign a relationship agreement. It certainly doesn’t feel like a balanced 
relationship. They [clients] impose their terms; they won’t accept limits on liability; they 
won’t accept law firms’ terms of business – and some of that is totally unfair. They don’t see 
it as an equal relationship – that would for sure be clear. We are the kind of humble 
functionary in all of this.” EH Finance 8 
 
“We are pinpricks compared to some of the clients we have and the relationship is entirely 
biased one way.” EH COLP 13 
 
“I’ve seen in the past that firms, or in-house lawyers, simply peremptorily say ‘Well, you 
know, all very interesting about your terms and conditions, but ours prevail,’ and, you know, 
you are left in the end ordinarily in the uncomfortable position that whether or not that is 
correct as a matter of law is sometimes sort of just ignored and sort of the work got on with. 
The biggest thing I would say is just the imbalance, the sheer imbalance of the relationship 
now between large companies and law firms in a way that, when I started off my career, I 
acted for some of the world’s largest companies and certainly I would say nowadays I feel 
that imbalance far more than I did when I started my career.” EH Corporate 1 
 
Where commercial risk may arise is where lawyers pitching for work and anxious to generate 
revenue become more concerned about securing a panel appointment or large engagement than 
they are about the details of the client’s outside counsel guidelines. Furthermore, we found a 
significant amount of evidence that law firms believe they are presented with terms of engagement 
by their clients and have limited ability to negotiate. The majority of our interviewees told us that 
terms were presented as a ‘take it or leave it’ proposition, with law firms being told that if they did 
not accept the terms, the work would go elsewhere, with plenty of other law firms willing to sign up. 
It is perhaps ironic that clients come to these firms (in part) for their ability to negotiate but then do 
not accept their lawyers using those skills to negotiate their own terms of engagement. There is also 
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a third problem, highlighted better in Chapter 5, in that law firms and their lawyers may not be 
seriously, or appropriately, thinking about what the terms of their engagement are and how they 
need to adapt their practices to comply or to minimise risk. We wonder if some lawyers, and some 
firms, see terms of engagement simply as a cumbersome step towards winning work and not as a 
risk management issue that requires careful thought.  
 
“Annoyingly many of our clients refuse to negotiate. The bigger the client, the more they are 
likely to just take a view that they don’t negotiate. And we’ll get the thing that frustrates the 
hell out of me, that many partners don’t seem to second guess, but I certainly do, is, ‘Well, 
you know, we have a number of firms on our panel. All the others have signed this and no 
one’s raised any of the concerns you have’.” EH Conflicts Officer 
 
“We all know full well there are rivals out there who will be nipping at our heels if we don’t 
pretty much say yes to everything. And that is a constant concern in terms of the back of 
one’s mind.” EH Corporate 1 
 
“Increasingly in that exercise I feel we are kind of on the cusp of that almost becoming a sort 
of an irrelevant exercise, because now I think I am sensing that people are saying, ‘We don’t 
really care. These exceptions you are identifying, you’ve got to just sign up in full. Everybody 
else is signing up in full, nothing special about you. You’ve got to do it.’ I don’t think we are 
quite there but I sense that there is more push back coming down the line on those 
guidelines.” EH Corporate 2 
 
“You can’t push back. It is just not possible at all. If you don’t complete, if you don’t provide 
them with what they want then there are plenty of other people who will do. I mean at the 
end of the day whatever we might think, it is effectively a buyers’ market for large 
organisations seeking legal advice and we have to decide whether we are prepared to play 
their game or not, which is why we don’t frequently.” EH Corporate 3 
 
One particular challenge raised by law firms about the way appointment processes work today 
concerns the role of procurement teams in the relationship. We were told that the days of partners 
at law firms negotiating with general counsel about the terms of an engagement are gone, and today 
procurement teams within major corporates and financial institutions will typically oversee the 
appointment process. In this context, several interviewees referenced the supermarket supplier 
analogy, referring to the way in which suppliers to supermarkets are forced to compete vigorously to 
get those companies to sell their products, often with profit margins challenged considerably as a 
result: 
 
“It’s a competitive market…law firms should be treated in a different league to other 
suppliers of goods and services. What we’re seeing increasingly is that we’re actually no 
longer dealing with lawyers in the legal department, more dealing with the business people 
who are actually dealing with procurement. We’re dealing with procurement professionals 
for our panel negotiations and so any notion that this is a two-way relationship is completely 
gone in my view.” EH Finance 2 
 
This changed practice by clients may make perfect commercial sense, and the ‘competitive market’ 
point in the above quotation is important. As we discussed earlier, there is a healthy market for 
corporate and finance legal services from large law firms and we were struck, on occasion, by our 
interviewees focusing on their relationships with clients/future clients and not necessarily on the 
wider market in which they were competing against other firms for work.  
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The SRA asked us to explore with law firms whether particular types of clients make particularly 
challenging requests. We were told that financial institutions are the most prolific users of law firm 
panels, and that US banks in particular have developed sophisticated terms of engagement for their 
legal services providers. Major corporations also make use of panels, but corporate practices do not 
deal with panel engagement terms on anything like the routine basis that their peers working in 
financial services do. Some large buyers of legal services, such as private equity firms, still rarely 
institute such formal buying processes. 
 
Despite around three quarters of our interviewees outlining a scenario whereby they are being 
forced to accept more and more onerous terms of engagement with little room for discussion, we 
did find that four or five of the firms we interviewed routinely pushed back on terms that they 
deemed unacceptable. Crucially, these firms continued to get instructions, including where they 
refused to accept positions on panels because of terms that they could not get comfortable with. 
The perception, therefore, that ‘everyone is agreeing’ appears misplaced: 
 
“Individual partners are generally very timid about doing anything to rock the boat. We do 
push back on some terms, we do talk to some clients and I’m a big believer in what’s really 
important is that firms, if they sign up to these terms, do so openly and say ‘Yes, we’re 
accepting that restriction’, rather than letting it sort of just run in the background and breach 
them. And again, can you negotiate them? Some clients you can, some you can’t. For those 
clients that won’t listen and won’t negotiate it is a bit of a power struggle issue, it’s often 
used as a kind of well you agreed to our terms or you’re just not through to the next stage of 
the process.” EH COLP 10 
 
“We’ve certain bank clients here where we’re off panel and we do a significant amount of 
work for them off panel and we love it.” US COLP 1 
 
“I take the view that we’re effectively a very large organisation ourselves, so we have the 
ability to say no if we want to say no. I don’t feel we’re like the supermarket supplier who has 
its pricing terms squeezed by the [large supermarkets] of this world and can’t do much about 
it, and I don’t think the law firms, the major law firms, are really in that position.” EH 
Corporate 8 
 
“We’ve turned down some big financial institutions where they’ve said, ‘You would not act in 
a hostile takeover against us,’ and we’ve thought, well look there are a number of clients 
we’ve currently got that might well want to do that.” EH Corporate 2 
 
Interestingly, we did not find any relationship between either the size of the firm or its heritage (US 
versus English law firms), in terms of an ability, or willingness, to push back on terms. As we come to 
discuss later on in this report, in some firms the COLP or General Counsel is used to negotiate terms 
direct with the client. This interviewee (US Finance 2) referenced the strength of the client 
relationship in determining the ability to negotiate deviations from standard terms: 
 
Q “Do you get much room for negotiation when they send you a pack like that?...You 
do?” 
R “Yeah.” 
Q “That's interesting, because some firms say the opposite. It must be the way you sit.” 
R “The stronger your relationship with the organisation is, the more you have.”   
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We would argue that the strength of relationship in this context refers to the confidence of the law 
firm to push a point that it is unhappy with, which may in turn relate to the law firm’s perception of 
its own importance to the client, and the client’s overarching desire to instruct the firm.  
 
CLIENT REQUESTS THAT GIVE CAUSE FOR CONCERN 
 
Commercial Challenges 
 
While client requests have clearly become more numerous, lengthy, and sophisticated in detail, we 
found mixed views amongst partners as to whether these changes give them cause for concern in 
anything other than a commercial context. Undoubtedly the biggest challenges for law firms that 
come out of panel requirements are financial, with fee arrangements a particular issue. Many of our 
respondents talked of pricing that bordered on uneconomic, which in turn creates risk to quality and 
service levels, but that is a commercial decision that firms must make when choosing whether or not 
to accept an engagement. All regulated firms, in any industry, need to decide whether they can meet 
the required standards at the going rate. If they cannot, their practices become unviable.  
 
“If you’re an in-house lawyer you’re balancing the risk of the thing going wrong against the 
price. And if the risk is pretty low and there’s lots and lots of firms who can do that sort of 
stuff, why not go for the cheapest apparently competent firm?” EH COLP 6 
 
“Some of those fee arrangements are really quite tough, sort of the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. Also I think reflecting the fact that the market is not growing at the moment 
and so there are a lot of law firms broadly competing for the same work. So clients have the 
opportunity to sort of play one firm off against another. But that pressure on fees, and some 
of those discounts are quite significant and where we might be held to a fee rate which was 
the rate enforced three or four years ago. That puts pressure because partners know they are 
judged in part by reference to realisation.” US COLP 4 
 
Several firms that we spoke to had introduced pricing committees with a view to mitigating the risks 
associated with pressures on pricing, essentially taking the decision on whether to accept 
challenging fee arrangements out of the hands of the partners most closely tied to the client 
relationship. This strikes us as a useful, and sensible, commercial development. 
 
Two other issues were mentioned in the context of client pressure which, on balance, we consider to 
be commercial rather than professional in their implications. First was the use of strict billing 
requirements, which many firms talked about as an issue, whereby bills to large financial institutions 
must be presented in a certain way otherwise they will simply not be paid. Like fees, these 
requirements do not impact professional obligations but do change the balance of power, as this 
interviewee points out: 
 
“You have hugely stringent billing requirements, like if you do not submit your bill within 
three days of the end of the month to which it relates you don't get paid full-stop, or you 
don't get paid for another three months or something of that sort. Massive credit periods, 90 
days, 120 days, things of that nature. And increasingly highly complex, very difficult to use 
computer billing systems, for which we often have to pay to be trained as a condition of 
acting for the client. They don't all directly impact on our professional obligations, but they 
distort our professional relationship, and when you're signing up with a client of that sort day 
one, the idea of trust and faith just goes out the window. They quite clearly demonstrate by 
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their approach they don't trust you, they're not interested in trusting you, they want to 
manage you within an inch of your life. It is difficult acting for people like that.” EH COLP 1 
 
Finally, several firms talked about difficult requirements on data protection that restricted the way 
in which the firm and its employees could work on a day-to-day basis. For example, we were told of 
banks that insisted the law firms that they employ cannot allow their employees to work on laptops 
on their files, or may not be allowed access to web-based email services such as Hotmail because of 
perceived security risks. These requests can run entirely counter to a firm’s own policies (e.g. that 
work email addresses not be used for personal communications). We accept that there may be 
challenging issues for firms balancing confidentiality duties to different clients in complying with 
multiple, different data protection policies. 
 
Challenges That Interviewees Accept 
 
Some of the things that we asked our interviewees about were, in their own minds, generally less 
important and less concerning. These were: 
 
[i] Secondments 
 
The SRA wanted us to ask whether partners experienced clients asking them to take secondees, and 
what the implications of doing so  were for the confidential information of other clients. We were 
told that firms now routinely provide outbound secondees to large clients – raising separate issues 
dealt with below – but inbound secondees are a much rarer occurrence. Where (a minority of) firms 
were accepting secondees from their clients into their firms, they were well aware of the risks to the 
confidential information of other clients, and only accepted the secondees where they were 
confident the risks could be managed with proper systems and controls. While these firms did not 
present inward secondees as of significant concern to them (i.e. risks were present, but they were 
seen as manageable and managed) we can see how those situations must offer up real and 
challenging issues for firms as regards confidentiality, data security, managing competing duties to 
different clients etc.  
 
On the topic of outbound secondments – which themselves raise commercial challenges for firms 
obligated under panel terms to provide resource to clients at their own cost – a number of 
challenges were brought to our attention. One of these was ‘virtual secondments’, raised by one 
interviewee: 
 
“The biggest challenge we have at the moment is what we call virtual secondments, where a 
client wants us to second someone, but they want them to be seconded while staying here in 
the office. Working, say, two days a week for the client. And that’s actually very difficult, 
because that then generates all sorts of problems. Because generally we tend to view a 
secondment as the individual goes off on secondment and they are under the control of the 
client, and generally we don’t require them to conflicts-check every piece of work they do for 
the client. Because we say, “For the purposes of that secondment they’re quarantined”.  But 
that doesn’t work if they’re here.” EH Conflicts Officer 
 
Another issue raised in the context of outbound secondments was the unwillingness of the 
recipients to accept liability for the individuals concerned: 
 
“We accept that information the secondees are privy to at the bank is confidential to the 
bank, we accept all of that. In terms of insurance and liability, with indemnities we’ve seen 
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some quite aggressive approaches from some of the banks. It’s quite difficult when we’re not 
allowed to have conversation with the employee, with the secondee, who remains on our 
head count rather than the bank, and there are some junior people as well as senior people. 
So they require us to not have the conversation with the employee as to what are you doing, 
what are you up to and… and then accept liability for their actions.” EH Finance 2  
 
Finally, the growing use of secondments in itself gives rise to interesting dynamics within in-house 
teams, such that lawyers from one firm can be taking instructions from a client, and negotiating a 
position, only to find that the ‘client’ is actually a lawyer from a competitor firm. We were told: 
 
“It used to be that you'd have one secondee in a legal department surrounded by 12 or 13 full 
time lawyers, now you've got six secondees in a legal department of nine people and it 
doesn't work for us as it used to.” EH Finance 5 
 
The potential for breaches of confidentiality on inbound and outbound secondments strikes us as 
being high, but our interviewees were confident that this potential could be, and was being, 
managed appropriately. We did not, however, have the time to understand exactly why this was the 
case. 
 
[ii] Audit provisions 
 
Secondly, we were asked by the SRA to find out whether clients were asking to audit law firms’ IT 
systems; whether firms were allowing them to do so; and how firms protected the confidential 
information of other clients during those audits. We were asked to look into this as an example of a 
situation where conflicts or independence might be challenged so we could understand how it was 
managed. 
 
Our interviewees told us that audit provisions were indeed becoming more common, and audits 
were being conducted more frequently. However, firms viewed these audits as a time-consuming 
administrative challenge for the most part, and all seemed confident in their ability to protect the 
confidential information of other clients during these processes. One COLP explained: 
 
“We’ve got one ongoing at the moment, and well, it is just like pulling teeth, because they’re 
– you know – It’s some administrator with a tick box checklist, and, yeah, it’s taking just an 
enormous amount of time. Just to go through and answer –it’s not that we can’t answer the 
questions, it’s just that it physically takes so much time. So, yes, audit provisions. Very, very 
common across a lot of these. I think this is the first one that I’m aware of that’s actually 
come in and done this. This is an IT security audit. I mean, there are two classes of audit 
provisions. There are general, ‘We want to come in and audit you’, and then there’s the, ‘We 
want to come in and audit your IT infrastructure’. And it’s very intrusive. Sometimes you just 
have to say, ‘Look, we’re not prepared to tell you exactly how to hack into our system, thank 
you very much.’ You know? Sometimes the questions they ask are incredibly intrusive. To 
things that are actually none of their business.” EH COLP 7 
 
One might see this approach as firms being forced into managing cyber risks via client regulation 
through terms of engagement. One might also question whether such practices give rise to threats 
to duties of confidentiality to different clients. Together, secondments, data protection management 
and IT audits strike us as combining to form very serious challenges to confidentiality with which 
firms are needing to grapple. 
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Less Widespread Challenges That Cause Concern 
 
In addition to the widespread concerns set out above and explored further in subsequent chapters, 
and the SRA concerns that we explored and found not to be particularly worrisome for firms, several 
issues were raised by only a few respondents but nevertheless strike us as concerning. 
 
In this category, several interviewees talked about Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses in fee 
agreements, whereby firms sign up to guaranteeing the client in question that its fees will be the 
best available to any of the firm’s clients. Such provisions are difficult to enforce, because fee 
arrangements are increasingly complex based on several variables beyond pure hourly rates, and 
potentially give rise to issues about acting in the best interests of other clients. We are concerned 
about how firms manage competing duties to different clients where MFN clauses require some, 
even abstract, disclosure of agreed fee rates, billing practices etc. We were told: 
 
“The sort of provisions that cause me concern would be sort of most favoured nation 
provisions in terms of fees, because they are almost impossible to police and almost 
impossible to deliver. In that sense they’re also potentially anti-competitive themselves in 
that they prevent you doing different deals with different people.” EH COLP 10 
 
A “Things like best rates, so somebody may offer you relatively modest amounts of 
work but they want you to guarantee you will match the best rates and of course 
what we do for our very best clients is not something we’d want to give to everyone 
and they would feel pretty offended if we did. So trying to balance those interests. 
Q Does that give rise to issues of confidentiality for other clients or I suppose they 
wouldn’t know which clients are getting which rates? 
A No, that’s right. But they, some of them, the more ambitious ones do actually take us 
into dangerous territory with confidentiality because they insist on knowing things 
about what we are up to.” EH COLP 13 
 
“It’s very difficult to police, particularly if you’re multijurisdictional, as well as difficult to 
compare apples to apples. Clearly impacting on duties to other clients. And we do have 
clients that talk to each other about fees that they pay us, so you can’t take the view that no 
one will ever find out.” US COLP 2 
 
The other area of concern here related to clients dictating to their firms how matters should be 
handled, and specifically how they should be resourced. We were told: 
 
“There’s also an increasing tendency for clients to set out what they will and won’t pay for, in 
terms of the legal work undertaken. So a classic example would be if you have a partner and 
an associate working on a matter and the partner and the associate need to speak to each 
other to agree what’s going to be done or consider some options, you’ll see some of the 
outside counsel guidelines will say that they will only pay for the time of the more senior of 
the two lawyers engaged in that conversation. Which in my view is completely and utterly 
crackers because how else, unless you say every single matter that you instruct us on you 
should only expect to have a partner working on it and not have any assistant or associate, 
that just does not make sense because how can more than one person work on the same 
matter unless they communicate with each other?” EH COLP 9 
 
In this area, Ben Heineman (former GC at GE) and David Wilkins have questioned whether we will 
have a “lost generation” of associates who were unable to secure the training and development they 
 
 
 
27 
needed because of fee pressures from clients. We expect that the SRA would have little sympathy 
here, and that they would expect the associates to receive the training they needed, at the firm's 
cost.65 Other firms raised issues with terms that obliged them to effect introductions to other clients 
of the firm that may be useful to the instructing client; to share information on the profitability of 
the instructing client’s work for the firm vis-à-vis other clients; and not to purchase supplies for the 
firm from providers that were competitors of the instructing client. In all of these instances, 
interviewees accepted the blurring of the line between commercial and professional pressures, but 
highlighted the balance of power challenges that arose. 
 
HOW FIRMS MANAGE OUTSIDE COUNSEL GUIDELINES 
 
As panel arrangements, outside counsel guidelines and other engagement terms have changed over 
time, so too firms have had to adapt their own internal processes to cope with these changes. Here, 
we explored with our interviewees the role of client relationship partners in deciding whether or not 
to accept terms put forward by clients, and the role of the COLP and other risk professionals in 
monitoring and mitigating issues arising from client terms. 
 
In subsequent chapters we will explore the role of client relationship partners and COLPs in 
identifying, managing and mitigating risks within their firms. Suffice to say here that many of the 
firms that we interviewed still left primary responsibility for accepting or refusing engagement terms 
with the partner instructed, though these individuals were frequently (but not exclusively) expected 
to run terms past the COLP or risk team before making the call. In many firms, any decision to 
deviate from the law firm’s standard terms should be referred up to the COLP and/or to a risk 
committee of some description, but while these systems have been put in place in the past few 
years, not all COLPs were confident that they were seeing everything that the firm had signed up to: 
 
“I wouldn’t say it’s 100% but it’s quite close now…I’ve taken over conflicts as well as risk and 
compliance. So I should see everything. I should see all the requests to pitch.” EH COLP 5 
 
“But anyway those sorts of issues come through the risk management board, but do we have 
a ‘You must submit all OCG or SLAs that you sign to the risk management board’? No. So on 
the agenda for the next risk management board will be what do we think might work in this 
regard?” EH COLP 9 
 
“So within our firm it has tended to be, that it’s down to individual partners, we’re getting 
better at requiring these things to come in centrally and involve some kind of central review. 
Would that lead to a significant change in how we manage them? Not as things stand, 
because what is the argument, we say to the client partner ‘We need to go back and say no 
to this’, but if we say no we’re not on the panel, therefore all the work we invested in getting 
on the panel is lost and a stream of future income is lost.” EH COLP 10 
 
In addition to terms of engagement being entered into by individual partners beyond the knowledge 
of the COLP, we also found some evidence of engagement terms being sent midway through a deal 
out to firms by clients, when they would normally, and should, have been signed upfront as required 
by the Handbook. Two or three partners raised this practice: 
 
“It’s almost like battle of the forms, so when you get instructed you’ll have a conversation 
with [Bank C], for example, and it’s, okay, you’ll act for the bank in executing this security 
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and negotiating this loan agreement, and you’re very careful about the areas that you know 
are crossed over or areas that are more risky. But then halfway through after the transaction 
lands on your desk your formal instructions are coming from somewhere else, which says: 
‘you’ll generally look after the interests of the bank’. You say, ‘Hang on a minute, no, we did 
not agree to do that’. So, it can be a bit tricky. I had on a recent job with [Bank C] actually 
where I got fed up. I had the more general terms of engagement sent to me. I ended up 
marking them up and striking out most of it and saying, ‘I did not agree to do this’. But you 
could see someone missing that if they weren’t correctly supervised, and the firm being liable 
in a situation where it perhaps wasn’t anticipating it. I think they’re quite mischievous in the 
way they do that.” EH Finance 7  
 
It is not, in and of itself, wrong for a client to be ‘mischievous’. But these practices signal a shift in 
the way in which law firms are engaged – specifically, when that engagement takes place and where 
the terms of engagement come from – which we would suggest is not reflected in the SRA 
Handbook.  
 
In Chapter 3 we look at firms signing up to terms with which they know they cannot comply, and 
taking a ‘pragmatic’ view of challenging terms. Finally, one partner raised the issue of clients 
changing terms and conditions of engagement midway through a relationship, particularly in the 
context of panel terms: 
 
“What we also get is that clients get taken over and they have new terms, or clients suddenly 
revise their terms. Historically there’s been this huge push from the SRA and everybody to 
send the client the engagement letter, and we have a beautiful engagement letter, and we 
do send it out but quite often it comes back and they say ‘No, these are the terms on which 
you’re engaging with us’. And even if we’ve been engaged on our terms for a decade, 
suddenly it’s like this, which they’re perfectly at liberty to do, but what I struggle with is most 
fee-earners don’t appreciate that they don’t necessarily have to say yes. The other thing we 
get is a client who’s been taken over and is seeking to renegotiate everything, here’s the 
terms, that sort of thing. That comes through quite a lot. And actually our guys are very slow 
off the mark with that, because usually they’re concentrating so hard on maintaining the 
continuity of contact with the personnel involved that they kind of think, ‘Oh, we’ll just let 
that happen’.” EH COLP 11 
 
We mention this because we suspect this was not the only firm to have had this experience, even 
though the matter was not mentioned by other respondents. It also returns to the theme of the 
changing nature of engagement terms generally, and the overarching concern about a shifting 
balance of power that potentially runs counter to the current drafting of the SRA Handbook. These 
issues cumulate to derive at the question of whether the SRA Handbook adequately reflects modern 
practice in large law firms.  
 
The three chapters that follow are each set out in three parts. They begin with scene setting: an 
overview of the relevant laws and regulatory practices. The middle part of these three chapters then 
sets out our findings from our interviews. The final parts offer up our views on the data – that is  
whether we think, as a result of the data, that the issues raised are purely commercial matters or 
whether they have the potential to engage either the regulatory objectives contained in the Legal 
Services Act 2007 or the professional obligations on lawyers in the SRA Handbook. 
 
 
 
29 
CHAPTER 3 - INFLUENCING ACCESS TO REPRESENTATION 
 
In this chapter, we consider how clients are able to influence who their lawyers represent and do not 
represent. This is partly about what we might term purely ‘legal conflicts’ (e.g. Firm X acting for two 
of its clients, A and B, at the same time on the same matter), but is more largely concerned with 
what we might term: (i) ‘contentious conflicts’ (e.g. Firm X acting on a litigation matter opposite one 
of its clients where that client is represented by another law firm); and (ii) ‘commercial conflicts’ 
(e.g. Firm X being asked to act by Client B on a transactional or advisory matter which is adverse to, 
or against the interests of Client A, even where the firm is not acting for Client A in that matter; or 
more generally where Firm X acts for Client A and Client B who both operate in the same industry, 
geographic area etc - what one might usefully think of as the Pepsi-Coke divide).66 The first part of 
this chapter discusses how conflicts are regulated by the SRA and wider commentary on conflicts by 
scholars, before we turn in the second part to what our interviewees told us about conflicts and 
access to representation.  
 
CONFLICTS: LEGAL, CONTENTIOUS AND COMMERCIAL 
 
Principle 4 of the SRA’s 10 Principles, which, “define the fundamental ethical and professional 
standards that [the SRA] expects of all firms”67, sets out that a lawyer, “must act in the best interests 
of each client”.68 The guidance to this principle details that a lawyer, “should always act in good faith 
and do [their] best for each of [their] clients,” and goes on to specifically reference a lawyer’s, 
“obligations with regard to conflicts of interest”.69 Conflicts of interest are then further elaborated 
on in Chapter 3 of the SRA’s Code of Conduct.70 The SRA Code establishes outcomes-focused 
conduct requirements, and each chapter outlines outcomes to be achieved and a series of linked 
‘indicative behaviours’. This is a shift in approach from the 2007 Code, which had detailed rules on 
conflicts of interest, particularly in respect of conveyancing. The SRA says that this new approach 
places, “greater emphasis on identifying and dealing with conflicts in all types of matters, and having 
systems and controls to enable [the lawyer] to do so”.71 The current content of the Handbook in 
relation to conflicts of interest is based very closely on the rules introduced by the SRA in 2006 
(found in the Code of Conduct 2007), which were themselves based on wording prepared by a 
committee set up at the request of the Law Society in 2000.72 As such, the regulation of conflicts of 
interest has undergone significant reform in recent years.  
 
The first part of Chapter 3 of the current Code is worth setting out in full: 
 
“This chapter deals with the proper handling of conflicts of interests, which is a critical 
public protection. It is important to have in place systems that enable you to identify 
and deal with potential conflicts. Conflicts of interests can arise between: 
1. you and current clients ("own interest conflict"); and 
2. two or more current clients ("client conflict"). 
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You can never act where there is a conflict, or a significant risk of conflict, between you 
and your client. 
 
If there is a conflict, or a significant risk of a conflict, between two or more 
current clients, you must not act for all or both of them unless the matter falls within the 
scope of the limited exceptions set out at Outcomes 3.6 or 3.7. In deciding whether to 
act in these limited circumstances, the overriding consideration will be the best interests 
of each of the clients concerned and, in particular, whether the benefits to the clients of 
you acting for all or both of the clients outweigh the risks. 
 
You should also bear in mind that conflicts of interests may affect your duties of 
confidentiality and disclosure which are dealt with in Chapter 4. The outcomes in this 
chapter show how the Principles apply in the context of conflicts of interests.”73 
 
As set out above, it is not possible for a lawyer to act where there is an ‘own interest conflict’ or a 
significant risk of an ‘own interest conflict’.74 As regards ‘client conflict’, the Code of Conduct 
requires a law firm to have in place effective systems of identification and controls, such that firms 
are able to assess the following factors, namely whether: (a) the clients' interests are different; (b) 
the lawyer’s ability to give independent advice to the clients may be fettered; (c) there is a need to 
negotiate between the clients; (d) there is an imbalance in bargaining power between the clients; or 
(e) any client is vulnerable. The SRA sets out that lawyers may act, with appropriate safeguards, 
where there is a client conflict and those clients have a substantially common interest if, among 
other matters, the following criteria are met: (a) the lawyer has explained the relevant issues and 
risks to the clients,75 and has a reasonable belief that they understand those issues and risks; (b) all 
the clients have given informed consent in writing to the lawyer; (c) the lawyer is satisfied that it is 
reasonable for them to act for all the clients and that it is in the clients’ best interests; and (d) the 
lawyer is satisfied that the benefits to the clients of doing so outweigh the risks.76  
 
Similar conditions, although not as strict, apply to where there is a client conflict and lawyers wish to 
act for multiple clients competing for the same objective.77 In March 2015, an updated practice note 
on conflicts of interest was published by the Law Society.78 It adds very little substance to the SRA 
Code. The Legal Services Act 2007 does not reference conflicts of interest and, perhaps as a 
consequence, the LSB does not specifically discuss conflicts in its paper on the meanings behind the 
regulatory objectives.79 However, we would suggest that the theory and practice of conflicts goes 
directly to impacts on access to justice, to the independence of the profession, to competition in the 
provision of legal services and, arguably, protecting and promoting the public interest. As set out 
above, the SRA appears to accept the last of these in describing conflicts of interest (in Chapter 3 of 
the Code) as “a critical public protection”. We come back to these matters in the final section of this 
chapter.  
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In England and Wales, Canada and the US, lawyers have “lobbied for conflicts rules to be 
relaxed…and advanced similar arguments for support, namely that reform served client needs and 
was necessary to reflect the realities of modern practice.”80 Other studies, in the US, Australia and 
UK, have found lawyers seeking to find ways around legal conflicts rules, either to increase the firm’s 
profit and/or to keep an individual lawyer at the firm content.81 However, our concern with this 
report lies not in this area. We were not asked to discuss the ‘legal’ conflicts rules, nor did our 
interviewees raise those rules as matters of concern to them, save in one specific context (where 
conflicts rules in jurisdiction A conflict with conflicts rules in Jurisdiction B – discussed below).82  
 
For lawyers, conflicts of interests can be much wider than is currently envisaged by the conflicts 
rules. Conflicts as a concept (and not just as a rule) can speak to more amorphous, and thus more 
challenging (and harder to define),83 issues in the relationships between lawyers, their firms, their 
clients, opposite counsel and the regulators. As such, conflicts can more widely concern: who gets 
paid what and when; how a lawyer is promoted and/or remunerated; the relative importance of any 
given client to the firm and/or individual lawyer; and the potential for a lawyer to improperly favour 
one client over another. Legal conflicts and the SRA’s conflicts rules are, in one sense, relatively 
straightforward. But the wider world of conflicts is, “a rich and subtle area that has a great deal to do 
with the way in which legal practice is organised”.84  
 
Christine Parker and Adrian Evans argue that, “It would be naïve to assume that complete client 
loyalty in all one’s thinking and acting as a lawyer can be guaranteed, and all conflicts avoided.”85 On 
this latter point, it is inherent in the nature of service provision that conflicts exist: the provider 
wants to be remunerated at X; and the payer wants to pay Y. As such, lawyer conflicts (in the widest 
sense) go to core issues of independence (discussed in the following Chapter) and loyalty. While this 
is not the place to rehearse the fiduciary duties that lawyers owe,86 irrespective of what the SRA’s 
Code of Conduct says, it is perhaps worthwhile setting out the key passage by Millett LJ on the duty 
of loyalty from the seminal case in this field Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew: 
 
“The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core liability 
has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of 
his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may 
conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the 
informed consent of his principal.”87 
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As Flenley and Leech set out, “The core facet of the duty of loyalty [of a lawyer] is the obligation to 
act at all times in good faith and in the interests of each client and not to prefer the interests of one 
client over the interests of the other.”88 This is a matter to which we return in the final section of this 
chapter. In 2012, Janine Griffiths-Baker and Nancy Moore wrote that they anticipated that, at some 
point, a large corporate client would sue a global law firm for damages based on breach of duty, 
“arising from allegations of impermissible conflicts”.89 We are not aware of any such case to date.90 
However, one could also imagine the situation, which we discuss below, where a court finds itself 
obliged to consider the duty of loyalty where a firm declines to act for Client X, an existing client of 
the firm, because of contractual obligations to Client Y, another existing client, in situations outside 
the scope of the legal conflict rules. Here, we are drawn to a dictum of Judge Ann Aldrich in a well-
known case in the US on conflicts in which the judge observed that, “A firm may not drop a client 
like a hot potato, especially if it is in order to keep happy a far more lucrative client.”91 It strikes us 
that much of the emphasis in the SRA’s conflicts rules is on lawyers’ obligations in relation to given 
matters rather than the complex relationships between firms and their suite of clients within and 
without the context of specific matters. Challenges from these complex relationships may, however, 
be reflected in other Principles found in the Handbook: acting in the best interests of each client 
(Principle 4 – although we accept this is framed as a matter centric obligation); acting with integrity 
(Principle 2); and not allowing one’s independence to be compromised (Principle 3). 
 
Much of the previous empirical work has considered situations in which lawyers comment on, or 
seek to avoid, the legal conflict rules.92 The small scale study of Australian in-house lawyers by 
Suzanne le Mire and Christine Parker goes beyond this. They found a variety of practice as regards 
which clients would and would not allow ‘contentious conflicts’ and ‘commercial conflicts’ (as we 
term them) and concluded that, “Overall, in-house counsel saw dealing with [these sorts of] conflicts 
appropriately as a matter of the relationship between in-house counsel and external lawyers.”93 
What will be shown below is that, at least for some clients using UK-based law firms, the issue is not 
one of relationships but of contract.  
 
Joan Loughrey has argued that allowing lawyers to act for multiple clients on unrelated matters, 
“fails to protect client interests because unrelated matter representation risks lawyers, consciously 
or unconsciously, failing to do their best for less profitable clients; clients may feel betrayed and thus 
become less likely to trust their lawyers, which would impair the quality of legal advice they give; 
and since they may not know of such representation, clients may be deprived of the opportunity to 
assess and safeguard their interests.”94 There is the inherent risk, raised by le Mire and Parker, that, 
“sometimes large law firms might intentionally drop smaller, less powerful clients in order to act for 
larger, richer clients who they hope will give them more work.”95 As we will come to see, some 
clients have afforded themselves, via contract, the power to both prevent firms acting for other 
entities and also to know who else a firm acts for, or plans to act for (which may breach duties of 
confidentiality).  
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The practical reality of how conflicts play out gives rise to a paradox. Our data, discussed below, will 
show that clients often want lawyers who have experience. Experience comes, at least in part, from 
acting for multiple sides and interests on multiple and varied matters in multiple geographic regions. 
But where conflicts provisions in lawyer terms of engagement restrict for whom that lawyer can act, 
does this not have an effect, a detrimental effect, on the breadth and depth of expertise that that 
lawyer can gain? In her study of conflicts in the US in the early 2000s, Susan Shapiro interviewed 128 
practising attorneys. She found that some clients in some sectors were willing to be less concerned 
about conflicts, and were willing to forgo the absolute devotion of a given firm to a given client, if 
they were getting a lawyer with more experience.96 Our data seems to suggest that while many 
clients want lawyers with broad and deep experience, some clients also want (paradoxically) those 
lawyers to be very restricted in who else, if anyone, they can act for.  
 
Who lawyers can and cannot act for influences the market for legal services and, in particular, the 
shape and size of the litigation market. Whether access to representation might be inhibited as a 
result of conflicts provisions in client terms of engagement was one of the drivers for the SRA 
commissioning this research. Access to justice is commonly framed in terms of unmet legal need for 
the poorest, and perhaps most deserving, members of society. The concept does not guarantee the 
right to the lawyer of first choice (at any cost and in any situation). The LSB has recognised that 
‘access to justice’ is not just a matter for vulnerable consumers:  
 
“Access to justice is relevant to all consumers - individuals, groups, companies and 
organisations - from the smallest to the largest. It is not restricted by income, scale or 
importance to the client as it brings a sense of proportionality and fairness to all legal 
relationships, disputes and proceedings. Thus access to justice matters for small and 
large business alike, just as it does for the most vulnerable consumer.”97 
  
In his report for the government on banks’ lending practices, Lawrence Tomlinson said,  
 
“Any law firm that does business with the banks will have a clause in their contract, 
preventing them from taking action against the banks. This means that for businesses 
the pool of lawyers available to give them advice and take their case is extremely 
limited. When you consider the size of the banks and the amount of work they 
undertake with a range of legal professionals, it is clear to see the problems businesses 
have in finding legal advice. Many of the top law firms will be conflicted so even if the 
business has the resource to pay them, they are not able to access the same class of 
legal advice that the banks can. For many businesses, finding a suitable lawyer is thus 
exceedingly difficult. Often their own lawyer, who has helped them and their business 
for many years, is even unable to help in this situation.”98  
 
Our data, discussed in the sections which follow, both supports and challenges this statement.99  
Below, we set out the data from our interviewees on conflicts and representation. As will be seen, 
the concern of those we spoke to, and our own concern, is focused far more on wider, contentious 
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and commercial conflicts, and not so much on the (narrow) framing of legal conflicts of interest 
covered by the SRA’s Handbook. 
 
OUR FINDINGS 
 
In this section we consider the ability of influential clients to dictate to their legal advisers who they 
may or may not act for in other matters. When we asked our interviewees to give examples of what 
they considered to be particularly problematic provisions in client terms, provisions on conflicts 
were almost universally front of mind. As such, we consider here the implications of these client 
controls, both in terms of their capacity to impact professional obligations, and their potential role in 
inhibiting access to justice. 
 
No-litigation Clauses 
 
All of the partners that we spoke to expressed growing concern about the attempts by large clients 
to limit their capacity to act for other clients, for reasons that go beyond legal conflicts of interest as 
defined by the SRA. The most common grievance from partners was the ‘no litigation’ clauses 
imposed, most frequently through panel terms:  
 
“Effectively clients are deciding who we can act for. That is fundamentally what it comes 
down to. Virtually no client will allow us to litigate against them. And, you know, my own 
view is that this should be our decision.” US COLP 3 
 
“Obviously sometimes there will be situations where litigation is very far flung and we don’t 
feel there is any connection with the activities we have with them on a normal commercial 
basis. Then we might not feel constrained by the regulatory conflict procedure to have, say, 
our Australian arm suing them on an Australian matter whereas we tend to do UK work. So 
there are situations where the panel would create a constraint that wouldn’t probably 
operate by operation of normal regulation and that can be a concern.” EH Corporate 5 
 
Some framed ‘no sue’ conflicts clauses in terms of commercial concerns: 
 
“I do worry, as I’m sure many partners do, that we have a lot of clients who are imposing 
these restrictions on us, particularly the no litigation or no hostile action restrictions, in 
circumstances where they don’t actually intend to give us much business.”  
EH Conflicts Officer 
 
There were others who felt that these clauses had the potential to compromise their independence: 
 
“Clients who simply refuse outright to allow you to act against them on a contentious 
matter, irrespective of whether or not you seek consent, I think that to my mind does start to 
potentially compromise professional independence, in that if you have enough clients who 
are saying that to you, your ability to run a litigation practice, for example, alongside a 
commercial or transactional practice, is quite difficult. And I think it’s one of the reasons why 
we’ve seen a number of these boutique litigation firms starting up in the last five years.”  
US Corporate 1 
 
Of course the decision on whether or not to accept such clauses lies fairly and squarely with the law 
firm in question, and many of our interviewees – whilst finding the pressure to accept clauses to be 
significant – agreed that the challenge was a commercial rather than a regulatory one. 
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Where these ‘no litigation’ clauses do potentially give rise to concern is on an access point, and this 
is particularly with regard to large financial institutions. As set out at the start of this chapter, this 
was a matter that the SRA had specifically asked us to raise with our interviewees. Here, it is possible 
to advance an argument that corporations that wish to sue large banks and insurers, the vast 
majority of whom have panel agreements in place with major City law firms, will struggle to find 
legal representation with sufficient standing or resources to do so. This is particularly the case given 
that panel terms will often preclude firms from acting “in contentious or potentially contentious 
matters”. This requires firms to predict whether a matter may potentially get acrimonious, and if so, 
to turn that work away: 
 
“When we see someone take on a matter on the other side of where the banks are 
responsible for, we very often ask the partner concerned, ‘Is there a dispute here?  Do you 
see a dispute?  Is there a possibility of a dispute?’  Because from a business perspective we 
don’t want them taking on a job which then escalates into a dispute and causes damage to 
the relationship.” US Finance 2 
 
It can also lead to firms having to disassociate with clients midway through transactions if a fallout 
with a banking client looks possible. We were told that this is a particular issue in restructuring work: 
 
A “I’ve had a situation recently where something’s getting or got a bit ugly and we’ve 
had to say, “Look, if it does get litigious or to the stage of grumpy/threatening 
letters, then we won’t be able to act for you because of panel commitments to two 
or three of the banks involved.” 
 Q Do you know what happens to that client or didn’t it ever get to that stage? 
A I had a conversation with one of the guys about half an hour, about 45 minutes ago, 
so hopefully there’ll be a sensible, commercial solution. Because we put our hands up 
early doors, and said, “Look, just to be completely clear, we can’t…” And it’s in part 
because we’ve just been panelled by a particular bank and the last thing we want to 
do, having spent 18 months getting panelled, is to then go and, “Yeah, we’re suing 
you now!” EH Finance 1 
 
We do not have a definitive view on this matter, and our interviewees were broadly split down the 
middle as to whether or not ‘access to justice’ was being prejudiced by the banks’ insistence on no-
litigation clauses (and analogous issues in the insurance market). Around half of the firms that we 
spoke to were of the opinion that an industry of law firms willing to act adverse to major financial 
institutions had sprung up in London in the last five to 10 years, and that those firms had sufficient 
quality, breadth and depth of resources to to handle sizeable cases against the large law firms that 
typically represent the banks. As such, those wishing to sue were represented and represented well. 
One litigation partner told us: 
 
“If you look at the market there are a large number of firms out there, the boutiques, who 
will sue banks. And a lot of people have come into the market. Obviously XX is the stand-out 
name based off their reputation in the States and they’ve done very well. We’ve seen them a 
lot, we know the guys over there a lot and they’ve clearly done very well. But there’s also a 
whole list of other firms. So I certainly wouldn’t look at it and say it’s a market that is under 
served.” US Litigation 1 
 
Many others were of the view that the banks have panel arrangements with so many of the leading 
finance firms in the City that it has become difficult for a claimant with a sophisticated derivatives 
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dispute, for example, to find a law firm with comparable depth of knowledge and resource to bring a 
case: 
 
“I think you could always get representation. Frequently you would not get the 
representation of the same order as the bank. So all the firms with, you know, tonnes and 
tonnes of lawyers and resources and plenty of facilities to do all the preparations, IT 
enquiries into disclosure and things like that, they’ve already gone. So you’d be down to firms 
with maybe one or two partners. And they can put on surprisingly a pretty good show in 
normal circumstances, but they are not of an equal size or weight to the people on the other 
side. They don’t have masses of infrastructure and personnel to call on. And that’s one of the 
ways that litigation, as you know, is done. Especially big litigation. They immediately send 
out 20 trainees to write letters all day complaining about things, hoping to occupy you 
answering the letters rather than getting on and doing the work. So that sort of size can 
impact the sort of justice of the situation.” EH COLP 3 
 
Two related points were raised, one of which was the fact that there is very little significant litigation 
against financial institutions in the City, giving rise to debates about cause and effect. Secondly, 
several partners noted that there is a public perception issue at the heart of this matter, as regards a 
belief that the major law firms are in the pockets of the big banks. We query whether that in itself 
prevents more banking litigation getting off the ground: 
 
A “There’s a public perception issue of the fact that no large city law firm will sue the 
banks right? And so you, I mean you can draw your own conclusion about how 
independent we are right? 
Q Yeah. 
A And that’s-, that is well it’s not an issue obviously for me as a partner in this firm, but 
I think if you take a broader view of the independence of the profession, that is, for 
me, in the sort of soundbite world of Sky News or something, that in a nutshell is why 
I think the SRA should be worried, because that doesn’t look good.” EH Finance 11 
 
A number of law firms raised questions about the behaviour of the banks in this regard, and 
particularly made reference to the tactical use of instructions by some clients, such that firms are 
put on panels, or given mandates, precisely to remove the risk of them litigating against the bank in 
future. We were told: 
 
“Some years ago we were sent a little bit of litigation by [INVESTMENT BANK X] and three 
months’ later when we acted against them they said, ‘You can’t, you’ve got a conflict. You’ve 
acted for us.’ To which we said, ‘Go away! There’s absolutely no connection between the two 
matters. We don’t have a no sue agreement with you, on your bike!’ It was clear that they 
had sent us a little bit of work in order to raise that argument and we were having none of 
it.” EH COLP 12 
 
“With some of these companies you get the sense that it is being used tactically. So banks 
are notorious for doing these tactically but we also get some insurance entities doing this, 
where they spread their work quite widely but then say to those firms, ‘Of course, you won’t 
come up against us will you?’ So trying to deprive their opponents of their first choice firms. I 
think it’s disgraceful, utterly disgraceful, because it looks to us deliberate that they’ve spread 
their work. They have a lot of work to give so they’ve spread it out and so starve their 
opponents of the best legal advice.” EH COLP 13  
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“You can be pinned down and stopped from suing them without actually getting any work at 
all. I feel that’s a kind of a restraint of trade. Obviously, at the end of it, the panel 
arrangement, you can decide whether or not you want to sign up again, but most law firms 
are desperate enough to need the work and so sign up and go along with it.” EH Finance 12 
We only have one side of this story - we did not interview clients, nor did we interview litigation 
experts - and would need to verify if this tactical use of contract is, in fact, occurring and, if it is, who 
is doing it. However, if there are situations in which in-house lawyers are using contractual 
provisions solely to deny third parties representation, one might question whether those lawyers are 
acting in according with Principle 1 of the SRA’s Handbook, the obligation to “uphold the rule of law 
and the proper administration of justice.”  
Finally, we feel it is worth noting that this access challenge goes beyond even panel terms, and is in 
fact in many ways a behavioural rather than simply a contractual challenge. We were told, for 
example, that many banks will simply not employ law firms that sue banks, thereby discouraging law 
firms from acting against any financial institution in a contentious scenario, even against those 
institutions that are not – and never have been – their clients. When combined with the maxim that 
law firms simply must not sue banks that they wish to work for, whether or not it is explicitly set out 
in panel terms, we find a significant market challenge: 
 
“Very, very few law firms in the city will sue an investment bank, because certainly the bigger 
law firms tend to act for most of the investment banks. But even – and I can’t think of an 
obscure investment bank, they’re all household or cityhold names! – but if you pick one that 
we didn’t act for, it is unlikely that we would sue that investment bank, because our other 
investment bank clients wouldn’t appreciate us taking a position that could be averse or 
adverse to the investment banking industry as a whole.” US Corporate 2 
 
“Even if we weren’t under panel terms, as a relationship issue, if we act for a, you know, a 
small bank, and we were asked by an individual to have a pop at them, or a small client, we 
would think very carefully about it. Because of the impact it would have upon our 
relationship with the other banking clients. If we get a reputation for being free and easy to 
act against the banks, we fear that the main banks may think the less of us.” EH COLP 4   
 
Commercial Conflict Clauses 
 
Outside of litigation, we also found many partners to be worried about the use of conflicts provisions 
to prevent firms acting in commercial matters for their clients’ competitors, or to prevent them 
acting against a client’s commercial interests. 
 
We were told that stipulations against acting for competitors typically arise in a corporate context, 
rather than amongst financial institutions, and many of our interviewees referred to the classic 
argument that a law firm cannot act for both PepsiCo and Coca Cola. One corporate partner said:  
 
“I think probably the most problematical area in those sorts of scenarios is where clients are 
requiring that we don’t act for competing businesses in the same, perhaps, geographical 
area, or the same sector, if you like.” US Corporate 1 
 
Several interviewees drew a comparison here with conflicts practice in the United States, where 
clients would typically take a “for us or against us” approach, prohibiting their lawyers from advising 
their competitors: 
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“There is a greater tendency for US clients to say, ‘You are either for us or against us’. And 
particularly in certain sectors, ‘You can’t act for our competitors’. We would try to avoid that 
but that is a feature I think that is becoming increasingly common here, because in a number 
of ways we do tend to slightly follow the US market.” EH Corporate 5 
 
Of greater concern to many of our respondents, however, was the use of very broadly drafted 
conflicts provisions in panel agreements, which law firms frequently felt were impossible to comply 
with. These commercial conflict provision will often prohibit panel firms from acting against the 
client’s ‘interests’, or from taking a position adverse to the client, on any matter, anywhere in the 
world. We were told: 
 
“And the increasing, especially increasing over the last three years, appearance of what I 
would call the US term, that you won’t take a negative position. I suppose they started out a 
bit on purely no-suit clauses and they seem to have started to extend to you won’t take a 
negative position to us as an organisation or our position in the market, even if there’s not 
even a hint of a direct conflict as regards them being involved in a matter on the other side of 
another client.” EH COLP 8 
 
“We actually said that to a client about a year ago and we'd actually had done a bit of 
research and said, "Do you know how many subsidiaries we've discovered?" They looked at 
us and said, "No". "You've got 475". "Wow, we didn't know we had that many!" And they 
expect you to be able to track it. That is a real issue. For anyone smaller than us below the 
top 50/75 firms, it's going to be hard work. We can't do it completely but it would be really 
hard work for anyone to actually keep an eye on that.” EH COLP 1 
 
“You sometimes see terms that sort of elliptically refer to positions so you won’t take a 
position that’s adverse to us. So might that mean that for example if you were acting for 
Amazon you wouldn’t seek to take a case that talked about enforceability of contract offers 
made electronically through websites to sell goods? Possibly you could but I don’t think any 
client ever tries to go that far.” EH COLP 10 
 
Around a quarter of the firms that we spoke to told us that they simply refuse to sign up to clauses 
of this kind: 
 
“So a general requirement not to act for particular entities it is very, very rare that we agree 
it. It’s much more common for it to be requested. The generalised, you know, ‘You won’t act 
for people who are contrary to our interests.’ Gosh, we have to watch like hawks for that. 
And the trouble is all of our partners – well, not all of our partners, a number of our partners 
– are saying, ‘Look, you know, they’re demanding this, demanding this,’ and we really have 
to have a very eagle-eyed compliance team, who just says, ‘No. We are not prepared to 
agree that kind of thing.’ We don’t even understand what it means, let alone anything else.” 
EH Corporate 14 
 
More of an issue for the SRA, however, may be the number of firms that reported signing up to 
these clauses, well aware that they were not capable of monitoring or mitigating the risk of non-
compliance but instead taking a “pragmatic” view: 
 
“There are certain banks that you have to sign up to schedules, which contain terms we 
would never subscribe to nor would we include in our own forms of engagement letter. But 
the reality I think in lots of these things is that one has to take a pragmatic view – unless 
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there’s something which is known and specific, a situation or something where you just know 
we can’t do that or we can’t subscribe to that.” US COLP 1 
 
“We often take a pragmatic approach to these things, and internally decide, ‘Well, is this 
really something that we think we need to, you know, square away with them?’ And that’s 
done very much in consultation with the relationship partners, who know the client very well 
and over a period of time build up an understanding of the sorts of situations that actually 
the client is concerned about. But, you know, you do run the risk of not working to the letter 
of the agreement. Which is sort of perverse.” EH Conflicts Officer   
 
“What some clients are doing is putting forward a set of terms and conditions with which 
they know we can’t comply and they just say, ‘In so doing we are transferring the risk on this 
from us to them. We know they can’t comply, they know they can’t comply. Something goes 
wrong and we either will or will not sue them so.’ Putting that into a regulatory context I 
suppose you could say it is not the right action of a regulated entity to sign up to an 
agreement with which it knows it cannot reasonably comply.” EH Corporate 2 
 
“I think one of the other things that always worries me quite a lot is the way terms are 
written down are often, conflict terms in particular, are often quite imprecise and the partner 
will say, ‘Hey look, I think we are just going to have to take a deep breath and go with this 
but I’ve worked with them for years and they have always been really reasonable and 
everything, and I know they’ll interpret this to mean that.’ Which is fine while that partner 
and that lawyer are the people who are in charge of that relationship. If that changes – we 
had it with a major [XX] company recently, that we had agreed some wording, which wasn’t 
great but you could see how it meant what we thought it meant and it had always been 
interpreted that way. And someone new turns up and says, ‘That’s not what it means’.”  
US COLP 3 
 
Two issues that were brought to our attention with regard to such broadly drafted commercial 
conflict terms are perhaps more worrisome. First, a couple of interviewees highlighted the rule of 
law issues that arise from governments asserting that their lawyers cannot act against their 
interests. For example: 
 
“I think the whole issue of who you may or may not act for is a big one, and it does worry me 
the tendency of government clients to begin to request such exclusivity. There I have a real 
worry. Because I think it does give rise to rule of law issues. If governments start insisting 
that, as terms of appointment of their lawyers, those lawyers agree that they won’t act 
contrary to the government, bearing in mind the size of governments, you could soon find all 
the major firms in a particular jurisdiction are not entitled to represent people against the 
government.  And I think that’s quite serious from a liberties point of view.” EH Corporate 14 
 
Second, several firms gave examples of offending large financial institutions – with whom they had 
panel relationships – when acting for other clients on matters where the banks felt the firms were 
acting against the bank’s interests. These so-called ‘issue conflicts’, where the position taken by a 
law firm for one client can be detrimental to the position another client would like to take on 
another unrelated transaction, can be particularly tricky for large law firms to navigate. These 
matters also have the potential to go to the independence of the lawyer, or firm (which we discuss 
in the chapter that follows). We were given two examples: 
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“We were acting for a XX financial sponsor and it was a big deal. They were new to the [YY] 
market, so one of the reasons they obviously came to us, is we’ve got experience, expertise in 
[YY], so they said ‘We want to raise this finance and we want you to do, to help us with the 
terms’. So we had long conversations with them, what terms do you expect to get, there’s a 
sort of variety in the [YY] market and they said, ‘We want to be aggressive’. So fine, we go 
and get a cross-section of deals that are being done in the market, we helped them put 
together the terms. We were then hauled in to see the arranging banks who we weren’t 
acting for, who essentially said to us, ‘You are acting against our interests’. To which we said, 
‘Well when we’re acting for you, you expect us to do the best we can for you right?  Well if 
we’re not acting for you, we do the best for our other clients,’ but they wanted to kick 
somebody, they were pretty disappointed. They felt that that was us pushing terms to them 
that they wouldn’t otherwise have thought about. And that that was contrary to our 
relationship with the banks. So that definitely goes to the whole independence of the firm 
because they’re basically saying, on the next one, ‘We don’t want you to do it’. Which of 
course we said, ‘Well I’m sorry that’s not acceptable.’” EH Finance 11 
 
“We have been on the side of the table of a borrower client where we have negotiated a 
position quite strongly in our client’s interest. Then the relationship partner or even the line 
partner will get a call from the bank saying, ‘That was too aggressive and you know that’s 
something that our policies don’t allow us to do’. Sometimes that gets elevated up and sort 
of they’re saying, ‘We’ve had a call from X at X bank and that you need to tone it down a bit 
or can’t you persuade your client to change its position for you?’ It’s not just banks that do 
that, by the way, we have that all-, and particularly some of the sponsors sometimes do that. 
But there are a couple of banks who do that a bit more than others and they tend to be 
across the Atlantic.” EH Finance 2 
 
A final challenge that was noted to us was the increasing convergence of the use of both UK and US 
conflicts practices, and particularly the growing use of waivers on this side of the Atlantic to deal 
with commercial conflicts. Interviewees told us that they were being asked to seek waivers where 
those would not be a requirement under SRA conflict rules, or were being asked to act with a waiver 
in circumstances where the SRA would deem the conflict to be unwaivable: 
 
“Sometimes you can't actually go up to [a client] and say, ‘There's somebody who wants to 
sue you’, because you can't disclose the nature of the party, you can't disclose the nature of 
dispute, so you can't really say anything. If it's non-contentious it's not so bad because you 
say okay, ‘We're being put on the other side of contract negotiation - which of course they're 
aware about - is it okay?’” EH COLP 2 
 
“So again, they impose the American style on us. We cannot act against them, unless we get 
a waiver from them. So that’s the American style, which we have lost work as a result of. 
Because we’ve had some clients who, for example, were wanting to have a pop at Client X. 
And that was based in the States. And our client didn’t want – in order for us to act for the 
client, we would have had to have got a waiver from Client X. The client didn’t want us to 
give Client X any warning that they were thinking of having a pop at them. So they went 
elsewhere.” EH COLP 4 
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OUR CONCLUSIONS 
 
The phrase ‘conflicts of interest’ is capable of meaning a number of different things. On one level, 
we are concerned with ‘legal’ conflicts (i.e. those reflected in the SRA’s Handbook) that seek to 
prevent lawyers and firms from acting for or against multiple clients on the same matter. On other 
more amorphous and more complex levels, law firms having multiple clients means that there is the 
risk that that firm will act against any given client on any given (contentious or non-contentious) 
matter (where that client has other representation) and/or that that firm will advance arguments 
which could, in future matters, be to the detriment of any given client (e.g. suggesting a clause be 
drafted or interpreted in way X for client Y, which would go against the drafting or interpretation 
they would advance for client Z). These wider contentious and commercial conflicts are not 
specifically addressed in the SRA’s Principles or the Handbook: the SRA’s conflicts focus appears to 
us to be on lawyers’ relationships with a ‘matter client’ (i.e. acting for X on Y) rather than their 
relationships with ‘clients of the firm’ (i.e. X and Z being clients of the firm with potentially 
competing interests). As a result, in these wider contentious and commercial conflicts situations 
lawyers and firms will need to juggle acting “with integrity” (Principle 2), not allowing their 
“independence to be compromised” (Principle 3) and “acting in the best interests of each client” 
(Principle 4). We explore independence in more depth in the chapter that follows. 
 
What our data also shows is that lawyers and firms, in these situations, need to be mindful of 
contractual promises they have made to clients on conflicts in their terms of engagement. The 
seeking by clients to restrict, via contract, who a lawyer and a firm can and cannot act for was of 
almost universal concern to our interviewees, and the first matter they raised when we asked them 
to talk to us about particularly challenging provisions in terms of engagement. Where these clauses 
restrict the ability of firms to sue their clients (on matters where those clients are represented by 
another firm), this gives rise to potential issues of access for third parties who may not be able to 
secure representation from their first choice of lawyer or firm. This has been raised previously by the 
Tomlinson Report as of specific concern in the context of financial institutions, and the same theme 
comes out from our data. What is less clear, however, is whether these practices (i.e. ‘no sue’ 
clauses) and their consequences (i.e. a reshaping of the field in terms of who is willing to sue whom) 
give rise to regulatory issues with which the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), Competition and 
Markets Authority (CMA) or the SRA should concern themselves. Access to justice and access to 
representation are related, and intertwined, but access to justice does not necessarily mean having 
access to your first lawyer of choice.  
 
Half of our interviewees were of the view that these practices have led to boutique litigation firms 
opening up that have cornered a niche in the market and offer representation where needed. The 
other half, while accepting these niche firms had opened, questioned the quality of representation 
at those niche firms (primarily because of their view that, say, complex, specialist financial litigation 
requires the claimant firm to also have a complex, specialist finance practice in addition to a 
litigation practice). Quality in legal services is, however, another challenging concept, and we might 
debate the indicators of quality in these sorts of contentious matters between firms with (on the 
face of it) equally qualified and educated partners. We also accept there is some self-interest in 
those who raised questions of quality relating to the boutique litigation practices. 
 
What seems clear to us is that the market for litigation has been reshaped as a result of contractual 
provisions on conflicts of interest. What concerns us are certain comments from some of our 
interviewees that these contractual provisions were introduced strategically by some clients to deny 
claimants representation from a tier of firms and in situations where firms are appointed to panels 
(and made to sign up to these ‘no sue’ clauses) where the panel client has no intention of giving that 
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firm much, or any, work. If (and this is a big ‘if’) SRA-regulated in-house lawyers are active in these 
practices, we might question whether they are really in compliance with Principle 1, a lawyer’s 
obligation to ‘uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice’. This matter needs 
further exploration. It is equally possibly that some of these practices arose via clients without any 
internal lawyer involvement. Where this is the case, this may be a matter of interest and concern to 
the FCA or CMA. Relatedly, Richard Moorhead has suggested that, “In theory, lawyers’ firms entering 
into contracts which restrain them from acting against banks which is broader than professional 
conflict rules might be criticised for compromising their independence (a core principle).”100 While 
we would agree with this possibility (that criticism might be so directed), we accept that others feel 
differently. There is no set answer to this matter at present.  
 
These concerns go not only to ‘no sue’ clauses but are equally relevant (if harder to pin down) in the 
context of commercial conflicts provisions introduced by clients into lawyer terms of engagement. 
We were told that these clauses seek to prevent lawyers from acting adverse to clients on 
transactional matters (where those clients have other representation) and extend to the more 
amorphous ‘thou shalt not act adverse to our interests’ clauses, which include denying firms the 
ability to advance issues (e.g. the drafting or interpretation of a clause in a contract) which might, in 
future, be prejudicial to a given client. A number of the firms we spoke to routinely push back on 
these sorts of clauses. We would suggest that this must be the right approach and that accepting 
such clauses poses serious potential risks to lawyers and firms of compromising their independence 
(Principle 3) and/or not acting in the best interests of each client (Principle 4). 
 
We are unclear, and have been unable to find clarity elsewhere, on the extent to which the 
professional obligations on lawyers and regulated entities restrict the ability of those lawyers and 
firms to enter into contracts with their clients.101 One view might be that such contracts are 
permissible save where they are in tension with the Principles and Handbook. However, such would 
assume (wrongly) that there are neat answers to the complex questions we raise in this chapter on 
conflicts of interest.  
 
At the same time, a number of firms told us that they have signed up to contractual provisions on 
conflicts with their clients where the firms are not sure they are able to comply with those provisions 
(for example because the provisions are so vast and the client has hundreds of subsidiaries operating 
in multiple jurisdictions). Is this a question of those firms really acting ‘in the best interests of each 
client’ (Principle 4), or is this simply a commercial matter (a risk decision) for firms to decide as they 
see fit (and not a matter for the SRA)? Lawyers, and firms, need to also be alive to the relevance of 
Principle 8 to these matters, which is an obligation to, “run your business or carry out your role in 
the business effectively and in accordance with proper governance and sound financial and risk 
management principles.” 
 
Joan Loughrey has suggested that if we see default regulatory conflicts rules as something to 
contract out of then we see conflicts as “purely private” matters and we fail to acknowledge, as the 
SRA itself acknowledges, the importance of conflicts to the public interest.102 Similarly, we might 
argue that firms accepting to widen their conflicts obligations via contract also frames conflicts in 
terms of the private and ignores the public. A potential counter to this may lie in how the common 
law has historically understood conflicts in terms of “undivided loyalty” to clients.103 Do we then see 
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 We note that Outcomes 3.4 and 3.5 of the SRA Handbook cannot be waived. 
102
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contractual provisions on conflicts being used as a self-correcting mechanism to the matter-focused 
approach to ‘legal’ conflicts regulation introduced by the SRA? This is unlikely, we would suggest, to 
have been the driving reason behind the provisions on conflicts in some lawyer terms of 
engagement, but the end result may well be the same.  
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CHAPTER 4 - INDEPENDENCE 
 
 
In this section of the report we explore the concept of lawyer independence, framed in the context 
of the changing nature of what clients demand from their external counsel (discussed in Chapter 2). 
The first part of this chapter explores the meaning of independence, as set out by the LSB and SRA, 
in case law and by academics working in this area. This part, compared to the introductions to other 
chapters in this report, is somewhat lengthy and reflects the fact that lawyer independence is a 
complex, contested and nuanced concept. The second part of the chapter sets out what our 
interviewees told us about how they understand independence, and draws on a number of 
examples given to us of situations in which the independence of corporate and finance lawyers may 
be challenged.  
 
In the third part of the chapter, we set out our views as to whether, as a result of the changes in 
lawyer-client representation (discussed in Chapter 2), and the influence clients have over 
representation (discussed in Chapter 3), the independence of lawyers in large firms is, or has the 
potential to be, compromised. 
 
WHAT IS INDEPENDENCE? 
 
Independence is referred to in the regulatory objectives set out in the Legal Services Act 2007. 
Section 1(1)(f) states that one of the objectives is to, “encourage[e] an independent, strong, diverse 
and effective legal profession.” One of the ‘professional principles’ in the Act is that “authorised 
persons should act with independence and integrity”.104 In 2010 the LSB published a paper setting 
out what it understood to be the meanings of the LSA’s regulatory objectives. On independence, the 
LSB said, 
 
“Independent primarily means independent from government and other unwarranted 
influence. A client should be confident that his/her lawyer will advise and act without fear 
that the state will penalise through regulation. Similarly, a client should be confident that 
his/her lawyer will advise and act without being prejudiced by other factors or interests 
other than the overriding professional responsibility to the Court – their advice should be 
independent of inappropriate influence. (Similarly, lawyers should be confident that their 
independence as officers of the Court is not constrained by their relationship with their 
client). But we must all recognise that the overwhelming majority of legal services are 
delivered for profit: the regulatory objectives serve to protect consumers from lawyers 
acting in their own financial interests over those of the consumer. An independent 
profession serves to promote the principle that legal service providers should be free from 
inappropriate influence (financial or institutional) to act as an agent of the client, in their 
best interests. Regardless of the structure within which legal services are delivered, we 
expect lawyers to be mindful of the source of payment for their services (be it legal aid, 
after the event insurance, before the event insurance, third party funding or any other 
                                                          
104
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source) so that they can identify and manage the potential threat to their 
independence.”105 
 
This is a useful, and rich, starting point for understanding independence. Principle 3 of the SRA 
Handbook states that a lawyer should, “not allow [his/her] independence to be compromised.”106 
The guidance to this Principle states that,  
 
“"Independence" means your own and your firm's independence, and not merely your 
ability to give independent advice to a client. You should avoid situations which might put 
your independence at risk - e.g. giving control of your practice to a third party which is 
beyond the regulatory reach of the SRA or other approved regulator.”  
 
From the first line of this guidance, we take it that independence has two core aspects: the ability to 
give legal advice to clients independent of state or regulatory interference; and the independence of 
lawyers and firms from their clients.107 Scholars who write in this area also acknowledge the two 
core aspects: independence from state; and independence from clients.108 The latter has been 
characterised as lawyer autonomy and/or ‘client capture’ in some recent academic work in this 
area,109 which draws on earlier work about the power balance between lawyers and their clients.110 
Kevin Leicht and Mary Fennell first suggested that ‘client capture’ may occur where, “the consumers 
of professional work gain the ability to control the activities, timing, and costs of professional work. 
In effect the ‘consumer becomes sovereign’ much as consumers search for (and price) other 
consumer goods and services.”111 This may lead lawyers to: 
 
“render advice which has less to do with professional standards but which is more closely 
related to the commercial interest of both the client and the professional. Professionals 
who are ‘captured’ by their clients cannot then be relied upon to provide the advice their 
profession requires of them. That is not to say that the advice may necessarily encourage 
the client to break laws or otherwise behave unethically.”112 
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Concerns about lawyer independence are not new, either in general or in the specific context of 
commercial practice.113 However, such concerns may be becoming increasingly important due to 
changes in the way in which legal work is awarded and rewarded, because client relationships move 
between firms, and due to increasing numbers of City firms moving away from pure lockstep. In their 
recent study of 106 Canadian corporate lawyers, Ronit Dinovizter, Hugh Gunz and Sally Gunz found 
complex and nuanced, direct and indirect, examples of client capture from those they interviewed. 
Their empirical findings also highlight,  
 
“…a number of personal characteristics and organisational contexts which may increase 
the risks for CC [client capture]. For example our interviews tapped into considerable 
concern about the perceived changes to practice—primarily focused on commercialism—
that have heightened the negative pressures felt by practitioners. Senior lawyers in 
particular were fearful of the impact on their more junior colleagues. Taken together, our 
results suggest that factors such as a firm’s compensation system, lateral mobility, an 
individual’s seniority and the qualities they value in their clients may have an influence on 
how professionals respond to CC.”114 
 
We return to these characteristics and contexts later in this chapter. Importantly, independence is 
also linked to the rule of law.115 In the 2012 Upjohn Lecture, Lord Neuberger, President of the 
Supreme Court, commented as follows on the ‘purpose’ of the legal profession: 
 
“A vibrant, independent legal profession is an essential element of any democratic society 
committed to the rule of law. It is not merely another form of business, solely aimed at 
maximising profit whilst providing a competitive service to consumers. I am far from 
suggesting that lawyers ought not seek to maximise their profits, or ought not provide a 
competitive service. What I am saying is that lawyers also owe overriding specific duties to 
the court and to society, duties which go beyond the maximisation of profit and which 
may require lawyers to act to their own detriment, and to that of their clients.”116 
 
The use of ‘overriding’ and ‘detriment’ in this speech are powerful signals. However, it is not entirely 
clear, from the above statement, or elsewhere, whether independence is, or should, vary depending 
on the sort of legal work a lawyer is engaged in: does independence mean something different, or 
matter more, in, say, litigation contexts over transactional lawyering? We would suggest not, and 
return to this below.  
 
It is worth setting this out explicitly. Independence, and Principle 3 from the SRA’s Handbook, 
applies (in principle) equally to lawyers working in-house as it does to lawyers working in private 
practice. In a recent empirical study by Richard Moorhead and Steven Vaughan, into how in-house 
lawyers perceived and managed legal risk, the following insights were drawn into the notion of in-
house independence, 
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“Professional claims to independence by our interviewees were subtle and not naïve. 
Independence did not either exist or not exist – it manifested along a continuum and could 
be weaker or stronger, in the same person, at different times and in different contexts. 
Our interviewees understood that professional independence was (sometimes) in tension 
with their need to serve, and be seen to serve, the business. Conversely, professional 
independence could be reinforced by the business (e.g. sometimes respondents reported 
a deliberate attempt to align the professional claim to independence with a leadership 
desire to do, and be seen to do, the right thing within their businesses).”117 
 
In a later part of this chapter, we discuss the extent to which the above findings on in-house lawyers 
align with what we were told by our private practice interviewees. 
 
JUDICIAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF LAWYER INDEPENDENCE 
 
We have been unable to find many cases which speak directly to, or comment on, the concept of 
private practice lawyer independence.118 Four rulings from the Lawyers Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) 
have relevance. In the first, a case concerning a lawyer and fraudulent investment schemes, the SDT 
commented that,  
 
"A lawyer is independent of his client and having regard to his wider responsibilities and 
the need to maintain the profession's reputation, [he/she] must and should on occasion 
be prepared to say to [his/her] client 'What you seek to do may be legal but I am not 
prepared to help you do it'."119 
 
In the second, a case before the SDT concerning the pursuit by a law firm of those it suspected of 
being involved with illegal broadband ISP file-sharing, there is the following comment: 
 
“[T]he Tribunal found that the Respondents had lost their focus on fulfilling their role as 
lawyers. They became in thrall to the scheme [during which 6,113 letters were sent out 
alleging copyright breaches] and what they perceived to be the driving imperative to make 
it profitable for themselves and their Firm. Their judgement became distorted and they 
pursued the scheme regardless of the interests of their clients and the impact upon those 
whom they identified as potential defendants among the general public. The Tribunal felt 
that the Respondents’ independence had been compromised to a significant degree.”120 
 
In the third, a SDT ruling concerning a firm taking loans from a client, the Tribunal commented as 
follows, 
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“Raleys [the firm] had had a long (over 100 years) association with the NUM [the client]. 
They were rightly proud of having served the Mining Community over many years and 
were proud to be the nominated NUM Lawyers. The difficulty which that situation created 
was that the lawyers become too close to their client and too reliant upon it. That kind of 
situation eats away at the independence of the lawyers and blinds them to their duties 
under the Professional Rules of Conduct of the Profession, especially towards their 
individual clients.”121 
 
In the fourth case, concerning a law firm that was dependent on an accountancy firm for 65% of its 
business, the SDT ruled that the lawyer’s independence had been compromised and referenced the 
“level of control” exerted by the accountants over the law firm, and the “interwoven nature of the 
relationship” between the two firms.122  
 
In a fifth case, in the High Court on appeal from a ruling of the SDT and concerning a lawyer 
accepting referral fees for personal injury claims, the trial judge, May J, commented that, 
 
“Referral fees were seen as objectionable because they tended to forge a commercial link 
of reliance between the lawyer and the referrer which was seen as inimical to the lawyer's 
independence and integrity; to the client's freedom to instruct a lawyer of his or her 
choice; and the lawyer's duty to act in the client's best interest.”123 
 
The court went on to find that the lawyer “became over-reliant on a single client to the detriment of 
her independence.”124 In Crown Dilmun v Sutton,125 a case concerning the fiduciary duties of 
directors, Smith J found that the director’s lawyer had been reckless (as to whether consent for the 
underlying transaction had been obtained) because, 
 
“…she was too far wedded to this big contract, which the deal maker Mr Sutton [the 
director] was bringing to her firm. CD [Mr Sutton’s company] was becoming history and 
the future lay with Mr Sutton. She was not going to harm the firm as she saw it by 
creating problems. To fall out with Mr Sutton at this late stage would jeopardise the 
contract and would lead to him going elsewhere.”126 
 
From these six cases, we take independence to be comprised of (at least) three facets: (i) a lawyer 
being prepared to say no to their client;127 (ii) an acceptance that independence may, in some 
situations, mean taking decisions that have negative financial consequences for the lawyer; and (iii) 
a need for a lawyer to avoid becoming overly reliant or overly close to any given client.128 While 
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these facets are interesting, and important, we would suggest, on the basis of our data, that they do 
not capture the full spectrum of challenges to lawyer independence in large commercial firms.  
 
THE CHALLENGES IN UNDERSTANDING INDEPENDENCE 
 
The SRA Handbook guidance, set out above, does not significantly amplify or expand on Principle 3. 
It does not, for example, say whether the ability to give free and independent legal advice to clients 
is more or less important than being independent from those clients. This is important as the 
guidance in the Handbook that ‘the public interest’ should determine the way forward for lawyers in 
challenging situations only operates when there is conflict between the ten Principles and not, as 
here, where any single Principle might have multiple meanings in tension with each other.129 Gordon 
Turriff argues that the meaning of ‘lawyer independence’ is not clear.130 We would agree. The LSA 
regulatory objectives and the SRA Handbook Principles are not given as a hierarchy. There are those 
who argue that client loyalty trumps any notion of independence.131 Indeed, some of the emphasis 
on lawyer independence seems to suggest that independence from the state is of prime importance. 
Robert Rosen argues that as lawyers become more embedded in their clients’ businesses, the more 
likely they are to see independence as being about insulating their clients from state oversight (and 
less about acting as a gatekeeper/shepherding those clients to comply with the letter and spirit of 
the law).132 In The Rule of Law, Lord Bingham commented that,  
 
‘Scarcely less important than an independent judiciary is an independent legal profession, 
fearless in its representation of those who cannot represent themselves, however 
unpopular or distasteful their case may be.’133 
 
We accept that Lord Bingham’s comment may equally go to the importance of lawyers being 
independent of popular opinion. As noted in the Introduction to this report, a lack of independence 
was one of the risks set out in the SRA’s 2014/2015 Risk Outlook. The SRA said: 
 
“Promotion of a client's interests, or a desire to maximise commercial return, should not 
override wider obligations to the public interest and the proper administration of justice. 
We acknowledge that the professional principles can, and do, come into conflict with each 
other. However, when professional principles come into conflict, the one that best serves 
the public interest, in the particular circumstances, prevails. There is an increasing trend 
towards corporate buyers of legal services, such as financial institutions and large 
multinational businesses, having sophisticated in-house legal departments. This can 
change the balance of power between the client and their legal advisor. Those we regulate 
must ensure they prioritise their obligations to act in the public interest, in accordance 
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with their duties to court, and must resist client pressure which may adversely 
compromise their professional independence.”134 
 
Later in the Risk Outlook, the SRA comments that,  
 
“[A lack of independence] may also be significant when a firm is reliant on a single or 
limited number of clients. Maintaining independence is also relevant to in-house lawyers, 
who may come under pressure from their employers.”135 
 
These are much richer statements from the SRA on independence than the guidance to Principle 3. 
Two matters strike us as particularly interesting. First, in the context of better understanding the 
concept of independence, five issues seem to be identified as important (which align with, but go 
further than, the principles we drew from the case law in this area):  
(i) the balance of power between firms and their clients;  
(ii) the reliance of a firm on any given client;  
(iii) the extent to which lawyers are willing to promote clients’, or a client’s, interests;  
(iv) the ability for in-house lawyers to stand apart from their employers;  
(v) and the role of incentives.136  
 
From the data we have gathered, set out in Chapters 2 and 3 and discussed below, we would agree 
with these. Second, the statements by the SRA in the Risk Outlook make it clear that independence 
(and Principle 3) can, and does, come into conflict with some of the other Principles to which lawyers 
are also subject (for example, the requirements to act in the best interests of each client,137 and/or 
to provide a proper standard of service to one’s clients).138 In its recent report on lawyers balancing 
duties in litigation, the SRA comments that, 
 
“In walking the line between their duties to clients, the court, third parties and to the 
public interest, lawyers' surest guides are their integrity and independence.”139 
 
There seems no good reason why this argument should not also apply to transactional lawyers. 
Indeed, such may be more important in situations that lack a neutral third party arbiter, such as a 
judge.140 Here, Richard Painter argues that, in the case of corporate representation, lawyers cannot 
always be easily distinguished from their clients,141 and are instead morally interdependent such that 
it is hard to distinguish actions of lawyers and actions of clients.142 The challenge, however, is in 
having independence as a guide when independence can mean multiple and many contradictory 
things at the same time.  
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As is evident from Chapters 2 and 3, tension and conflict between and within the Principles are 
recurrent themes. We would also suggest that such opens up the space to better understand the 
complex issue of independence. Independence is not just a simply tripartite relationship (client – 
lawyer – state). Instead, there are multiple, interlinking relationships, and organisational factors, 
which may impact on independence – for example, a lawyer’s relationship with her firm; the firm’s 
relationship with the SRA; the power and influence held by a COLP; the connection between any 
given lawyer and any given in-house lawyer; how an in-house lawyer is accepted or perceived by her 
organisation’s business units; the impact of representative bodies etc.143 We try to capture some of 
this complexity in the diagram below.  
 
 
FIGURE 4.1 – THE INTERCONNECTED NATURE OF LAWYER INDEPENDENCE
144
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OUR FINDINGS 
 
On the following pages we outline our findings based on what interviewees told us about 
independence. More specifically, when speaking with COLPs and senior partners about 
independence, we sought to establish their views on what the term “professional independence” 
meant to them; how they felt their clients understood the term; whether they had seen situations 
where independence had been compromised by peer firms, or where clients had sought to exert 
undue pressure on external lawyers; and how their firms sought to identify and mitigate risks to 
independence arising from client pressure on fee earners at all levels. 
 
In this section, a number of structural pressures on independence are raised, such as fee 
arrangements, law firm compensation models, and individual partners becoming overly reliant on 
any one given client. Two specific threats to independence were brought to our attention 
(unprompted) by interviewees, namely the risks arising from clients seeking to put pressure on the 
way legal opinions are drafted, and third-party payers seeking, in some contexts, to influence the 
behaviour of advisers to other parties on a transaction. Finally, we consider here the way in which 
firms mitigate independence risks at more junior levels within their organisations, and the role of the 
COLP as the ‘holder’ of professional values for the firm.   
 
Our Interviewees’ Definition of Independence 
 
It quickly became apparent during the interview process that the senior lawyers that we were 
speaking with had a limited understanding of the concept of professional independence. The 
majority of interviewees struggled or failed to define the term, with a handful very clear that they 
were not independent and that it was not their role to be so. Indeed some felt their clients 
considered them, and wanted them to be a, “member of the family” [EH Corporate 15]. As we set 
out above, lawyer independence is complex and nuanced, and so a failure to articulate what 
independence meant, or could mean, is perhaps understandable. Some of the responses to our 
request for a definition of the term are set out below. Several partners expressed complete 
ignorance of the concept: 
 
Q  “How you would describe professional independence?  
A Crikey, I’ve never even heard the expression. Is that as an individual or a practice?” 
EH Finance 4 
 
Others felt the concept was simply anathema to modern legal practice: 
 
“I don’t know if I’d ever… how often I would think of myself as being independent as a strong 
part of my offering and it is not something that you ever, ever use in a pitch. You actually go 
more the other way and say we would like to be part of the team, we want to understand 
your business. If there is a commercial term that they can win at the expense of the other 
party, then absolutely it’s my, you know, in my interests to act in their best interests, my 
obligation to act in their best interests and win that point and is that independence? That’s 
not, that’s fighting their corner isn’t it?” EH Corporate 15 
 
This viewpoint is perhaps suggestive of an approach to professional values which are framed almost 
exclusively in terms of the best interests of the client (over other interests).145  
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When pushed, however, most would accept that independence from clients is important, and one or 
two made reference to the American concept of ‘zealous advocacy’ as providing more clarity: 
 
“Not being beholden I think is a good way of putting it. If you're beholden to someone then 
you can't exercise your independent judgement. Beholden can be anything from literally 
being a bit of a crook to just being too dependent on a big client, having someone who's too 
much of a mate. If you've got someone who's a really good friend who works for a client 
you'd probably want to try and make sure that somebody else gives your instructions.”  
EH COLP 1 
 
“With these really big clients you’ve always got to make sure that you’re dealing with them 
eye to eye rather than on your knees.” EH COLP 9 
 
“I mean I suppose professional independence means that you advise on the basis of what you 
consider to be the relevant aspects and you resist attempts by your client to push you into a 
particular conclusion.” EH Finance 10 
 
 
We asked interviewees how they felt their clients viewed independence, and whether private 
practice lawyers felt that their clients expected their advisers to exhibit ‘independence of mind’ and 
‘in appearance’,146 including from clients. We went further, asking senior partners to consider how 
clients’ expectations in this regard had changed over time.  
 
The majority felt that there had been a shift in the perception of external legal advisers over time, 
and that they are increasingly expected to act as ‘part of the team’, rather than to challenge. But 
very few thought their clients were entirely ignorant of the concept of professional independence, 
or that they were consistently making unreasonable demands that brought these issues to the fore. 
We accept this may seem somewhat contradictory: our interviewees were, generally, poor at 
articulating what independence was, or could be, while at the same time they accepted, when 
pushed, the importance of independence and told us they would resist challenges to their 
independence wherever those challenges presented themselves. Most felt that they needed to 
resist challenges to their independence, and that protecting the independence of the profession was 
important: 
 
 “I think you’ve got to be independent. Being a service, you’ve got to understand the 
commercial work that your client does to understand the nature of their business, so you can 
give some constructive and meaningful advice to them in the situation that they’re in. I think 
maybe clients thought, ‘Well, if they’re a service industry, they’d better get on and serve’, 
which is a different perspective. I’ve not agreed with that. Some clients think, you know, ‘Who 
pays the piper calls the tune’”, that sort of thing.  Which is something you do have to resist.” 
EH COLP 3 
 
“We are here to give commercial legal advice and if one was to think that commercial legal 
advice could be in some way altered because of the proximity of a relationship, that wouldn’t 
be right. That said, the proximity of a relationship on a commercial level, and understanding 
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your client, is extremely important, because that does help you to shape the commerciality of 
the advice that you are giving.” EH Corporate 3 
 
Client Pressure 
 
The SRA was curious to know whether senior lawyers in private practice had ever felt uncomfortable 
about the closeness of the relationship between a colleague, or a competitor, and their client.147 We 
also sought to find out whether interviewees had ever witnessed individuals employed by clients 
putting pressure on external lawyers. 
 
The majority of those that we spoke to could not point to specific instances of independence being 
compromised. The following four quotes present a range of views of how our interviewees 
conceptualised independence: 
 
“Most grown up law firms behave in an appropriate way with their clients and I don’t see 
even with [the firm], even our top ten global clients who are very important to our firm, I 
can’t think of a single incident where the undue influence of one of those clients put the firm 
in a position where we were not complying with our general professional duties.” US COLP 1 
 
“I think we’ve always been independent in the sense that I don’t think it’s any more possible 
now to buy advice that you want than it was previously, but it’s certainly possible to get much 
better economic terms than you ever could as a client.” EH Corporate 11 
 
“It’s hugely important and I think we all regard it as hugely important to be able to say no to 
a client. I’m struggling to think of a situation where I’ve felt under pressure to take on a piece 
of work that I hadn’t wanted to take on and certainly I’ve never been asked to do anything 
improper.” EH Corporate 12 
 
Despite this broad sense of proper behaviour, when prompted most respondents were able to point 
to situations where their independence might be put under pressure, or where challenges might 
arise. Often these were in the context of day-to-day working relationships, and once again several 
interviewees made reference here to a shift in the balance of power over time, such that clients are 
now more able to dictate the behaviour of their legal advisers: 
 
“More broadly, more nebulously, the sort of day-to-day working relationship can give rise to 
requests to do things that we might not be happy with. Specific things on a case. Or to accept 
certain sort of – a power relationship between the two firms. I think that’s probably more 
insidious rather than overtly saying they don’t like clause whatever of your terms of business. 
It’s sort of day to day working relationships, I think, where things can be more concerning.” 
EH COLP 3 
 
Most agreed that there had been a shift in the dynamics of law firm/client relationships, in the 
context of independence, over time: 
 
“I think lawyers are regarded as being part of the service industry. And with most service 
industries the client can dictate the speed and the scope of what they want to be delivered. 
So, I think it has much moved towards the client specifying what they want out of their 
                                                          
147
 The question was phrased in this way because previous research suggests that asking interviewees to talk 
about their own potential failings bears little fruit. 
 
 
 
55 
lawyers and managing the whole process; rather than saying to the lawyers, ‘Can you give 
me some advice because I’m consulting you as a professional?’” EH Corporate 13 
 
While this may in many ways be a sensible and innocuous development, there was some indication 
that it might on occasion be more problematic: 
 
  A  “It feels to me 20 years ago you gave your advice and your advice was what it was, 
rather than you were compelled by some business imperative that the advice should 
be a certain way.   
  Q  So, that happens now?  
A  Hm. Not too much, but I certainly see instances of it.” EH Finance 8 
 
Many interviewees speak of the power of the large financial institutions in this regard, and their 
ability to make demands of law firms where there is limited room for negotiation. Many told us that 
if they do not behave in a certain way when acting for a bank, their client will simply go elsewhere. 
And yet a quarter of the firms that we interviewed took a much more robust adversarial approach 
and spoke about routinely pushing back against challenging (or, as they perceived them, 
unreasonable) requests from clients. One corporate partner said: 
 
“If you stand up to clients, they normally back off. You know? They may be very angry, but 
they don’t come to [the firm] for shonky non-independent advice. If they want shonky non-
independent advice, they generally go somewhere else.” EH Corporate 14   
 
Structural Pressures on Independence 
 
A number of structural pressures on independence were raised by our interviewees, most notably 
fee arrangements, law firm compensation systems, and the tendency for individual partners and/or 
teams to become reliant on one particular client. 
 
With regards to fee arrangements, several partners raised concerns about firms signing up to 
contingent fees, or success fees, which meant they had “too much skin in the game” (EH COLP 7) and 
were no longer acting independently. There is a general consensus that clients increasingly favour a 
move away from hourly rates for transactional work, so that they can better manage tight legal 
budgets, and whilst this is understandable from the buy-side, private practice lawyers need to be 
mindful of the potential impact on independence. These fee arrangements can lead to a risk that 
partners become motivated less by their client’s best interests and more by getting the deal done at 
any cost so as to better remunerate the firm.148  However, it would be possible for partners, and 
firms, to adapt to new fee arrangements in ways that seek to reduce the risk of challenges to their 
independence. 
 
“It’s not so much that anyone would be stupid enough to advise on something that was 
clearly technically not correct as a lawyer – well maybe there is someone who’s stupid 
enough to do that, but I think that would be a little unlikely. It’s more just you start to step 
away from just wanting to advocate for your client to a point where what you’re advocating 
for is for the deal to get done. And that could result in your client not getting as good an 
outcome from the risk allocation, for example, as they might otherwise get, because you feel 
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that it’s a deal that should be done, everyone’s a winner, and actually I’m particularly a 
winner because I get my fees paid. And you start to advocate the deal rather than 
advocating your client’s case or your client’s position for the deal.” US Corporate 1 
 
What is notable here is that while four or five other interviewees raised similar concerns, many more 
spoke about having themselves working on a contingent fee basis, or a success fee, and did not feel 
that such gave rise to independence issues. 
 
Secondly, and with regard to partner compensation, we were told by several firms that the models 
by which they and their colleagues were remunerated had some impact on their ability, and 
willingness, to push back on client demands that made them feel uncomfortable. For example, 
several lockstep firms felt that lockstep compensation – whereby partners are rewarded according 
to seniority rather than according to their contribution – served to support them in maintaining their 
independence from powerful clients. 
 
“We're a rigid lockstep, which I think actually helps in a funny kind of way because there's 
less individual pressure on people and it also means that you've got a greater sense of not 
doing anything wrong for the wider partnership.” EH Finance 5 
 
 “We do have a merit-based remuneration system, so it can be quite painful if we’ve had to 
walk away from something.” EH Corporate 12 
 
One partner gave an example of his firm opting to walk away from a relationship with a major client 
because it was uncomfortable about the panel terms: 
 
 “It wasn’t a difficult decision at all. I mean there were line partners who when they go into 
work, 60% or 70% of their daily lives for many years have been working for that one bank, 
who were obviously extremely worried about it and were not particularly happy about it. But 
you know, as a firm we’re lockstep, so we don’t… not too difficult a conversation to sort of say 
‘Look, don’t worry, there’s plenty of other things that we can support you in, and put you into 
other relationships etc.’ We’ve lived with that arrangement for several years now, it’s worked 
well.” EH Finance 2  
 
One COLP cautioned about assumptions concerning the role of the compensation system in 
influencing partner behaviour, and many others felt the compensation system to be irrelevant:149 
 
“I think one has to be very careful to say that remuneration systems necessarily produce a 
particular culture, because I don’t think they do… or I can think of very, very good firms which 
are very merit-based in terms of the way they distribute profit, but which seem to have very 
good strong cultures, which wouldn’t accept people doing things outside the culture of the 
firm.” EH COLP 6 
 
A final matter that was raised with regard to structural challenges to independence centred on the 
issues that arise out of reliance on a single client. Many of the individuals that we spoke to identified 
this as a concern at firm level, often in the context of comments that suggested only firms where 
large clients contributed a significant amount to overall turnover might have independence issues: 
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“I think perhaps [independence] is less of an issue for large law firms. I suspect it’s more of an 
issue for smaller law firms. It’s around who’s your biggest client;” EH Finance 7 
 
“So, to turn your question slightly on its head: how would one feel about a relationship with 
any client – again, nothing to do with banks – but any client whose continued patronage, if 
that’s the right word, was germane to the future of survival of the firm? I don’t know. I think 
that would be, certainly if I was a senior partner, managing partner in that firm, I would see it 
as fundamental to actually ensure that that reliance was not a long-term proposition for the 
firm; that we would be looking to spread that risk, as it were.” EH Finance 6 
 
“It's partly professional principles but also this firm doesn’t have a client that is worth more 
than about 3% of its annual turnover.  Its reputation, brand and goodwill are worth far more 
to it than the interests of any client in any situation.  I think if you were in a smaller firm with 
a dominant client who dictated the financial performance of the firm it would be more of a 
worry.” US Finance 2 
 
Several partners referred to potential problems arising if a client accounted for more than around 
3% of the firm’s turnover, but said that that was not an issue at their firm, where no one client was 
dominant. We were unclear, and remain unclear, why 3% was seen as the magic number. When we 
pushed the point further, exploring issues of reliance at an individual partner or team level, 
references to percentages were less useful, and most partners accepted that challenges to 
independence can and do arise: 
 
“I think people do get pressurised to compromise their independence sometimes, because the 
revenue coming from a particular client is so significant that the partner would be very 
concerned about losing that.” EH Corporate 13 
 
“There might be an issue of – and again to personalities – the pressure coming not at a firm 
level but on an individual level, where the client relationship partner might be a sort of 
deputy or whatever, that work has been and is the mainstay of that partner, or that team’s 
revenue generation. And so therefore decision making that that team makes, or wants the 
firm to make, is driven by that client relationship.” EH COLP 8  
 
MARKET PRACTICE AND PRESSURES ON INDEPENDENCE 
 
Two areas where market practice has developed in such a way as to give rise to concern about 
professional independence were raised by our interviewees. These areas, concerning client influence 
over opinions and the role of what we have termed “shadow clients”, were raised repeatedly by 
interviewees without our prompting. When we asked partners about areas where they felt that 
professional independence might be challenged, these were the two issues most frequently raised. 
 
 
 
 
The Giving of Opinions 
 
First, with regard to the giving of legal opinions, we found several law firms telling us that clients 
were exerting undue influence over law firms to shape their opinions in a certain way. The giving of 
an opinion by a firm, as with any work product, involves elements of negotiation as to form, content 
and format. Such discussions may be perfectly acceptable. What we have found some evidence of, 
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however, is pressure by clients on opinion writing that goes beyond the bounds of acceptable 
negotiation, and lawyers telling us that they are being pushed to give opinions that they do not feel 
comfortable with. The leading US legal ethics scholar William Simon has previously suggested that 
there is now a “market for bad legal advice” in which clients prefer lawyers who are willing to give 
them the opinions they want.150 
 
One corporate partner referred to a blurring of the line such that external legal advisers are 
becoming facilitators on deals, rather than independent advisers: 
 
“Something I think lawyers have to be careful of is where they can be pushed to give views 
the client wants them to express, rather than those being views that they would naturally 
express themselves. So, I think that’s probably the biggest risk, that what ordinarily, or a few 
years ago, would have been the professional independence has suddenly become a bit more 
blurred, because the client wants to achieve a particular business objective, and the lawyer 
becomes a facilitator of that rather than an advisor. That is probably the main distinction: 
facilitator versus advisor.” EH Corporate 13 
 
Several other partners talked of being put under pressure to deliver opinions that they were not 
happy about. For example: 
 
“Now, one can understand the bank’s desire to have consistency amongst its panel firms in 
terms of how legal opinions are given in relation to financing or security documents. Because 
if some banker in some branch wants a legal opinion in relation to a security package, you 
don’t want to find that Firm A is giving a wildly different opinion to Firm B.  
 
“The problem with that, of course, is that if firms are required to give opinion wording, which 
ideally they would not agree to, or if it’s going beyond what they consider normal and 
reasonable, but they are told by the client, ‘Well, all other firms are willing to do it. If these 
firms are willing to do it, why aren’t you?’ You again may have to assume the risk; and it 
may be a limited risk, but there are some provisions of legal opinions where you would want 
to give a certain qualification or caveat or whatever. That certainly arose where a client, a 
banking client, was asking, it was in relation to real estate financing transactions, that firms 
agree to a standard format.” EH COLP 12 
 
This begs the question: if Firm X is unwilling to give an opinion in a form that Firm Y is happy to give, 
why does the client not just ask Firm Y to give the opinion? This strikes us as a subtle, but potentially 
invidious practice on the part of some clients. Is it possible that Firm Y is not used because Firm Y is a 
less good ‘reputational intermediary’ than Firm X? Work in this area suggests that lawyers act as 
reputational intermediaries where they reduce uncertainty by using their professional reputation as 
a bond – or form of insurance – to guarantee the veracity of their client’s representations.151 Here, 
choosing Firm X may not be about quality (or not all about quality) but may rather concern the signal 
that using Firm X sends. If true, lack of independence from the client has the potential to undermine 
the public interest by enabling clients to use compromised lawyers and firms to send misleading 
market signals (for example when firms issue opinions). 
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Several of the largest firms now have opinion committees to try to mitigate the risk of client 
pressure being exerted and leading to poor opinions practice. Those committees are commonplace 
in the United States but we were not able to establish how widespread their use is on this side of the 
Atlantic. One partner said:  
 
 “I mean obviously in a more general way clients quite like you to say things that they want to 
hear, but that’s an old problem. If it’s not what they want to hear then they challenge us to 
say it in the most palatable way and, but perhaps we particularly get that in opinions. They 
are a bit like, ‘Can you shade your opinion so it looks a bit more like this?’ And the answer is 
either yes or no and we get round that by having an opinions panel so no one gets put under 
too much pressure.” US COLP 3 
 
Many of the firms we spoke to do not have such committees in place, however, and find this area 
worrying.  
 
Shadow Clients 
 
A second, and much larger topic of concern, is around third-party payers, and more specifically what 
we have termed ‘shadow clients’. Here we are referring to another age-old practice whereby, 
particularly in leveraged finance but also elsewhere, borrowers dictate who their lending banks can 
use for legal advice. This situation arises because the borrowers are typically paying the banks’ legal 
fees, and as such feel justified in influencing the decision over which law firm is instructed for the 
banks. In this situation, the borrower becomes a law firm’s ‘shadow client’,152 with significant 
influence over its appointment, remuneration, and potentially the scope of its work, but without 
directly instructing it. 
 
This gives rise to a number of issues, both on a practical level in terms of a law firm’s ability to 
recover its fees from the other side, but also with regard to independence. Case law would also 
seem to suggest that where a third party, over the course of a series of transactions, reposes trust 
and confidence in a lawyer, that might give rise to a fiduciary duty without a retainer.153 Critically, we 
were told that it is becoming increasingly common practice for the sponsor on a private equity 
transaction to appoint the law firm that will advise the lender before that lender bank has been 
chosen. As a consequence, the scope of that law firm’s role and the terms of its engagement are 
agreed with the sponsor, instead of with the bank that will ultimately be the law firm’s client.154  
 
While banks will often have some room to challenge the appointment – and the law firm chosen by 
the borrower will typically be one that is on most of the banks’ panels – the bank will essentially be 
told not only which firm it has to use, but also the scope of the legal work that the borrower is 
willing to pay for. That means that the law firm acting for the bank is potentially motivated more by 
satisfying the borrower on the other side of the table – because that is where the next deal will 
come from – than by satisfying his or her client. There is also the potential that the firm will be 
taking instructions on which pieces of advice to give, and which points of law to take, from the other 
side. We were told in this context: 
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“Basically the lender and the sponsor clients are not actually getting the best advice because 
one or the other of the lawyers is concerned about a view that the sponsor or lender client 
will have of them in taking particular positions on points. So, actually on both sides of the 
table I’ve had sponsor clients saying to me and I’ve had lender clients saying into me, ‘Hang 
on, what on earth is this lawyer doing? These are points that I do not want to give’. But it’s 
because – cahoots is an emotive word – but it’s almost like they’re in cahoots because they’re 
frightened to damage their reputation with someone who might be on the other side of the 
table who they perceive is perhaps a better work bringer. So, actually their advice is being 
coloured. In that particular situation I mentioned it was the lender who in their view was 
being prejudiced because the sponsor was calling the shots.” EH Finance 7 
 
“I think there is a genuine potential, I only say a potential, for ethical conflict if your fees are 
being paid by a third party.” EH Corporate 2 
 
“I think its unfortunate banks have allowed themselves to get into a situation where this 
happened. Ironically, the fact that the borrower was paying is probably one of the main 
reasons why borrowers have been able to assert so much control over these costs, because 
ultimately they're paying for them.  Their argument to the banks is, if they're a strong 
borrower they'll say, ‘If you want to use lawyers, if you expect us to pay for them, then we 
want to have a say. We want to choose them or have a strong say in who you choose, 
because it's our problem; it's our fees.’ It can give rise to challenging pressures for an 
individual partner or a law firm's deal flow and income to be determined by whether the 
people on the other side of the table, whose interests aren't aligned with their own client's, 
like them. There's always a suspicion or the fear that some lawyers in the market will gain 
market share by not really doing the best job for their client but by being over-
accommodating to the borrower's side.” US Finance 2 
 
“So the panels are definitely important, but actually it’s more the fact that the financial 
sponsor is even more important. And some people perceive a risk to independence through 
the strength of that financial sponsor relationship. Because if they are the one that’s paying 
you, and dictating your appointments, then that I think sometimes creates a perception that 
you are more in their pocket than -, you are more on their side than you are your client’s side, 
which is the bank.” EH Finance 11 
 
“I think the point about the fees being paid by the other side and us being appointed by the 
other side is probably the main professional area of interest at the moment. It doesn’t 
necessarily work to our disadvantage, but there is that concern, especially with very powerful 
sponsors who have maybe got themselves too much leverage with the banks.  Some might go 
a bit too far in terms of accommodating them.”  US Finance 2  
 
The following conversation between the interviewer and the respondent is typical of the discussions 
we had with regard to the implications of this behaviour, which many partners describe as standard 
market practice: 
 
Q “And what about taking that a step further where borrowers… how common is it that 
you might be put into the transaction for the bank by the borrower, if you see what I 
mean? 
A Yeah that’s very common, very common that the issuer – this is very common in 
capital markets as well. I mean for example we have one very significant client, well 
they’re actually not a client, we have one institution in our capital markets practice 
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which always requires us to act for the underwriters so they’re never our client but 
our relationship is they always refer they always say to the underwriters “you’ve got 
to use XXX”. 
Q Does that present any professional issues or how can you make sure it doesn’t? 
A I’m not sure it presents any professional issues. 
Q Independence issues? 
A I think it can get a bit awkward sometimes, if you’ve got a really difficult issue on a 
deal and particularly if the borrower or originator, issuer, doesn’t see it as a difficult 
issue and just thinks you’re being difficult or if one of the underwriters or one of the 
lenders raises a particular issue, which may be totally unreasonable, but because 
you’re their counsel you’ve got to represent it and fight for it. Yeah that can be 
awkward. I suppose it might cross your mind that unless you handle it properly you’re 
not going to get a referral in the future but I don’t think it changes the way we do it.”  
US Finance 3 
 
Many of the partners that we spoke to were at pains to point out that the phenomena of third-party 
payers, and by extension shadow clients, was not a new one, and that firms behave reputably in the 
vast majority of circumstances: 
 
“It genuinely doesn't change our legal advice, I can say that hand on heart. I know that's the 
right answer, but it's genuinely the right answer as well.” EH Finance 5 
 
Nevertheless, we were told that the power of the sponsors in these situations has grown in the wake 
of the credit crisis, and the tendency for banks to come into deals with their legal advisers having 
already been appointed for them has increased. Many advisers to the banks told us that the banks 
were not happy with this arrangement: 
 
“On the vast majority of the banking deals that I work on, the borrower pays the bank’s legal 
fees, and it’s been like that since time immemorial really. But what the powerful sponsors 
now do, or even the big borrowers, corporate borrowers, they say, ‘If we are paying the 
bank’s lawyers’ fees, we want to choose who the bank’s lawyers are.’ And of course that 
creates some very odd dynamics because they’re never going to choose a law firm that’s 
going to give them a bloody nose. So who really is your client? And anecdotally, there are lots 
of stories where the banks feel pretty hacked off that the people that are meant to be batting 
for them seem to be conceding much more to the sponsor than you would expect. And I don’t 
think that’s good for the profession.” EH Finance 3 
 
This issue was also the only example of a threat to advisers’ independence that was raised, 
unprompted, at the GC Roundtable, outlined in Chapter 6 of this report. 
 
While appreciating that the banks are sophisticated purchasers of legal services, and that the terms 
are being dictated to them by the sponsors on these transactions (with the law firms merely 
bystanders), we would suggest that these arrangements do appear to put the independence of 
lawyers at risk and therefore raise challenges for the legal profession and the SRA. We would also 
suggest that these ‘shadow client’ situations do not engage the conflicts rules as set out in the SRA 
Handbook because the borrower/sponsor is never, at least technically, a client of the firm on the 
matter. 
 
MITIGATION OF THREATS TO INDEPENDENCE 
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When it comes to mitigating threats to the firm’s, or any given lawyer’s, independence, we asked 
our interviewees whether they felt that their firms had effective systems and controls in place to 
identify and mitigate risks arising from client pressure on fee earners at all levels. We found 
evidence of a rather concerning lack of systems and controls at the non-partner level within firms, 
below partner, where many partners struggled to explain any meaningful procedures in place. 
 
Very few firms were able to point to regular, and in many cases any, professional ethics or 
professionalism training programmes for associates that covered matters such as the principle of 
lawyer independence. Often these existed ‘on day one of joining’, and were not repeated. In only 
two or three cases were there established ethics training schemes running on an annual basis, or 
every two years. Instead, many partners pointed to the firm’s culture as the chief mitigation against 
threats to independence below partner level:155 
 
 “I think the culture here is that associates should feel comfortable to come to a more senior 
associate on the matter, or a partner and say, I’m being asked to do something and I’m not 
comfortable.  Can I talk it through with you?  Just in the way a partner would feel able to go 
and talk to the office of general counsel.  So I don’t think there’s a formal process, but I think 
it’s a cultural thing.” US COLP 4 
 
 “I think that actually finding people that work at the firm who have integrity and common 
sense as to what’s honest and what’s not is actually far more important than some box 
ticking exercise.” US Finance 1156 
 
“Well I guess there’s no explicit training-, I don’t think there’s any explicit training on that 
particular point, because I guess we’re trained for all of our career to know where the lines 
are.” EH Finance 11 
 
“I suppose it comes down to communication and I’m not sure there’s a very sophisticated 
answer to this, but of course aspects of deals or smaller deals get done with very little partner 
involvement for economic reasons if nothing else, but we try to absolutely imbue in all the 
associates that if they feel they’re being pushed or compromised they need to get a partner 
involved.” EH finance 10 
 
Others pointed to informal procedural measures, often the domain of individual partners, such as 
insisting that partners be copied in to every email conversation with a client, or making associates 
share rooms with more senior lawyers so that they could be more closely monitored. The 
overwhelming consensus, however, was that mitigation is purely informal for fee earners: 
 
 “I don’t have a particular sense of how that’s done on a formal basis. I know that partners 
are certainly told, we know that one of our responsibilities is to monitor what our associates 
are doing with clients and to make it easy for them to raise any concerns that they have. So 
an open door policy, all that kind of stuff.” US Corporate 1 
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 Q “Do you do things like ethics training for junior law firm associates?” 
 A “No, we don’t. I think there used to be an induction process which included things 
like that. That’s not happening at the moment, but it’s something that we’re looking to re-
introduce when the next set of trainees arrive in September. Because I had that when I was a 
trainee and I found it very useful.”  EH Corporate 13 
 
We were struck by the lack of focus in the majority of those firms we spoke with on regular ethics 
training, by the reliance on law firm culture as the guiding light for a firm’s lawyers, and by the lack 
of formal procedural measures in place to mitigate threats to independence. The SRA has identified 
ethics as core to competence (and indeed it is the first competency on the SRA’s new ‘Competence 
Statement’) but they are not stipulating that ethics (or any other training) form part of continuing 
professional development. Given the findings in this report we recommend that firms and their 
professional bodies give serious consideration to developing ethics training as part of their ongoing 
training programmes. 
 
INTERNAL OWNERSHIP OF RISK AND THE ROLE OF THE COLP 
 
Within the law firms that we spoke to, a debate emerged about the ownership of compliance and 
risk, with COLPs increasingly taking on responsibility for supporting partners should they come under 
pressure from clients to behave in a way in which they feel uncomfortable. COLPs tell us that this has 
changed over time, in part since COLPs formally took up their roles on 1 January 2013. Often COLPs 
will be tasked with having the difficult conversations with clients that partners choose not to have, 
though several COLPs told us they prefer to leave as much responsibility with the partners as 
possible, so that they are forced to “win the argument” (EH COLP 9) with difficult clients, rather than 
simply passing the buck. 
 
COLPs told us they were often taking on the role of standing up to clients from partners that felt 
under pressure:  
 
 “In terms of issues arising during the matter, I think things have changed since I became GC. 
When I first started most people tried to sort them out themselves, unless they thought it was 
a money laundering issue, in which case they'd come and talk to me. Now more and more 
people come and talk to me when they've got a problem that they're uncomfortable about 
and that they're not sure they can solve themselves. Which is as it should be, that's what I'm 
here for partly. So although it's not a formal process or procedure I think I can trust most of 
my partners to recognise a problem. Some of them are prepared to accept more risk than 
others, inevitably, but I don't think any of them are accepting the sort of risks that would 
actually cause me to have sleepless nights.” EH COLP 1 
 
“The fundamental trigger will be the partner or the lawyer believing that there may be an 
issue here. And to some extent what’s happening is that that individual partner or that 
individual lawyer, in a way, is covering off the risk by coming to me. Sometimes they want to 
be able to say to the client, ‘Look, I understand you’re not necessarily going to like what 
we’re going to say here, or the position we’re taking on our terms of engagement, but I’ve 
run this past our General Counsel,’ and occasionally I’ll be dragged in to deal with the client 
direct. So that would be where the lawyer here or the partner here accepts in a way that 
what is being said from a risk and compliance point of view is correct but they’d rather I was 
the person delivering it, or I was the reason for it rather than them.” EH COLP 9 
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Some COLPs felt that law firms still have a long way to go in recognising and mitigating the risks that 
arise from client relationships: 
 
“The Big Four I think are better at it than we are. Law firms generally – it would be 
interesting to know what other law firms say about that. But having systems in place to spot 
a team’s struggling, are they likely to make bad decisions, well no-one on earth can be doing 
this amount of work by themselves without cutting corners or doing something, so what on 
earth are they doing. So that’s something which we could be better at.” EH COLP 8 
 
A number of COLPs felt that by assuming responsibility for difficult client conversations, they were 
disempowering partners and allowing them to become even more compliant with the wishes of 
clients, because they no longer assumed ownership of challenging situations. This delegation of 
responsibility issue is perhaps not new, but may be a downside of the advent of the COLP position in 
law firms:  
 
“I do think you have to win the argument, or persuade them. And I think the challenge is to 
have a rational explanation as to why you’re saying what you’re saying. That’s why actually, 
although I don’t mind being used as cover for a partner that’s got problems with a client in 
this area, I think it’s much better that the client partner wins the debate or persuades the 
client, because that’s again dealing with the client eye-to-eye rather than on your knees. You 
know, ‘I’m just a client partner, please don’t... I’ll hand it over to our General Counsel’.” EH 
COLP 9 
 
“They tend to find their way to me I suppose and then I would counsel them and mentor 
them and may front it with them as well. So quite often the very difficult conflict 
conversations come my way as a representative of the firm. I would always try and get the 
client partner to deal with it if possible, because I think that creates a better dynamic longer 
term in terms of that relationship, because I think client partners do need to learn to be able 
to say no. Managing a relationship is not all about saying yes, but if it is tense or difficult 
and/or important then again I will get involved.” EH COLP 10 
 
On the other hand, one can view this rise of the COLP as having a positive impact, enabling 
compliance and risk managers with regulatory clout to push back against client demands in 
circumstances where partners carrying the commercial relationship find this difficult or impossible. 
 
OUR CONCLUSIONS 
 
Independence in the legal profession is a complex and nuanced concept. At its most basic, it 
suggests that lawyers should stand apart from client and/or state influence. However, and as  
represented earlier in this chapter in Figure 4.1, we would suggest that influence is better 
understood as a series of interconnected and multiple relationships which each have the potential to 
impact on the role of, and advice given by, any individual lawyer or any law firm. Independence is 
the practice of advising and acting free from inappropriate influence. We would also suggest that, in 
the context of the lawyer-client relationship, the following matters have the potential to influence 
the independence of any given lawyer: (i) the balance of power between lawyer, firm, client 
relationship partner and client; (ii) the reliance of the lawyer and/or firm on the client for business; 
(iii) the willingness and potential for lawyers and firms to say ‘no’ to clients; (iv) the acceptance by 
lawyers and firms that affirming independence may have negative financial consequences; (v) the 
closeness of the lawyer and/or firm to the client; (vii) law firm culture; and (vi) the ways in which 
firms structure and distribute incentives.  
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Our view is that the current definition and exposition of independence in the SRA Handbook does 
not account for these nuances. At the same time, it is not in any way clear to us how ‘the public 
interest’ acts as a meaningful decider in situations of conflict – for example (and we accept this is a 
very simplistic, binary example), is the public interest in effecting client wishes and undertaking 
transactions that contribute to the economy more or less than the public interest in lawyers 
standing up to their clients and declining, on occasion, to effect their wishes? We would argue that 
our evidence shows that weakened independence influences the objectivity with which law is 
interpreted and acted upon. There is a public interest in the law being advised and acted upon 
objectively. If a lawyer is being asked to say the law is less X than she believes, or that the risk in 
doing Y is less than she believes, or that the law should be described in these terms (when the 
lawyer believes it is best described in other terms), then that is compromising her independence and 
weakening the rule of law and compromising the administration of justice.  
  
Our interviewees were, in general, unable to clearly articulate what the principle of independence 
meant. However, when pushed, most could understand the importance of lawyer independence, 
although a minority were of the fixed view that they were not independent, and were not appointed 
by clients to be independent.  We were told by our interviewees of a number of structural pressures 
on independence, such as fee arrangements, law firm compensation models, and individual partners 
becoming overly reliant on any one given client. Two specific threats to independence were brought 
to our attention (unprompted) by interviewees, namely the risks arising from clients seeking to put 
pressure on the way opinions are drafted, and third-party payers seeking, in some contexts, to 
influence the behaviour of advisers to other parties on a transaction (starting by dictating who those 
lawyer advisers could be). The second matter strikes us as problematic and less amenable to 
resolution by a simple reaffirmation of the SRA Handbook Principles. We have coined the term 
“shadow client” to denote the power that these third parties (commonly borrowers or private equity 
sponsors) have to choose which law firms act on which transactions. While we were not given any 
specific examples of this practice resulting in tangible violations of the Handbook, many of our 
interviewees were concerned by the potential for lawyers appointed by third parties to possibly act, 
in ways subtle and refined, in the interests of those third parties over the interests of their clients. 
We would agree, and this point was also raised (unprompted) by a member of the GC Roundtable.  
 
Finally, we were struck by the lack of sophistication as to the ways in which a number of our 
participating firms mitigate independence risks at more junior levels within their organisations. This 
may or may not be reflective of the wider market. We were also struck by the view of the role of the 
COLP as the ‘holder’ or arbiter of professional values for the firm, and raise the question of whether 
such has the potential for individual lawyers to become less aware of, and less interested in, their 
own professionalism, professional identity and professional obligations.  
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CHAPTER 5 – RISK TRANSFERS 
 
In this chapter we explore ways in which risk is, or may be, transferred to large law firms, and other 
ways in which the liability of firms may be negotiated or increased through their relationships with 
their clients. The SRA asked us to specifically discuss three matters with our interviewees: (i) law 
firms accepting liability for the work of third-party law firms (or other advisers); (ii) law firms 
indemnifying clients; and (iii) the extent to which law firms are able to cap their liability. A fourth 
matter, the use of reliance letters, was raised to us by the firms we spoke to.  
 
The second part of this chapter sets out what our interviewees told us about their experiences of 
these matters. In the third part of the chapter, we set out our views as to whether, as a result of law 
firms accepting risk or otherwise reshaping their liability profile, there may be challenges to some of 
the regulatory objectives contained in the Legal Services Act 2007, in particular s1(f) which sets out 
the requirement to, “encourage[e] an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal profession.” 
The LSB primarily understands ‘strength’ in this context to mean the ability of the profession to 
“speak authoritatively on matters of relevance”, and sees ‘effective’ in terms of meeting the needs 
of consumers.157 We would suggest that while these are some possible facets of s1(f), they ignore 
the importance of a strong and effective profession in terms of one which is financially healthy and 
which has a strong international brand. We return to these matters at the end of this chapter.  
 
THE REGULATORY CONTEXT 
 
Law firms, and individual lawyers, have a responsibility under Principle 8 of the SRA Handbook to run 
their businesses, "effectively and in accordance with proper governance and sound financial and risk 
management principles". The guidance to this Principle in the Handbook says that, “Whether you are 
a manager or an employee, you have a part to play in helping to ensure that your business is well 
run for the benefit of your clients and, e.g. in meeting the outcomes in Chapter 7 (Management of 
your business) of the Code.”158 The linked mandatory outcomes in Chapter 7 include an obligation to 
have “effective systems and controls in place” to achieve and comply with the Principles (O(7.2)), an 
obligation to, “identify, monitor and manage risks to compliance with all the Principles” (O7.3)), and 
an obligation to, “train individuals working in the firm to maintain a level of competence appropriate 
to their work and level of responsibility” (O(7.6)). We wonder whether, and as highlighted below, 
some of the firms that we spoke with are undertaking appropriate due diligence and risk 
management (sufficient to evidence compliance with Principle 8) in relation to risk transfer by their 
clients.  
 
LAWYER LIABILITY 
 
As a basic starting point, law firms, and their individual lawyers,159 may be liable to their clients 
where they are negligent and/or where they are in breach of their contractual terms of 
engagement.160 The contractual and tortious duties overlap. Case law in this area suggests that, in 
terms of contractual liability, clients need to be specific in setting out exactly what their lawyers will 
be liable for. Lord Woolf, in Midland Bank plc v Cox McQueen, commented that, “If commercial 
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institutions such as banks wish to impose an absolute liability on members of a profession they 
should do so in clear terms so that the lawyers can appreciate the extent of their obligation which 
they are accepting.”161 The courts have so far been relatively unwilling to impose on lawyers an 
obligation (and corresponding liability) for matters outside of the scope of their engagement.162 We 
come later in this chapter to discuss a shift in practice in how lawyers or their clients draft the scope 
of their work.  
 
Where a lawyer does, however, give advice outside the retainer, there may well be liability in Tort.163 
Whether or not a firm or lawyer will generally be liable in Tort depends on a variety of factors, as set 
out in Duncan v Cuelenaere: the experience and training of the lawyer; the form and nature of the 
client’s instructions; the specificity of those instructions; the nature of the action or the legal 
assignment; the precautions one would expect a lawyer, acting prudently and competently, to take; 
and the influence of other factors beyond the control of the client and the adviser.164 The duty of 
care owed by any given firm or lawyer to any given client is variable,165 and lawyers do not, in 
general, owe duties at common law to third parties. 
 
On matters where a client is getting advice from multiple advisors, there is generally no liability for 
Adviser A as a result of advice given by Adviser B to Client C.166 Indeed, it is possible for firms to 
carve out, via contract, the proportion of liability for which they may be responsible in situations 
where a client has multiple advisers.167 Vicarious liability, however, refers to a situation where 
someone is held responsible for the actions or omissions of another person. In the legal services 
field, this is commonly discussed in situations where Partner A is held responsible for the actions of 
Partner B where both work in the same law firm;168 and/or where a law firm is held vicariously liable 
for the acts of one of its employees.169 It is established that some relationships can give rise to 
vicarious liability (for example, employment, partnership and membership of an LLP). Similarly, there 
are other situations in which it will be clear that there is no vicarious liability (for example, where the 
alleged wrongdoer is plainly an independent contractor). However, there are more complex, and 
uncertain situations.  
 
In the situation where Law Firm X co-ordinates advice by Law Firm Y to Client A, as part of a larger 
matter on which Law Firm X is also advising, could Law Firm X be vicariously liable for defective 
advice given by Law Firm Y?170 In JGE v Trustees of Portsmouth Roman Catholic Diocesan Trust,171 the 
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Court of Appeal (by a majority) concluded that vicarious liability could be applied to relationships 
outside the existing recognised categories where, "the relationship ... is so close in character to one 
of employer/employee that it is just and fair to hold the employer vicariously liable."172 One, 
however, might take the view that, in the example used above, Law Firm Y is purely, and wholly, an 
independent contractor (such that vicarious liability would be impossible) and the relationship is 
wholly different to that of employer/employee.173 Despite this, we could imagine situations in which 
the degree of control exercised by Law Firm X over Law Firm Y, and the degree of integration of Law 
Firm Y into Law Firm X’s business (multiple ‘best friend’ referrals; secondments between the two 
firms etc), was such that imposing liability might be fair, just and reasonable. In the alternative, one 
might argue that Law Firm X had a non-delegable duty to Client A (to provide legal advice on the 
relevant matter in a situation where they could not contract out that advice) and, as such, would be 
liable for Law Firm Y’s advice.174 We accept that this discussion is largely academic, but it strikes us 
as interesting, important and worthy of further exploration when, as set out below, firms are 
commonly accepting the potential liability in contract for advice given to their clients by other 
advisers.  
 
As noted above, we were asked by the SRA to ask our interviewees about the extent to which their 
clients sought indemnities from them. Indemnities offer the beneficiaries much wider recourse to 
large quanta of damages (i.e. more money). This is because, with an indemnity claim and unlike a 
standard breach of contract claim, there is no need on the claimant to show fault or negligence. 
Instead, it suffices to show that the 'trigger' for the indemnity has occurred. Equally, there may be an 
ability to recover all loss which causally flows from such trigger event, no matter how remote or 
indirect it may seem to have been. Finally, there is no requirement for the indemnified party to show 
that it has mitigated (sought to reduce or minimise) its loss, nor is it possible to argue contributory 
negligence of that indemnified party. 
 
OUR FINDINGS 
 
In the following we outline our findings based on what interviewees told us about risk transfers. 
When speaking with COLPs and senior partners about risk transfers, we sought to establish their 
views on how client relationships might be giving rise to a transfer of risk; we discussed their views 
on their firms’ abilities to identify, monitor and mitigate risks arising from client relationships; and 
we asked about the firms’ willingness to accept risk and liability transfers sought by clients.  
 
The General Transfer of Risk 
 
Many of those that we spoke to talked about clients seeking generally to transfer risk on to their 
legal advisers. For example: 
 
“One of the terms that I really disliked and we wouldn’t take, but it took about three months 
for the client to back down on it, was, “You are expected to raise any legal or commercial 
issues that are relevant even if they fall outside the ambit of our instructions”. EH COLP 5 
 
We wonder whether this particular request may actually be a reflection of the common law, as 
discussed above, such that lawyers are obliged to warn their clients of risks of which they become 
aware, even where such falls outside the scope of the agreed retainer. Others told us: 
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“It’s well known that lawyers have deep pockets through professional indemnity insurance. I 
think the profession has been absolutely disgracefully hopeless in not following the lead of 
other professional services firms, like the accountants, and managing limited liability.” EH 
Finance 8 
 
“They do sometimes ask questions where you sort of get the impression that, well, are you 
just a cheaper form of insurance by them trying to get you to confirm things, which quite 
often are as much to do with commercial judgement as any particular legal point.” EH 
Corporate 1  
 
“There are a number of clients who view us like an insurance policy which is something I 
hate. But sometimes they don’t care too much what you say as long as they get an opinion 
letter at the end, which they can stick on the file and sue you on if it doesn’t work out.” EH 
Finance 10 
 
“You know very well that half the time people instruct you because they want your insurance 
policy to back them up.”  EH corporate 9  
 
“You get actually get large in-house legal teams that try and do the work for themselves, 
quite often they’ll prepare something and then they’ll just last minute send it to you to 
review it. And that is I think a clear attempt to try and transfer liability for a job that you 
haven’t done onto you and your insurers.” EH Corporate 13 
 
One finance partner took the view that large organisations, and particularly large financial 
institutions, are less concerned about transferring risk to their law firms, so much as transferring the 
risk away from themselves; perhaps a somewhat subtle distinction. A key point is that, to date, law 
firms have not experienced any significant resistance from their professional indemnity insurers on 
these points. Most interviewees said that they regularly checked their position with their insurers, 
and were confident they could get coverage for their exposures. It is this softness in the insurance 
market, driven by capacity, which is further fuelling the perception of the profession having deep 
pockets. That argument is encapsulated by the following corporate partner: 
 
 “The market for us for insurance is still comparatively soft because there is lots of capacity. If 
you were to see a series of big, i.e. more than £100 million, claims come through against big 
law firms, I think the whole situation would change. You would find the market would harden 
really quickly and then it would be you either cap or you don’t get cover. So we are still 
operating in a relatively soft insurance market. But that could all change. It wouldn’t take 
more than a few really big claims to get at that.” EH Corporate 2 
 
How Client Relationships Transfer Risk 
 
Every one of the partners that we interviewed told us that the clients that they are working for are 
increasingly expecting their legal advisers to accept more risk, either through the use of more 
sophisticated outside counsel guidelines, panel arrangements or engagement terms. Some of these 
risk transfers are presented to law firms as non-negotiable, and most partners say that they cannot 
routinely push back on risk transfers being imposed on the profession, though around a quarter of 
the firms spoken to have successfully pushed back on risk transfers in some way. 
 
Some of the terms that firms are being asked to sign up to significantly broaden the scope of their 
engagement with the effect of transferring risk. For example, one COLP reported refusal by a client 
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to sign the firm’s standard engagement terms that set out that the firm was not advising on the tax 
and commercial implications of the transaction in question. The client insisted that tax advice be 
wrapped in to the engagement terms. Another COLP told us that large clients now expect his firm to 
check, as part of the background to ordinary service, whether the client is breaching sanctions by 
making payments: “That is something we are reluctant to do because, of course, this is taking on 
potentially substantial risk” [EH COLP 13]. A third COLP described some American corporations 
insisting that their law firms provide anti-corruption undertakings, and saying that firms will not get 
the work unless they undertake not to assist any individual in the organisation with the breaching of 
the company’s procurement programme. Others talked about clients attempting to pass on some of 
their obligations with regard to anti-bribery or anti-money laundering on to the law firm. 
 
Reliance Letters 
 
One specific issue with regard to risk transfers that was raised by around a quarter of the 20 law 
firms questioned, without our prompting, was the use of reliance letters. These are demanded by 
non-clients of the firm – typically lenders to a firm’s borrower client – and require the firm to permit 
that non-client to rely on the advice given to its client, and accept liability for that advice. The use of 
reliance letters has grown in recent years because they are typically demanded by non-bank lenders, 
such as insurance companies and funds, who have increased in number and become more significant 
market participants since traditional bank lending reduced in the wake of the credit crisis. 
 
Our interviewees tell us they are not comfortable signing such letters, but often have limited ability 
to say no because their borrower clients are under pressure to get their lawyers to do so. For 
example:  
 
“We actually had a situation about three weeks ago with a non-bank lender lending to our 
client, who presented to us two days before the facility was meant to be completed with a 
six-page reliance letter covering both things like money laundering and also the work we had 
done, and giving warranties as to whom we'd spoken, warranties about the advice we'd 
given, not in detail but on what subjects we'd provided advice. We just took one look at it 
and said we're not going to sign it. So they rang the client and said unless your lawyers sign 
this we're not going to give you the money. That's a true story. We went back to their 
lawyers and said, "Did you advise your clients to do that? Unless you assure us that you did 
not, and what's more that you've told them that they can't, we're going to report you", and 
we ended up signing a one-line letter. It's just outrageous the way these people behave, and 
it's getting worse and worse.” EH COLP 1 
 
Some of the US lawyers interviewed pointed out that the practice of giving reliance letters to other 
parties on a transaction is far more widespread in the States and does not give cause for concern. In 
the UK, however, lawyers told us they were worried about their exposure as a result: 
 
“So, for example your client has asked you to do a piece of work and asked you for some 
advice, and wants one of their investors to be able to rely on it. So, they’re trying to extend; 
they want to get more for their money. So, rather than telling investors, ‘You’ve got to assess 
this yourself’ they would like to rely on our advice. And of course we didn’t do the work for 
their investors; we did the work for the client. It’s chipping away and extending the scope of 
the work I think, which is one of the main concerns. And the type of loss which that investor 
may face may be very different from the type of loss that you had in mind when you were 
doing the work advising your own client.” EH corporate 13  
 
 
 
 
71 
There is the potential that where a non-client of the firm is to reply on an opinion or advice given by 
the firm, that non-client may also seek to influence the content of the opinion or advice (i.e. what is 
and is not covered). Here, there is a real risk that the firm may come to accept a duty of care to the 
non-client and for it, as a result, to then become a client of the firm.  
 
Wrapping Liability 
 
One area where we were told that insurance companies have so far been willing to stand behind 
firms is in wrapping liability – that is, the practice of firms coordinating or giving advice with input 
from other law firms (or other advisers) and agreeing to accept liability for the advice or work of that 
other firm. Many of our interviewees told us that they are now regularly expected to wrap liability 
for the work of other firms. Only a very small minority reported pushing back routinely and 
successfully on that requirement, though around half said that they accepted such conditions rarely 
and “tried to resist it”. The following was a typical comment: 
 
“You can’t avoid there being an overseas law firm involved in many transactions, so if we’re 
advising on English law, and we don’t advise, or a part of our firm doesn’t advise, on the 
relevant foreign law, we have to go to somebody else. Unless the client instructs those 
people directly we tend to have to pick up liability. Touch wood, it hasn’t been a major 
problem, but it is at least a theoretical problem.” EH Corporate 9 
 
The COLP at one of the firms that would not accept liability wrapping said: 
 
“I don’t see why we should take responsibility for advice in jurisdictions where we know 
nothing about, you know, about the advice. So no, it would be very rare for us to do that.” 
 US COLP 3 
 
Where the practice of wrapping liability was accepted, most firms were well aware of the risk 
transfer issues that arose as a result, and most reported speaking to their insurers to confirm their 
position. Typically the risk was mitigated through due diligence on the foreign law firm involved, 
with an English-qualified lawyer reviewing things produced by the foreign law firm before passing 
them to the client, and with the use of back-to-back engagement letters. 
 
Only one firm gave an example of a bad experience where something had gone wrong with a third-
party law firm that they had engaged on a deal on a client’s behalf. The client was a large financial 
institution using a panel of legal advisers. The law firm in question had not agreed to accept liability 
for the advice of the foreign law firm, but was nevertheless in the firing line when mistakes were 
made: 
 
“Interestingly when that firm did cock up - this organisation knocked on our door and said 
just to let you know this has all happened, we expect you to indemnify us. They were out of 
pocket by about 150 grand or thereabouts, and we said no. They came back and said ‘well 
look, as a relationship firm we need something,’ and we ended doing a one-off payment to 
them for 20 grand. It's quite clear if we hadn't of done that we wouldn't have been on the 
panel. But it wasn't our liability.” EH Finance 5 
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Indemnities 
 
We asked interviewees in what circumstances their firm might agree to indemnify clients. In a small 
number of cases, we were told that indemnities were not something that clients were requesting, 
though for a majority of firms they were becoming commonplace, and a growing issue. Respondents 
told us that US financial institutions and public sector clients increasingly ask law firms for wide-
ranging indemnities, while most panel terms would include indemnities in bespoke areas such as 
confidentiality and data protection.175 In this regard, the vast majority of the lawyers that we spoke 
to reported pushing back quite hard when asked to sign, particularly wide-ranging, indemnities, but 
many firms were ultimately agreeing to them. As with wrapping liability, a small (and almost 
identical) minority of firms refused outright to sign indemnities. 
 
An interesting question arose around the firms that reported never seeing, and never being asked to 
sign, indemnities. The majority of firms, who say such terms are now widespread in panel 
agreements, suggested that competitors who said they were not seeing them must be inadvertently 
agreeing to indemnity clauses without properly reviewing terms. There was a sense that indemnities 
were unfair: 
 
“So we can have given correct advice. But if the client suffers a loss, we’re still liable. It just 
seems so wrong.” EH COLP 7   
 
Another interviewee explained the range of topics being covered by indemnity clauses: 
 
“One of the other big trends that we’ve noticed is indemnities, and sometimes very wide-
ranging indemnities. That’s relatively new. Essentially some of them are not unreasonable. 
Some of them are, ‘We expect you to indemnify us against any breach by you, the law firm, 
of anti-bribery or corruption rules and regulations’, or, ‘Your breach of someone else’s IP 
rights’ or something like that. Which is kind of a pointless thing to say to a law firm, but fine. 
But when they’re essentially seeking our indemnity in relation to our advice, and any loss 
whatsoever that might flow from that, essentially we’ve become their insurer.”  
EH Conflicts Officer 
 
The lawyers that we spoke to suggested that indemnity clauses may be another example of the 
types of terms being introduced by procurement departments, where legal services providers are 
being treated as akin to other suppliers of goods and services, and therefore being asked to sign 
similar clauses. We were told that insurers do not have a problem with law firms signing up to 
indemnities. Despite this, most firms are trying to resist them, with varying degrees of success: 
 
“One doesn’t like giving indemnities at all.  And we try and argue it’s not necessary, because 
they’ve got the contractual requirement that we provide services to a proper and reasonable 
level. If we don’t, there’ll be a breach of contract, and if we have breached it, then they’ve 
got the PI cover to go against. So we don’t need a primary obligation of an indemnity to 
protect them. It doesn’t go down well with American banks particularly, and particularly XX. 
They accepted our points philosophically, but commercially XX said, ‘We are going to get 
indemnities from everybody.’ And so if we want the work, we give the indemnity.” EH COLP 4 
 
                                                          
175
 See, for example, the indemnities in the government’s Legal Services Framework Agreement: http://ccs-
agreements.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/contracts/rm919  
 
 
 
73 
“Something that I find much more objectionable is the indemnity provisions that [clients] 
insist on, sometimes on a non-negotiable basis. Sometimes we are able to negotiate 
amendments, but it’s just a pure shifting of risk. I find it just unacceptable that the indemnity 
provisions just appear to shift all risk, if you read them literally – and that’s what the contract 
says – it’s just shifting all risk on the project onto us. I can see from a client’s perspective why 
that’s a marvellous idea, because we’ve got deep pockets and a big insurance policy. But it 
doesn’t seem right.” EH COLP 7 
 
“In previous firms I had a much stronger rule to say no, here we tend to think about it and 
quite often do it. I don’t like indemnities but that’s a really quite technical argument. I mean 
the reason why I don’t like them is that they can be broader than what you can be 
responsible for, or they can give you issues with your insurance, they can remove the duty to 
mitigate, all those sorts of things. But I view them more of an ‘also ran’ in the context of the 
issues.” EH COLP 10 
 
“The examples that come to my mind are government contracts, where they tend to have a 
sort of general indemnity for anything that their service provider or their legal service 
provider might cause. I haven’t noticed it so much recently in private sector terms. But 
actually on the government side we have found, once where we’ve got into the position 
where we’ve got terms agreed, they’ll see sense on some of those terms and we’ll manage 
through using compliance as well to get some adjustments to things like that so they are not 
completely immovable.” EH Corporate 5 
 
Most of the partners that we spoke to were uncomfortable with their firm being pushed to give 
indemnities to clients, because of the related exposure, and routinely resisted with varying degrees 
of success. Several seemed relatively dismissive of indemnities as an issue, regarding them as 
routine, particularly in the context of confidentiality or data protection, and several others were 
surprisingly relaxed about signing them. 
 
As a procedural point, most firms expect partners to refer decisions on the signing of indemnities up 
a chain of command within the business, typically going first to the COLP and/or risk team, and then 
often elevating acceptance of an indemnity up to a committee of partners tasked with taking such 
decisions. Still, as with other areas of outside counsel terms, most law firms admit there remains 
potential for individual partners to sign up to indemnities, either without realising they are doing so, 
or without involving other members of the firm in the decision-making process. 
 
Capping Liability 
 
All of the firms that we interviewed include limits on liability in their standard engagement terms. 
Equally all reported pushback on caps, most notably from financial institutions and government 
bodies. These purchasers of legal services typically refuse all caps on liability. We were told that 
other clients are more willing to accept caps and, as such, many firms still do a majority of their work 
on some sort of capped basis. 
 
Most interviewees felt that the refusal by the banks to allow law firms and individual partners to 
impose caps on their liability, particularly on very large transactions, was unfair: 
 
“One of the things obviously is that sometimes we’re dealing with some pretty chunky 
transactions. So when you’re dealing with something, we closed one the other day which was 
£[X-hundred million]. So its big numbers and they’re significant enough numbers that if you 
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make a world-class whoopsie in your documents or whatever, it would have implications for 
the wider firm because the PI cover doesn’t go that far.” EH Finance 1 
 
“The typical thing of banks is that they never want your cap on liability. And that is quite an 
aggressive position to take. But they demand it and they always get it. So on the scale of sort 
of risks that you might be exposed to as a law firm, which the SRA is keen to know about, 
that is quite a big risk. Obviously if you’re talking about huge cases where the sort of 
headline figures may be billions, that is quite a major risk to absorb.” EH COLP 3 
 
“I think [not allowing] limits on liability are completely unfair. Those directors in banks we 
know were not putting any of their money at risk when they were behaving in an entirely 
reckless fashion. So why should my assets, my personal assets, be at risk? And not just in 
relation to limits on liability, but I think I find even more offensive, their lack of engagement 
in ‘sue the firm, not the individual’ type provisions that we would have in our limits. At times 
you can get them to see reason on stuff like that; but their general position is, ‘We don’t 
accept limits on liability, and this is a limit on liability’.” EH Finance 8  
 
Some partners at law firms believe that caps on liability are a hard argument for law firms to run, 
given that it can be seen as an admission that mistakes may be made. But others draw the 
comparison with the accounting firms, where it is routinely accepted that the Big Four will be able to 
cap their liability on transactions176: 
 
“I wouldn't bother a UK clearer asking about caps on liability now, I just wouldn't bother, I 
probably haven't asked for the last three/four years. It's clearly ridiculous on a transaction to 
have no liability cap. They can't say it's that important because if it was they'd insist the 
accountancy firms do it.” EH Finance 5 
 
The fact that large accounting firms are able to work with capped liability gives rise to debates about 
apportioning liability, because in an uncapped environment law firms and accounting firms would 
both pick up their fair shares of liability should anything go wrong on a deal where both could be 
blamed. But if accounting firms have been able to agree a cap on a transaction, and law firms have 
been unable to do so, clients have often insisted that law firms pick up all the responsibility, 
including the accounting firm’s liability above and beyond the firm’s cap, in a situation where both 
were liable. A number of firms told us they included proportionate liability clauses in their terms to 
counter such arguments, but that clients resisted them. One said:  
 
“We have a proportionate liability clause in our agreements. Now some clients resist that.  
And I actually get very tough with them about it. In fact I said to one client, ‘I’ll tell you what, 
you write me a memorandum explaining why that’s fair, and if you succeed, I’ll agree it.’ And 
in the end they said, ‘Alright,’ and they’d accept it.” EH Corporate 14 
 
A couple of law firms raised similar issues with regard to instructions that they accept from 
syndicates of banks, where one of the banks in the syndicate has a panel relationship with the firm 
and has refused a cap on liability. While the syndicate terms may allow for a cap on liability, that one 
bank with the broader relationship will continue to insist that it has a side arrangement whereby the 
law firm’s liability is uncapped. Two partners, from the firms that raised the syndication issue with 
us, commented as follows:  
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 The British Venture Capital Association (BVCA), for example, signed a memorandum of understanding in 
1998 with the then Big Five accounting firms that allowed for them to cap liability on private equity deals, with 
£25 million the agreed cap on deals worth more than £55 million. 
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“That creates difficulties, because if we’re advising the syndicate, do we have to tell them 
that there’s a sort of a side arrangements with one of the banks that actually, yeah, our 
liability to them is unlimited, because of the panel terms, notwithstanding the fact that the 
syndication agreement says that it is on a limited basis.” EH COLP 4 
 
A “What we are trying to do is come to an arrangement with bank A unilaterally, to 
say that ‘We will limit our liability to all four of you on the face of the report. But for 
you, Bank 1, it’s a matter of a separate contracting arrangement between just you 
and us, and if there were to be a problem then we would treat you as uncapped.’ 
Q And the other three banks know about that? 
A No.” EH Finance 3 
 
IDENTIFYING, MONITORING AND MITIGATING TRANSFERS OF RISK 
 
While our conversations demonstrate some evidence of a build-up of risk in the legal profession, 
particularly as a result of the financial services industry focusing attention on its own risk 
management and mitigation, we also found firms growing more sophisticated in their own methods 
of risk identification and management. 
 
Lawyers tended to describe their firm’s ability to identify, monitor and mitigate risks arising from 
client relationships as good, or at least sufficient. That they would be so positive is perhaps 
unsurprising. Most rated their firm’s willingness to accept risk and liability transfers sought by clients 
as medium to low (although one might argue that our findings demonstrate otherwise), but noted 
that their ability to stand up to client demands was sometimes challenged by clients saying the firm 
would not get the work if it did not agree to certain terms.  
 
Critically, all firms were able to demonstrate new and constantly evolving methods for identifying 
and mitigating risk transfers, usually through client acceptance processes that had been developed 
in recent years and were becoming increasingly sophisticated. Most firms were cognisant of room 
for improvement, and significant areas of risk remaining and arising from client pressure, with this 
partner’s response being typical: 
 
“I think there are specific areas where there are processes in place for doing that, for 
example reviewing terms and conditions. So, provided people follow those processes the risks 
there can be mitigated. But I think more generally, because of business pressures, there are 
some risks of powerful clients dictating terms to us. And I don’t think the firm is very good at 
managing that because that requires you to make long-term decisions, and the outcomes 
will affect some partners adversely and benefit others. And that is something that I think 
firms aren’t very good at managing. I think that requires quite a lot of senior management 
involvement, because you both need to make the decision but also mitigate the effects of 
that with the partners that have lost out. And as I say, I don’t think this firm is very good at 
doing that at all.” EH Corporate 13 
 
The mitigation of the risks set out in this chapter was most typically achieved through better 
processes for reviewing and monitoring client terms; for referring terms on liability caps, liability 
wrapping and indemnities to specifically-tasked people within the organisation; and for recording 
terms accepted in prior arrangements. 
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When considering more general transfers of risk, mitigation typically focuses on better scoping of 
law firm obligations (i.e. narrowing the scope of engagement), and resultant liabilities. This is an area 
where nearly all firms told us they were working hard to up their game: 
 
“You apply different limitations onto the scale and you look very carefully at what it is you 
want to expose yourself to from a liability perspective. This is a difficult one – it is a fine 
balance between clients feeling that their lawyers are trying to just sort of limit all their 
liability because at the end of the day we are paid very well to identify risk for them. But at 
the same time, if you are being asked to do something very quickly for which you are not 
being paid a great deal of money, you need to be very careful about describing what it is that 
you’ve done. I’ll give you a very simple example. A client might have an annual report or 
prospectus or some kind of public document that it is going to send out and it is fifty pages 
long. They ping it to you and they say, ‘I’ve just got a couple of specific questions in relation 
to that statement on page 13 and are we able to say what we are saying on page 25?’ Now, 
unless you are very clear that you have not read the rest of the document and that you are 
not advising on the rest of the document, there could be a risk that if there was something 
else in there that you had not read, they could come back afterwards and say, well come on, 
you’re a highly paid, sophisticated law firm, you ought to have read the whole thing, surely, 
and pointed out any risks to me? Notwithstanding the fact that is not what they specifically 
asked you to do when they sent it to you. And there are clients out there who will take 
advantage of that kind of event if it was to happen.” EH Corporate 3 
 
“I’m thinking of one instance where, either in the engagement letter, or the partner 
concerned saw the issue arising and said “You know there is a big, big area here we’re not 
advising on it, we assume you’re getting help from insert name here, but you need to.” And 
that was one of 10,000 emails sent on the file, but was critical when push came to shove.” EH 
Finance 2 
 
“If a client comes up to you and says ‘we've got this really complicated lease unwind and we 
want you to cap your fees to confirm whether we can or can't at £3,000 or whatever,’ I'm 
afraid to say we have historically taken that sort of responsibility, which is crazy. So we're 
more and more aware of the fact that if a client comes up to us and says they want to cap 
the fees, we're very clear about the fine scope and very clear about limitation of liability.” EH 
COLP 2 
 
OUR CONCLUSIONS 
 
The picture painted by this chapter is relatively clear: we find an increase in risks accepted by firms, 
on an individual and systemic basis, with some (but not many) firms being robust in their push back 
against these practices. While this is interesting, it is perfectly possible to see these changes as 
simply an allocation, or reallocation, of power and risk between sophisticated parties – a matter of 
contract and negotiation (which in turn shapes the nature and extent of tortious obligations). As 
such, the developments in risk transfer of which we were made aware would be of no proper 
regulatory interest to the SRA (and might instead be better taken forward by the relevant 
representative bodies). However, we think there is an equally valid argument that sets out that 
these risk transfer practices operate to build up systemic risk in the legal profession,177 which could, 
in due course, lead to significant liability, the risk of law firm collapse, and a resultant undermining of 
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 There is, somewhat surprisingly, little literature on systemic risk in the legal profession. A number of 
commentators have looked at the role of law firms in relation to systemic risk in financial services sector, but 
not on systemic risk per se in the legal profession. This is, perhaps, worthy of further exploration.  
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the strength of the profession (in terms of brand and perception) on the international stage. Equally, 
one might frame these practices in the context of Principle 8 of the SRA Handbook and question the 
extent to which firms are engaging in sound and effective financial and risk management. It might be 
thought irresponsible for a firm to act on a matter which could give rise to liability greater than the 
firm could sustain, unless the firm also caps such liability at the amount of its insurance (or lower).178 
 
Finally, we were struck, in our interviews, by the role of the insurance sector in these matters and 
the seeming willingness of those insurers to accept their insureds taking on a variety of forms of 
potential liability. We would suggest that this is worthy of further exploration.  
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 We are aware that Bar associations in New South Wales and Western Australia encourage firms to 
participate in schemes which cap liability at AUS $10m. 
CHAPTER 6 – THE (INITIAL) VIEW FROM IN-HOUSE 
LAWYERS AT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Having concluded our extensive interview process with private practice partners and COLPs, we felt 
it important to seek out an in-house perspective on the issues raised by our interviewees. As a 
result, with the support of the SRA, a meeting with five (in total) general counsel and other senior in-
house lawyers was convened, all of whom worked at major financial institutions, to discuss our 
topics of independence, representation and risk on a non-attributable basis during a two-hour 
meeting at the start of May 2015. What follows is a summary of that conversation. 
 
We conducted our research among private practice lawyers in a structured and comprehensive way 
(as set out in the Executive Summary and Appendix 2), so as to satisfy ourselves that those 
interviewed represented a good sample of opinion within the cohort of large law firms in which we 
were interested. This section on in-house lawyers is not intended in any way to offer up a 
comparable representation of in-house counsel views. Instead, we hoped to elicit a small sample of 
views on our key themes; to give general counsel room to respond to some of the issues raised by 
private practice lawyers; and to open a dialogue with a section of the in-house community that the 
SRA may wish to broaden and continue. 
 
OUR FINDINGS 
 
As a general point, the general counsel and senior in-house lawyers were grateful to have been 
invited to participate in the process and were keen to put forward their views on the issues under 
discussion. It was noted that the number of lawyers now practising in house has increased, and that 
the SRA Handbook in its current form does not necessarily take that into consideration. We would 
agree. As presently framed, the Handbook sets out, at the end of each chapter, different outcomes 
that apply to the in-house community. However, the core Principles, and associated guidance, does 
not account for any differences between those employed in-house and those in private practice.179 
The significant shift in the number of in-house lawyers in the last decade (a doubling of numbers 
between 2002 and 2012) may well be sufficient justification for the current approach in the 
Handbook to be revisited. The vast majority of in-house solicitors (60%) work in the private sector 
and are most concentrated in the financial services sector.180 
 
Engaging External Advisers 
 
All attendees at the roundtable worked at financial institutions, but not all used panels to manage 
relationships with external legal advisers. All accepted that the terms of engagement that they now 
expect law firms to sign up to on receipt of instructions have become lengthier, but they did not see 
that as an issue. Nor did they think it an issue that private practice lawyers felt there was little room 
to negotiate on the terms of business. One lawyer present said: “We have standard contract terms, 
have these master agreements; why should we deviate from that?” 
 
Panels have been used to reduce costs and institutionalise relationships between financial 
institutions and their advisers: “We now have a panel, and we have maybe had it four years,” said 
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 Slaughter and May have published an in-house lawyer guide to the SRA Handbook, which has the backing of 
the GC100. See: http://slaughterandmay.com/media/1805055/sra-handbook-2011-in-house-lawyer-guide.pdf  
180
 Oxera, ‘The Role of In-House Solicitors’ (February 2014), 22. 32% of 1,037 in-house respondents to an 
online survey said they worked in financial services.  
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one attendee. “We have found we have generated significant savings. In the last five years we have 
been cutting costs, and rather than cutting people from our teams, where we can really generate 
more savings is on some of those relationships. Ten years ago the relationship was at desk level; now 
we institutionalise the relationships, and we have more pulling power through that.” 
 
Alongside the pressure to cut costs, in-house lawyers told us their role is increasingly focused on 
managing risk for their employer, rather than executing transactions, and this has changed the 
relationship with external counsel. “The in-house world has moved into a very different direction 
over the last five or six years, which is more about risk management,” said one lawyer present. “The 
job of in-house lawyers is very different to what it was seven or eight years ago. Our job is risk 
management: legal, compliance, reputational and other risk management. The role of external 
counsel has changed too, and has to change, not necessarily as fast as we have. Through this 
institutionalisation of relationships, what we expect from external counsel, and why we can’t have 
hundreds of firms, is that we expect risk management from them too. They need to understand our 
risks and our appetite for risk – which, by the way, is moving – and be able to manage it.” 
 
This focus on managing risk, reducing cost, and institutionalising relationships leads to the greater 
use of panels: “When you link this risk management with the savings we are all trying to achieve,” an 
attendee said, “Then we have to have very clear relationships with outside counsel, we have to give 
them processes, clear guidelines on our legal risk appetite, and every other type of risk, for the bank 
or the desk, at any point in time, and get some value for that. They haven’t changed their models 
and they should be. Law firms are stuck in the twentieth century.” 
 
It was further explained that legal departments, at the five banks represented, now no longer sit 
within investment banking, but are instead part of the central corporate function, alongside IT, HR, 
Compliance and other non-fee generating teams. That changes the dynamic of engaging external law 
firms, and removes some of that power from general counsel: “Traditionally it’s been general 
counsel deciding what happens in relationships; now it’s more legal COOs [Chief Operating Officers] 
who, in terms of cost, make those decisions on fee arrangements etc,” said one attendee. 
 
Influencing Representation 
 
The representatives of financial institutions that were present felt strongly that their legal advisers 
should not be permitted to sue them on behalf of other clients, and their terms of engagement 
include no-litigation clauses. One said: “We don’t allow panel firms to sue us, they know that if they 
do it will have an effect. That’s why at the end of the day there are bank firms and then non-bank 
firms.” 
 
Those present had very limited experience of being on the receiving end of lawsuits, and when those 
had occurred, they had ordinarily involved employment matters – handled by niche employment law 
firms. Some had seen litigation boutiques on the other side of non-employment lawsuits, but there 
was no consensus on the quality or availability of alternative advisers that could, should they wish 
to, sue banks on behalf of clients. 
 
The in-house counsel did not make use of wider conflict clauses that suggest their advisers should 
not act against their commercial interests, arguing instead that it is useful to have advisers with 
experience of working for other players in the market. One said: “All those firms act on transactions 
on the other side, it’s helpful when they do so. Often they take very aggressive positions, and I don’t 
think we would take a view that they shouldn’t.” Another added: “One of the benefits of going to 
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outside counsel is that you get the market view, so you need them to be acting for buy-side firms as 
well as sell-side firms; it’s helpful.” 
 
Independence 
 
We asked in-house lawyers to define what they expected in terms of professional independence 
from their advisers, and they struggled to articulate their expectations. Separately, however, when 
discussing how non-panel firms might start to get work from the bank, one general counsel said: 
“We tell firms that if we see a firm acting for an issuer on a particular transaction across from us, and 
we like the work that you do, and you don’t behave in a way that’s going to upset us, then we are 
more likely to use you as our counsel next time around. We are very open with law firms trying to 
get into the tent, we say start off by not acting unreasonably when you’re in a position against us.” 
This line of argument, which went unchallenged by other roundtable participants, might require law 
firms seeking to win work by such means to consider whether they are acting in the best interests of 
their client in those circumstances. This possibility was not raised by our law firm interviewees.  
 
With regard to the other matters raised by private practice lawyers in the context of independence, 
the in-house roundtable lawyers told us that they like to receive opinions in standard format, and 
they like to be able to discuss them. “It doesn’t feel wrong to push it and make sure they have gone 
as far as they can,” said one lawyer. The use of opinions committees at some law firms was raised as 
a mitigating factor employed to prevent lawyers giving opinions that the firm did not support. 
 
As with private practice lawyers, we asked the in-house lawyers if there were any situations that 
they had come across where they had concerns about independence. Without prompting from us, 
the one issue that was raised was that of ‘shadow clients’ (our term) and third-party appointers. One 
said: “There are some situations that worry me on the independence side, for example in leveraged 
finance, where the sponsor says all the banks are going to use X, for example. We have all the 
bidding banks with different interests required to use a law firm, and I think there’s a question of 
independence. You have sometimes got the option to appoint your own counsel, but usually that’s 
either not possible from a cost perspective, or sometimes you are just discouraged from doing so in 
any event by the sponsor. I don’t think that happens often, and I don’t think it’s a massive problem, 
but elements of the way the market works – where certain parties to transactions have a lot of 
power and tell the rest of the parties how it’s going to work, including respective counsel – do cause 
concern.” 
 
The concept of the law firm acting as “structuring counsel”, before the banks are brought in, was 
raised, and the way in which the decision was taken subsequently on who the firm would act for, 
whether borrower-side or lender, should be “monitored pretty carefully”, we were told. 
 
Risk Transfers 
 
Finally, we asked the roundtable attendees about risk transfers, and particularly the issues of 
wrapping liability, indemnities, and liability caps. Those present did occasionally, but not always, ask 
their law firms to accept liability for the advice of third-party law firms on transactions. They did not 
use indemnities in their standard terms (or were not aware of them if they did).  
 
They all felt strongly that law firms should not be able to cap their liability, and further pushed back 
hard on firms trying to introduce liability caps under the radar, for example by sending engagement 
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letters midway through deals that included caps on liability.181 The consensus view was best 
summarised by this comment: “Why shouldn’t lawyers stand behind their advice? We can’t cap our 
liability, so we turn and say, ‘Why should they?’”  
                                                          
181
 We believe that, in the US, practice varies between States as to whether law firms are permitted to cap 
their liability. This document provides a short overview: 
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0065/materials/pp8.pdf  
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APPENDIX 1 – THE TOPIC GUIDE 
The below interview topic guide sets out the wide range of matters of interest to the SRA as a series of 
questions and prompts. Not all issues were discussed in all interviews and, as is common in interviews of this 
nature, new issues not considered below which were raised by our interviewees were then rolled forward to 
future interviews. We have put asterisks at the end of the questions that the SRA asked us to prioritise. 
A. BACKGROUND & INTRODUCTIONS 
B. YOU AND YOUR FIRM 
• What is your main practice area?  
• How long have you been in practice?  
• How long have you practised at the firm? 
• Are panel relationships with clients significant to your practice, or firm? 
• Which of the following best describes your firm - "English heritage", "US heritage", "English/US 
heritage"  
C. CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS 
• What sorts of requests do clients make of you that may impact your professional obligations? 
What professional obligations are affected? *** 
o What about your duties not to allow your independence to be compromised; to treat all 
clients fairly; to act with integrity; to uphold the rule of law?  
• How have client requests and their impact on professional obligations changed over your time in 
practice? What factors do you think have influenced this change? *** 
o  International competition; emphasis on client service; greater use of panels; use of client 
procurement functions to engage external lawyers; growth of in house legal departments; 
client pressure to reduce legal costs; firm pressure to maximise billings; growth of merit 
based partner compensation systems; other?  
• Do particular types of client make particularly challenging requests? *** 
o  Banks; PE houses; corporate clients in particular sectors; US clients; Other?  
• Where your firm has a panel relationship with a client is it easier or harder to manage risks arising 
from that client relationship? *** 
• Where your firm manages a client relationship through a client relationship partner (or team) is it 
easier or harder to manage risks arising from that client relationship? *** 
o Do you think your client relationship partners are effective at mitigating the risk that 
incentives to preserve and develop the client relationship adversely impact professional 
obligations? Is this risk monitored by the firm?  
o How often do clients or client relationship partners say “this is a relationship issue”? How 
do you or your colleagues respond when client relationships impact professional 
obligations? 
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o Do you ever act "opposite" panel or other clients? How does this affect your independence 
or approach? 
• Have you ever felt uncomfortable about the closeness of the relationship between a competitor 
firm or a peer and their client? Why? *** 
o If possible, please provide examples. 
• Have you ever felt uncomfortable about the closeness of the relationship between your firm or 
colleague and a client of your firm? Why? *** 
o If possible, please provide examples. 
D.           PRESERVING PROFESSIONALISM   
• What does "professional independence" mean to you?  
o Do you -  and do you think your clients - expect lawyers to have "independence of mind" 
and "in appearance" including from their clients? 
  o Has this changed during your time in practice? How? 
• Have you ever witnessed a non lawyer or lawyer employed by a client putting pressure on his/her 
in house or external lawyers?  
o To take a course of action you thought conflicted with professional obligations? To take 
legal or other risk you thought imprudent?  Please expand 
• Have you ever been in a situation where you thought the individual instructing you was not acting 
in the best interests of the client, or unethically? 
o What did you do? 
o Did you escalate it to another person higher up in the client's organisation? If so, how was 
that received? 
• How does your firm support its lawyers when professional duties require them to act against a 
client's or the firm's interests, e.g. to turn work away or cease to act? *** 
o Has this ever happened to you or a colleague? 
• Do you think your firm has effective systems and controls in place to identify and mitigate risks 
arising from client pressure on fee earners at all levels across the firm? *** 
o What are these systems and controls? 
• Do you think that the SRA is effective at regulating professionalism and ensuring lawyers at large 
law firms retain their professional independence from their clients and their firms?  
• Do you think that the SRA is effective at regulating professionalism and ensuring in house lawyers 
retain their professional independence from their employers? 
o How could the SRA be more effective in these regards? 
o Have you ever considered reporting misconduct to the SRA? If you decided not to report it, 
why? 
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• In what circumstances do you think a lawyer should "whistle-blow" either "up" or "out" of his or 
her organisation? 
o To avert serious harm to a client's shareholders, for example?  
• If you encounter malfeasance or misconduct by a client how do you ensure the appropriate person 
in the client organisation is made aware - especially where you are concerned that the person 
instructing you may not be acting properly? 
• If your duties to your client come into conflict with other professional duties which takes 
precedence?  
o Under the SRA's 2011 Code of Conduct the principle that best serves the public interest in 
the particular circumstances takes precedence. Do you agree with this principle?  
o Do you think your clients are familiar with and would agree with this principle? 
E.            RISKS ARISING UNDER OUTSIDE COUNSEL GUIDELINES ("OCGs") /TERMS OF 
ENGAGEMENT MANDATED BY CLIENTS 
• Have clients ever asked you to agree their OCGs or Relationship Agreements or other terms of 
engagement (each "Client Terms") without (or with limited) negotiation? *** 
o If so, how often does this happen and with what types of client? 
o What terms cause you anxiety? 
• Do you have a process for vetting/approving Client Terms or do individual partners have the 
discretion to agree them? *** 
o Are you aware of partners trying to circumvent these processes when trying to "win" 
work?  
o Do you periodically review and compare Client Terms across the firm? 
• Can you give examples of particularly problematic provisions in Client Terms? *** 
o Do Clients Terms transfer risk or liability to your firm? 
• Do you ever contact your insurers about provisions in Client Terms? If so, how often? What do 
they say when you contact them? 
o Have you ever discovered that Client Terms exposed the firm to potential liability of which 
you were unaware? 
• Do Client Terms impact duties to other clients? *** 
o Do clients ask you to take secondees for example? How do you protect the confidential 
information of your other clients when you take in client secondees? 
o Do clients ask to audit your IT systems? Do you allow it? How do you protect the 
confidential information of other clients? 
o Do clients ask you to complete security questionnaires? Who completes them? Would 
some of those questions, if answered, compromise security? 
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• Do you think that clients make tougher demands of firms when it comes to conflicts of interest 
than are demanded by professional rules and the law? 
• When a client or potential client seeks to bar your firm from taking any adversarial position against 
it, or from acting for its competitors, how do you respond to these "client controls"?  *** 
• Are you aware of any situation in which an SME, financial market counterparty, or individual in a 
regulatory investigation has been unable to secure legal representation with sufficient standing or 
resources as a consequence of these "client controls"? *** 
F. MITIGATING LIABILITY 
• Where your firm is coordinating or giving advice with input from another law firm do you ever 
agree to accept liability for the advice or work of that firm? *** 
o If so, how do you mitigate the risk of potential liability?  
 In what circumstances does your firm agree to indemnify clients? *** 
o Which types of client request indemnities?  
o In what context/types of work? 
o Would your firm agree to indemnify a client in respect of negligence?  
• If your firm were instructed to review a large volume of documents, and the client asked for the 
review to be limited because of cost or time constraints, what would you do? 
o Would you seek to cap the firm's liability?  
o Where you are not able to cap liability how do you mitigate the risk of potential liability?  
• How would you rate your firm's ability to indentify, monitor and mitigate risks arising from client 
relationships - good, sufficient, poor? *** 
o Why? 
o How do you think this compares with your competitors? 
• How would you rate your firm's willingness to accept risk and liability transfers sought by clients - 
high, medium, low? *** 
o Why? 
o How do you think this compares with your competitors?  
• How often do you need to contact your insurers about indemnities sought by clients or other client 
risk transfer mechanisms? What do they say when you do contact them?  
• How do you think clients' and firms' attitudes to risk and liability transfer have changed during 
your time in practice? Does this cause you concern? *** 
G. SUMMING UP  
• Are there any other comments that you would like to make? Are there other questions you think 
we should be asking?
APPENDIX 2 – METHODOLOGY 
The interest of the SRA, because of the concerns shared with it, lies for this project in large law firms 
conducting significant non-reserved legal services through their corporate and finance practices. To 
be clear, this is not to say that the SRA is not also interested in professional standards in other areas 
of the legal services sector.   
Our starting point for this project was the cohort constituting the 196 firms that the SRA then 
categorised as ‘High Impact’ firms.182 Under the SRA's risk scoring methodology, ‘High Impact’ firms 
present the greatest ‘impact’ risk because they are the most significant legal services businesses 
regulated by the SRA. Whether a firm is ranked as ‘High Impact’, and where it appears in the SRA's 
ranking changes from time to time and depends on various factors: the firm's gross fees from 
regulated activities undertaken from offices in England & Wales ("turnover"); and the number of 
SRA-regulated professionals working at the firm being the most significant.  
At the time the project was initiated, the SRA’s ‘High Impact’ cohort comprised a wide variety of 
firms and ABSs. Some of these firms conduct little or no international corporate or finance work (for 
example, large personal injury practices).To narrow the cohort, we took data from Chambers & 
Partners, a directory of leading law firms, to identify firms from the initial list of 196 ‘High Impact’ 
practices that are regarded as leaders in the field of either corporate and/or finance work.  
Our use of Chambers & Partners led to a population of 40 English or English heritage firms (‘EH’ 
firms) and 22 US/US heritage firms (‘US’ firms). Some of the US firms did not appear in the SRA’s 
‘High Impact’ list, but were ranked highly for corporate and/or finance work by Chambers & 
Partners. As one of the SRA’s research interests was the potential difference between UK and US 
firms, these US firms were added in to our population and form part of the total of 20 firms 
interviewed.  
Each list, of 40 EH firms and 22 US firms, was put into alphabetical order. We then used a random 
sequence generator to create two random sequences: one sequence for the numbers 1-40; and the 
second sequence for the numbers 1-22. We then approached the first 15 EH firms from the first 
random sequence (i.e. if ‘17’ was the first random number in the first random sequence, we 
contacted the firm at number 17 on our EH list, and then moved on to the second random number in 
the sequence). Where a firm declined to participate in the research, we moved down the random 
sequence until we had reached 15 participant UK firms. The same approach was taken to derive at a 
sample of five US firms. In total, we approached 37 firms with a request to participate; of which 17 
failed to reply or declined to participate (for a variety of reasons). This is a high response rate and 
reflects, we would suggest, the importance firms placed on the subjects under discussion.183 Ethical 
approval for the project was given by the University of Birmingham.  
We worked with the SRA and several members of the ERG to design an interview questionnaire that 
set out the topics of interest to the regulator. This is attached as Appendix 1 to this report. The 
questionnaire is broad and deep: after an initial set of interviews, it became clear that we would not 
be able to cover all the questions in all of the interviews. Given this, we asked the SRA to highlight to 
us those questions of most importance. We then took forward those prioritised questions – and set 
out our data on them in this report – and additionally raised with our interviewees as many of the 
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 The initial cohort comprised 203 High Impact firms but some of these firms closed between the start and 
finish of this research project. 
183
 In the social sciences, a response rate about 50% is considered very good indeed. See: Yehuda Baruch and 
Brooks C. Holtom, ‘Survey response rate levels and trends in organizational research’ (2008) Human Relations 
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other matters as was possible in the time. We were also keen to give interviewees the time and 
space to raise any concerns of their own not raised via the topic guide. We then took those new 
issues forward with other interviewees. 
In total, 53 interviews were conducted. Of these, 11 interviews were conducted by Claire and Steven 
together; a further seven by Steven; and the remaining 35 by Claire. The longest lasted 63 minutes 
and the shortest 36 minutes. The vast majority were between 45 and 55 minutes long. In terms of 
interviewees, we talked to: 
 EH COLPS = 13 
 EH Conflicts Officer = 1 
 US COLPS = 5 
 EH Corporate Partners = 15 
 US Corporate Partners = 2 
 EH Finance Partners = 12 
 US Finance Partners = 4 
 US Litigation Partner = 1 
The interviews were anonymous. The SRA did not, and does not, know which law firms we contacted 
and/or which partners, COLPs and others participated. This report uses identifiers (‘EH Corporate 6’, 
for example) when we quote from the interviews, which were professionally transcribed and then 
redacted, to give the reader a sense of the breadth of comments we received.184 We had, in total, 
almost 1,000 pages of transcribed data. The transcriptions are held on a password-protected 
network drive at the University of Birmingham that is only accessible on campus. The original audio 
files have now been destroyed.  
 
                                                          
184
 We have conducted some very light editing of some of the quotes to make them more readable and/or to 
remove certain sympathetic circularities and/or to avoid interviewees being potentially identified. 
